tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-90234172024-03-18T04:48:45.487-05:00This Is Your Captain SpeakingThe secret life behind the cockpit door. Rob Graves, an airline Captain, betrays the profession telling all the details of what it's like to be an airline pilot from dodging thunderstorms to life in hotels.The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.comBlogger206125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-810140845066039152022-02-06T16:39:00.004-06:002022-02-06T16:42:33.448-06:00Aviation vs 5G Telecoms: Bring Popcorn for this Food Fight<p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjbW08ItbfOosgwelBZA-2WXPrVuW4rN3zlWiyhJRLAspK2GytayIMh5EwOAStwVw2tzbYC4UUPuPs9dly40CTxr-6Qgw2A2-JNzNAcGG93GVfIoykvZKc_s2DWmGO2cfdgrFIUEt9u-CvOtnt8O6qGv6SRYlMPdDuaFeoLykusQsUQ78xoHA=s2709" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2709" data-original-width="2709" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjbW08ItbfOosgwelBZA-2WXPrVuW4rN3zlWiyhJRLAspK2GytayIMh5EwOAStwVw2tzbYC4UUPuPs9dly40CTxr-6Qgw2A2-JNzNAcGG93GVfIoykvZKc_s2DWmGO2cfdgrFIUEt9u-CvOtnt8O6qGv6SRYlMPdDuaFeoLykusQsUQ78xoHA=s320" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><p>There has been a fair amount of ink spilt documenting the battle between the aviation and telecom industries over the issue of 5G deployment and the threat of electronic interference with aviation safety systems. There are literally billions of dollars of telecom investment lined up against the threat of massive disruptions in the national airspace system, the airlines, and cargo airline supply chains. Fronting for the telecom and airline industries are two old growth government alphabet agencies, the FCC and FAA respectively.</p><p>The FCC is an independent agency charged with regulating the nation's electronic spectrum. The FAA, organized under the Department of Transportation, regulates the nation's airspace and airlines. Also lined up in their respective corners are two industry trade groups, 5G Americas representing the telecom companies, and Airlines for America (A4A) representing the airlines. It is in this arena that this drama is being played.</p><p>At issue is whether newly implemented 5G transmissions will adversely affect radio altimeters on commercial aircraft. Radio altimeters use radio transmissions to determine precise aircraft altitude when an aircraft is close to the ground. They are much more accurate than classic barometric altimeters and are therefore used during low visibility approaches where precise measurement is needed. A number of other systems including thrust reversers, terrain avoidance systems, and windshear avoidance systems use the data from the radio altimeters to function properly. The loss, therefore, of the radio altimeter will invalidate all low visibility approaches which in effect takes us back to the 1970s for landing in fog, snow, or rain.</p><p>The electronic details are mundane. 5G transmissions are in the C-band spectrum which is adjacent to that which radio altimeters use. The fear is that the high power 5G transmissions will bleed over and disrupt the altimeters. Partisans who point out that the Europeans and others haven't experienced any 5G interference issues neglect to note that the European C-band deployment is different than US C-band, and has a larger frequency buffer. The question remains though of how much interference actually exists and whether safety would be potentially compromised by 5G interference.</p><p>Airline passengers should rest easy. The FAA, for all its faults, will not let airline safety be compromised. Yes, I hear you laughing after the 737 MAX debacle, but consider that the aircraft certification and operations branches are effectively separate organizations. But also, as a result of that incident, the FAA is now hyper-sensitive to any perceived laxity towards safety. The operations side is obsessively conservative and has already issued multiple airworthiness directives forbidding the use of any low visibility approaches requiring the use of the radio altimeter in the presence of 5G towers. One might even surmise that the new directives are overly conservative in order to compel diversions which would bolster the political case the FAA is attempting to make.</p><p><b>How Did We Get Here?</b></p><p>Cock-ups of this magnitude, pitting US industrial sectors along with their regulatory watchdogs against one another, are rare. The FAA has published a timeline of events from their perspective stating that the alarm had been sounded multiple times dating back to 2015. For their part, 5G Americas, in a white paper, states that a working group studying the issue took these concerns into account and yet did not reach any consensus and therefore did not submit any technical reports nor recommendations to the FCC. My personal guess is that even if the senior leaders in either the FCC or the telecoms had even been briefed about a potential problem, which seems unlikely, the thought of billions of dollars of revenue from spectrum sales or 5G deployment easily diverted their attention.</p><p><b>Claiming the Moral High Ground</b></p><p>At this point the lines have been drawn and each side is playing for keeps. The telecoms are unlikely to back down from their 5G deployment after spending billions for the spectrum, hardware, and marketing costs. The AT&T girl doesn't work for free after all. The telecoms claim that the aviation sector botched their chance at any input and are now whining after the fact.</p><p>The aviation sector will of course roll out the safety card. They will also try to make the case that it is the telecoms who are the interlopers in an already stable and established system. And as day follows night, this entire fight will likely end up revolving around money. This is where it gets interesting.</p><p>One need only take a peek at the market caps of the telecoms versus the airlines to see where the 800 pound gorillas reside. The combined market caps of AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile, the big players in this episode, come to about $549B. The big four airlines (AA, UA, DL, SW) tote up to a whopping $75B. UPS and FedEx add another $244B but only a fraction of their operations are impacted. My guess is that the telecoms are better positioned to make more "friends" in the administration and Congress.</p><p>The current administration would love nothing better than for this mess to go away as both of the agencies in question belong to the executive branch. It is just not a good look; though each party will waste no time in blaming the other for the mess.</p><p><b>Pay the Man and Move On</b></p><p>The denouement of this melodrama will undoubtedly consist of part engineering solutions, such as adjusting the power output or orientation of the 5G towers. However, it may well include more costly fixes such as replacing current radar altimeters with updated models employing filtering to reject 5G interference. The airlines will likely attempt, and fail, to get the telecoms to pay for these upgrades. In any event, the entertainment will be worth the price of admission.</p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="font-size: medium;">Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 30 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at <a href="http://robertgraves.com">robertgraves.com</a>.</span></i></p>The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-71251659774370018632021-07-01T20:31:00.000-05:002021-07-01T20:31:38.138-05:00The Lost Christmas Trees of the Strategic Air Command<p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwQSLSgfwWXz_dGE0jhsI2y3hbSlpQhJ6-emrZEb9OFgYBpD0ssUOA21wnUfraMUp4YTKWZUcr5zW1VH4wCifa2rnEbcM9G39OpDkxHVtAh_IX7F2_tuxsAVmtl6IOCv81MZ7RTw/s600/Amarillo_Air_Force_Base_-_Front_Gate_-_Postcard.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="382" data-original-width="600" height="204" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwQSLSgfwWXz_dGE0jhsI2y3hbSlpQhJ6-emrZEb9OFgYBpD0ssUOA21wnUfraMUp4YTKWZUcr5zW1VH4wCifa2rnEbcM9G39OpDkxHVtAh_IX7F2_tuxsAVmtl6IOCv81MZ7RTw/w320-h204/Amarillo_Air_Force_Base_-_Front_Gate_-_Postcard.jpg" title="US Air Force Photo" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p>The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was a major command within the US Air Force from its inception in the aftermath of World War II until it was disbanded at the end of the Cold War. SAC was charged with conducting long range offensive air operations world wide. During the height of the Cold War, SAC consumed a large share of the Air Force budget in support of two of three legs of our nuclear response triad: bombers and intercontinental missiles. The Navy had responsibility for the third leg which consisted of nuclear missile armed submarines.</p><p>The manned bomber leg of the nuclear triad eventually came to be dominated by the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress. The B-52 was a large aircraft with a wingspan of about 185ft. With aerial refueling, these aircraft were intended to bomb targets in Russia after launching from their US and allied bases. Given the large fuel and armament loads, long runways had to be constructed to accommodate this intercontinental mission. These runways were often as long as 12,000 feet and as wide as 300 feet to accommodate the B-52's wingtip gear.</p><p>Dozens of these gargantuan runways were built in both the United States and some allied nations during the 50s and 60s. Accompanying these runways were parking spots for the bombers and their mated tankers to allow a quick takeoff in the case of incoming Russian missiles. These "alert" parking areas came to be known as "Christmas trees" due to the shape of parking aprons which empty out on to a central taxiway leading to the runway. Aircrews would spend up to a week living in a special dormitory known as an "alert facility", ready to launch their aircraft to fight WWIII on the several minutes notice of an incoming attack.</p><p>SAC was disbanded in 1992 at the termination of the cold war and many of the bases that hosted B-52s have been either closed or repurposed. Those Christmas Tree ramps and huge runways live on however. Some have been overtaken by weeds and others are now commercial airports. They can be readily seen from the air if you know where to look. Here are a few of my favorites though this is nowhere near an exhaustive list. </p><p><b><span style="font-size: medium;">Bergstrom AFB, Austin, TX</span></b></p><p><b><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></b></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5Z5-ThnwKBc/YN5mgIh663I/AAAAAAAFBw0/TO3wsUB0PFov0FEtnuxurz9bH5ZTJtUwgCPcBGAsYHg/s1684/IMG_0402.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1684" data-original-width="1668" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5Z5-ThnwKBc/YN5mgIh663I/AAAAAAAFBw0/TO3wsUB0PFov0FEtnuxurz9bH5ZTJtUwgCPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0402.PNG" /></a></div><br /><p></p><p>Bergstrom AFB was established in 1942 and ping ponged several times between SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) during its life as an Air Force base. B-52s were stationed there in the early 60s until they were replaced by RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft. A pair of F-4s on approach into Bergstrom were famously captured in a music video by the Clash of their hit Rock the Casbah in the early 80s. The base was closed in 1993 and repurposed as Austin-Bergstrom International Airport. The alert parking aprons were incorporated into the cargo ramp and can still be seen. The airport it replaced, known as Austin Mueller Airport, was redeveloped into residential and commercial space, but the historic control tower still stands in that neighborhood.</p><p> </p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>Grissom AFB, IN</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-44IPpSKz7sI/YN5myW7mKXI/AAAAAAAFBxA/XvnnPQl5DAIsrOLxLJcUoudGata5vsxKACPcBGAsYHg/s1668/IMG_0403.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1485" data-original-width="1668" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-44IPpSKz7sI/YN5myW7mKXI/AAAAAAAFBxA/XvnnPQl5DAIsrOLxLJcUoudGata5vsxKACPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0403.PNG" width="320" /></a></span></div><p><br /></p>Grissom AFB started out in 1942 as a Navy base. The base was transferred to the Air Force in 1951 and reopened in 1954 as Bunker Hill AFB. While the base never hosted B-52s, it did host both B-47, B-58 and interceptor aircraft which would also have used the alert pads. In 1968 Bunker Hill was renamed Grissom AFB (three letter identifier GUS) in honor of Astronaut Gus Grissom who died in a Nasa space capsule fire. The base is now an Air Reserve base hosting KC-135 aircraft and several other reserve units. The runway is 12,500 ft long.<p></p><p><b><span style="font-size: medium;">Larson AFB, Moses Lake, WA</span></b></p><p><b><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /></span></b></p><p><b></b></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><b><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-o87BRmo9j0Y/YN5nDIQzhLI/AAAAAAAFBxI/S73B4Aa-SqAWOiZmaVdJgjfdHtw6XGXYQCPcBGAsYHg/s1620/IMG_0404.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1620" data-original-width="1336" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-o87BRmo9j0Y/YN5nDIQzhLI/AAAAAAAFBxI/S73B4Aa-SqAWOiZmaVdJgjfdHtw6XGXYQCPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0404.PNG" /></a></b></div><p><br /></p>Larson AFB like many other bases was activated during the war as a training base. The close location to Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle meant that Larson would see quite a bit of test aircraft operations. The XB-47 made its first flight from Moses Lake as did the YB-52. The base hosted B-52 and KC-135 operations from 1960 to 1966 when the base was closed. The main runway is 13,500 ft long. I also have some personal experience here as this is where I got my 737 type rating in a rented 737. This was before the time when type ratings could be attained with simulator time alone. After getting my bounces, our destination of SEA went below minimums and we ended up holding for an hour on my nickel. 737s rented for something like $25/minute if I recall. Expensive, but it all worked out in the end.<p></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>Glasgow AFB, MT</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisr1U7xdaA1vnFNAW3_F39scwiaLZ0DEUixfpeZOpAClsinjR1f7p3Le0ASU8tmEZyTw4X3GpIpF4HsFsffZDoRDUwHC6YVFXoY-oOo3SYTPBb9O7qSaxsMvVaQT6vLwNoL5VcWw/s1668/IMG_0405.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1557" data-original-width="1668" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEisr1U7xdaA1vnFNAW3_F39scwiaLZ0DEUixfpeZOpAClsinjR1f7p3Le0ASU8tmEZyTw4X3GpIpF4HsFsffZDoRDUwHC6YVFXoY-oOo3SYTPBb9O7qSaxsMvVaQT6vLwNoL5VcWw/s320/IMG_0405.PNG" width="320" /></a></span></div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /><b><br /></b></span><p></p><p>Many SAC bases were located in northern states as it reduced the flying distance to the Soviet Union. Known as "northern tier" bases, these were considered less than desirable assignments by many as the locations were isolated and the weather was cold. Glasgow was operational as a SAC base with their own assigned aircraft from 1960 through 1968. It was used for dispersed operations of aircraft from 1971 until the base closure in 1976. Since that time the runway and buildings have been left abandoned with occasional use by the Boeing Company for noise testing of airliners.</p><p><b style="font-size: large;">Clinton-Sherman AFB, OK</b></p><p><b style="font-size: large;"><br /></b></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MVRkZHMaV28/YN5nVYQgxlI/AAAAAAAFBxQ/90uNKBZ7xqcpWkr4Bhq1ikq86ZwHW1SaQCPcBGAsYHg/s1458/IMG_0406.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1458" data-original-width="1317" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MVRkZHMaV28/YN5nVYQgxlI/AAAAAAAFBxQ/90uNKBZ7xqcpWkr4Bhq1ikq86ZwHW1SaQCPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0406.PNG" /></a></div><br /><b style="font-size: large;"><br /></b><p></p><p>Clinton Sherman had its start in 1942 as a Navy base. After the war, it reverted to civilian use and was used to salvage and dispose of surplus military aircraft. Reactivated in 1954, the Air Force then went on to build a 13,500 ft runway for SAC operations. The base hosted B-52 and KC-135 operations from 1959 to the closure of the base in 1969. This base illustrates some of the problems with commercial redevelopment of old SAC bases. These bases were intentionally placed well away from cities and commercial areas for the reason that it was believed that in the event of nuclear war, they would attract missile attacks. When the bases closed, attempts were made to repurpose the facilities with limited success.</p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>McCoy AFB, Orlando, FL</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Zo-vSZ9FtZw/YN5nbNCEG-I/AAAAAAAFBxU/sNboI1SOEq0z3XC2bL-Epm2fB2YLFgDFQCPcBGAsYHg/s1657/IMG_0407.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1657" data-original-width="1359" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Zo-vSZ9FtZw/YN5nbNCEG-I/AAAAAAAFBxU/sNboI1SOEq0z3XC2bL-Epm2fB2YLFgDFQCPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0407.PNG" /></a></span></div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /><b><br /></b></span><p></p><p>Anyone who's flown down to see the Mouse in Orlando may have wondered why they purchased a ticket to "MCO", the three letter identifier for Orlando International Airport and not something like "MOU" or "DIS". That's because before there was Orlando International, there was McCoy AFB. Named for Colonel Michael McCoy who was killed in an aircraft accident at the base, it was a front line SAC base from 1951 to its closure and conversion to civilian use in 1975. The primary SAC runway and alert ramps are still in existence.</p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>Amarillo AFB, TX</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-HkRIu44CO9k/YN5pExs1qaI/AAAAAAAFBxs/NwTCPY5I4SAMJ23dPwgDpz1bd7soiRGqwCPcBGAsYHg/s1668/IMG_0408.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1279" data-original-width="1668" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-HkRIu44CO9k/YN5pExs1qaI/AAAAAAAFBxs/NwTCPY5I4SAMJ23dPwgDpz1bd7soiRGqwCPcBGAsYHg/s320/IMG_0408.PNG" width="320" /></a></span></div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div></span>The airfield now known as the Rick Husband Amarillo International airport dates back to 1918 when two Army Signal Corps aircraft landed in a field near Amarillo. The airfield was a SAC base from 1959 to its closure in 1968. During that time it hosted both B-52 bombers and KC-135 tankers. Lore has it that it was President Lyndon Johnson who ordered the base closed after 16 panhandle counties voted Republican in his reelection contest. Also of personal interest to me is that Amarillo was the origin of the 909th Air Refueling Squadron. Now based in Okinawa, Japan, it was the squadron where I flew the KC-135 back in the 80s. The alert parking and long runway are still in existence.<p></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b>Dow AFB, Bangor, ME</b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"><b><br /></b></span></p><p><span style="font-size: medium;"></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: medium;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhH5ZfCErqSjtLvY-Vwk2fdaH6wgL4JCqWlnVokRYtzKFiz6xMIvQaMn29GflmeT7UcM9VF7mBPiokweKJIYlWqcS8OiIF2GUpN9d_j66Y0x8_nWJKtlpOlYQosmTohfhQaP98_kA/s1668/IMG_0409.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1526" data-original-width="1668" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhH5ZfCErqSjtLvY-Vwk2fdaH6wgL4JCqWlnVokRYtzKFiz6xMIvQaMn29GflmeT7UcM9VF7mBPiokweKJIYlWqcS8OiIF2GUpN9d_j66Y0x8_nWJKtlpOlYQosmTohfhQaP98_kA/s320/IMG_0409.PNG" width="320" /></a></span></div><p><br /></p>Dow AFB was established in 1947 and sold to the city of Bangor, Maine in 1968 to become Bangor International Airport. B-52s and KC-135 tankers were stationed there beginning in 1960. The base was closed in 1968 with reasons given as the maturation of the ICBM fleet which meant fewer bombers were needed as well as budgetary pressures from the Viet Nam war. The long runway and alert parking are still visible and in civilian use.<p></p><p><b style="font-size: large;">Conclusion</b></p><p>In the span of about 20 years from about 1950 to 1970, tens of millions of dollars were spent and hundreds of thousands of yards of concrete were poured to create amazing runways which in some cases were only in use for a decade or less. The era saw amazing aircraft such as the B-58 Hustler be designed, deployed, and retired in as little as a decade. It was a time of possibilities. Much of what was built is now gone except for the B-52s of course, and the weed covered Christmas Trees of the Strategic Air Command.</p>The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-27000073968247294522021-01-16T20:07:00.001-06:002021-01-16T20:07:36.173-06:00Pilot Report: 737 MAX Return to Service Simulator Ride<p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xMyhBKGz6KE/YAObRAuOzCI/AAAAAAAE8oU/hjq1P5Uer1wVU8Rj1TXhXS-NMZO_nA8XQCLcBGAsYHQ/s2048/Max8_HDR1-2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1362" data-original-width="2048" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xMyhBKGz6KE/YAObRAuOzCI/AAAAAAAE8oU/hjq1P5Uer1wVU8Rj1TXhXS-NMZO_nA8XQCLcBGAsYHQ/s320/Max8_HDR1-2.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p><br /></p><p>It has been nearly two years since the 737 MAX was grounded in the aftermath of several crashes. After the redesign of a flight control system, the aircraft has been re-certified by the US FAA and EU EASA and is returning to the skies. Several US and international airlines have already returned their MAX aircraft to scheduled service with others to quickly follow.</p><p>One of the requirements for the return to service of this aircraft is that pilots undergo a training session in a simulator. The purpose of the sim ride is to familiarize pilots with the behavior and possible failure modes of various flight control and indication systems. The ride included demonstrations of the normal function of the speed trim system (STS) and Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) during a stall and failure scenarios of angle of attack (AOA) and airspeed indicators. Runaway stabilizer trim malfunctions and flight with manual trim were also included. Failures of the MCAS subsystem, which is unique to the MAX, were implicated as contributing causes in two crashes prior to the aircraft being grounded.</p><p>Preparation for the ride included an extensive computer based refresher course on MAX systems and procedures and a detailed pre-brief on the planned simulator training events. Flight in high fidelity flight simulators is considered equivalent to flight in an actual aircraft, but superior as a training device as many maneuvers and failure scenarios can not be safely accomplished in an aircraft. That said, the devices cost tens of millions of dollars and training time is scarce and valuable. My airline has procured nine MAX simulators for the purpose of re-qualifying all their pilots in as short a time as possible.</p><p><b>Stabilizer Trim: What Is It?</b></p><p>The events surrounding the grounding of the MAX center on the stabilizer trim system. I am going to attempt to keep my explanations in reach of a general audience with some basic understanding of the dynamics of flight. There are many online resources available for those who wish for a more in depth explanation of aerodynamics.</p><p>The horizontal wing on the tail of a conventional aircraft is known as the horizontal stabilizer (stab). The elevator is attached to the back of the horizontal stabilizer and is a primary flight control. It moves to change the pitch of the aircraft. The horizontal stabilizer itself also moves a bit to “trim” the aircraft for a particular airspeed. Change the speed of the aircraft, and the trim will need to be changed to prevent the pilot (or autopilot) from having to hold constant force on the controls. A pilot can release the controls of a well-trimmed aircraft without it wanting to climb or descend. This condition is also the most aerodynamically efficient configuration resulting in a smaller fuel burn.</p><p>On the 737, stab trim is normally controlled electrically by switches on the control column which are activated with the thumb. The switches (two for redundancy) control an electric motor which spins a large wheel next to the pilot’s knee on the center stand. This wheel is mechanically connected to a jack screw which physically moves the stab. The motor has two speeds determined by flap position. The slow speed is used for flaps up and the fast speed activates when the flaps are extended. This wheel also serves as a manual crank to be used if the electric motor fails. Accidentally leaving the crank handle extended is a self-critiquing error as the handle hurts like heck when it hits your knee (so I’ve been told).</p><p>It is impossible to miss this wheel turning as it has stripes painted on it. While flying manually (without the autopilot), the pilot will use the thumb switches to activate the electric trim, but when the autopilot is engaged, the autopilot keeps the aircraft in trim using the same system. Therefore, the trim wheel will be seen moving on occasion in automatic flight as the autopilot adjusts the trim.</p><p>Starting in the 80s on the “Classic” version of the 737 (models 300 through 500), Boeing introduced a trim subsystem known as “speed trim”. Speed trim would operate in manual flight under certain conditions should the aircraft deviate from the trimmed airspeed. As mentioned above, trim correlates to airspeed. This system would make trim inputs in opposition to any speed deviation to encourage a return to the originally trimmed airspeed. The important thing to note here is that the trim wheel might now be seen moving in manual flight un-commanded by the pilot.</p><p><b>MCAS: What Is It?</b></p><p>MCAS or Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, is another trim subsystem which was introduced on the MAX aircraft. It was found during certification of the MAX that the aircraft had some unwanted handling characteristics when approaching a stall. Specifically, just before stall entry, and well below any normally encountered airspeed, control column pitch forces became lighter when they are required by certification rules to become heavier. MCAS was designed to run the trim forward under these specific conditions to counter this tendency. It uses the high speed rate of the trim motor regardless of flap position. </p><p>Why did the MAX handle differently than its predecessors? The aerodynamics is complex, but the larger engines on the MAX had to be placed further forward on the wing to ensure ground clearance. This and other design factors likely caused the handling differences. This is the source of some controversy about whether the MAX should have been given a separate type certificate, but reviewing that subject is not the purpose of this report.</p><p>One point I’d like to make about flight control augmentation systems in general is that they are ubiquitous and date back to the 1950s. The existence of an augmentation system does not ipso facto indict the underlying design, but rather is an engineering solution that enhances the flight characteristics of nearly all modern high performance aircraft. I have experience flying aircraft which were virtually un-flyable without augmentation. Even fly-by-wire aircraft flight control systems, which are common today, can be thought of as augmentation systems with 100% control authority.</p><p>Lastly, the most important part of the entire electric stab trim system is that it can be deactivated at any time through the use of two stab trim cutout switches located on the center stand directly behind the throttles. These switches remove power from the electric trim system and all subsystems including speed trim, autopilot trim, and MCAS. Following deactivation, the aircraft can still be trimmed by manually cranking the trim wheel.</p><p><b>The MAX Return to Service (RTS) Simulator Ride</b></p><p>The simulator session was scheduled for a two hour training event preceded by a one hour pre-brief. The session was designed to cover both normal and non-normal flight profiles. The normal profile included a demonstration of the speed trim system on a routine departure and the expected annunciations and flight control behavior during an approach to stall. </p><p>The non-normal profiles demonstrated trim system failures and angle of attack (AOA) and airspeed indicator failures. The trim system failures included the use of the Runaway Stabilizer non-normal checklist and immediate action items, and subsequent flight using only manual trim. The AOA and airspeed failure profiles were designed to replicate the startle effect and confusion that can manifest from multiple annunciations and aural warnings during this type of malfunction. Subsequent use of the Airspeed Unreliable non-normal checklist and known pitch and power settings were required.</p><p>The simulator used was a CAE 7000XR series high fidelity simulator with full motion and daylight wrap-around visuals. All of the training events were flown from SeaTac airport in VFR conditions. The sim was initialized for takeoff on RWY 16L with all preflight items having been accomplished. I was paired with a line first officer for the training event.</p><p><b>Speed Trim Demonstration</b></p><p>A normal takeoff and RNAV departure to 10,000 ft were accomplished. During the climb in manual flight, deviations from trimmed flight were purposely introduced through the use of increased or decreased pitch inputs on the control column. The speed trim system was then observed to make trim inputs opposite of the speed deviations to encourage the aircraft to return to its originally trimmed airspeed. Once the originally trimmed airspeed was re-achieved, the speed trim inputs were automatically removed by the system.</p><p>The speed trim inputs were accomplished by the slow rate of the trim motor as the flaps were already up. The effect of these inputs was subtle and easily overridden if needed. </p><p><b>Approach to Stall/Stall Demonstration</b></p><p>After level off, we each were directed to pull the power to idle but to maintain altitude in manual flight through pitch control to observe the annunciations and flight control behavior during a stall. The approach to stall maneuver has been a staple of airline training for many years, but typically the maneuver would terminate with the activation of the stick shaker stall warning followed by a recovery. It was felt that exploring actual stall characteristics was unneeded and possibly negative training as this situation would never theoretically materialize in actual line operations. A recovery would always be made upon the activation of the stick shaker.</p><p>In the aftermath of the Colgan and some other crashes which served to highlight concern about deficiencies in manual flight skills, the FAA introduced extended envelope training (EET). This training went beyond traditional airline flight training to explore flight handling characteristics in areas of the flight envelope that would never be expected to be seen in line flying. The new thinking was that having some experience in these unusual situations might be of use in case one ever developed.</p><p>We were asked to make nose up trim inputs down to the lowest flaps up maneuver speed and afterward to continue to maintain altitude through control column pressure alone. A number of visual and aural alerts displayed and sounded as airspeed continued to decrease. The aural "Airspeed Low" alert sounded followed by the "Buffet Alert" FMC advisory message. The pitch limit indication appeared showing that we were within 5 degrees angle of attack to stick shaker activation. The stick shaker activated upon reaching the airspeed where natural stall warning buffet is computed to commence by the stall warning yaw damper (SWYD) computer.</p><p>During this demonstration, rearward control column forces continued to increase. As airspeed decreased below minimum maneuver speed, the speed trim High AOA mode activated thereby adding nose down trim at the slow rate of speed (because the flaps were retracted). This served to increase the necessary force to maintain altitude. Note that the high AOA speed trim feature is not unique to the MAX, but is included on older 737 models.</p><p>Eventually, the trim wheel made an abrupt twitch forward at the high rate, but only for a fraction of a turn. This, our instructor told us, was the MCAS system becoming active or "waking up". What was happening behind the scene was the MCAS logic took a "snapshot" of the existing trim position when its threshold AOA was reached. It then calculated a maximum amount of trim that could be added. Should the trim ever meet this computed limit, the speed trim and MCAS system becomes inhibited for the remainder of the flight. A short time later, MCAS activated adding additional nose down trim at the high rate of trim motor speed. The control forces were now heavier, but still manageable. </p><p>Finally, the Elevator Feel Shift (EFS) module increased the system 'A' hydraulic pressure to the elevator feel and centering unit as the AOA approached its stall value. The elevator feel and centering unit is how any elevator force is transmitted to the pilots through the control column. Changes in trim go through this unit before they are felt by the pilot. This hydraulic pressure increase dramatically increases forward pressure on the controls and felt like someone was trying to jerk the controls out of my hands. Again, it should be noted that the EFS module is not unique to the MAX but is also included on earlier 737 models.</p><p>At this point the aircraft was in a full stall with strong buffet being felt. The controls could still be held aft, but only with two hands on the yoke and significant effort. We were then instructed to release back pressure and to let the aircraft recover and accelerate. The aircraft recovered quickly. The inputs previously made by MCAS and speed trim were automatically removed as airspeed increased and AOA decreased.</p><p>This was the end of the demonstration. Both of us ran through this event several times so that we were familiar with the sequence of alerts and flight control inputs. 737 stall behavior is benign with no significant roll or wing drop being noted. Recovery was prompt with back pressure release and flying airspeed was quickly reestablished.</p><p><b>Runaway Trim Demonstration</b></p><p>All aircraft with a powered trim system are subject to a condition known as runaway trim. Recall that elevator trim repositions the horizontal stabilizer in order to "trim" the aircraft to a particular airspeed. When properly trimmed, elevator stick forces are minimized. "Trim to relieve stick pressure" was the mantra when I was in USAF pilot training in 1982. It is still true.</p><p>The converse that a badly untrimmed aircraft is difficult or impossible to fly is also true. An inoperative trim system is sub-optimal, but one that continues to trim after the trim switch is released, or trims on its own can quickly create a dangerous situation. Stick forces will quickly become so unmanageable that continued controlled flight is not possible. This may manifest as either nose down or nose up trim. Neither is good.</p><p>Fortunately, Boeing has always included a non-normal checklist (NNC) to address runaway trim. If correctly followed, this checklist will result in the runaway trim malfunction being corrected, or the electric trim system being deactivated. Recall that the electric system, including speed trim, autopilot trim, and MCAS, has always been able to be deactivated through the use of the stab trim cutout switches located on the center stand.</p><p>Our demonstration started with the instructor introducing a runaway nose down rapid rate trim malfunction. The most important step of any non-normal event in an aircraft is identifying the malfunction correctly and then applying the correct non-normal checklist. Many an accident has been the result of a wrong assessment of the problem or the application of the wrong checklist. </p><p>Recall that it is now normal for the trim wheel to spin un-commanded by the pilot in manual flight due to inputs by either the speed trim system or MCAS. Since the flaps were up and the aircraft was not in a stall situation, the fast rate trim activation immediately telegraphed a malfunction.This is how an MCAS malfunction might present along with some nuisance alerts. At this point, accomplishing the immediate action items (IAIs) of the Runaway Trim checklist on the Quick Reference Card (QRC) followed by the remaining steps listed in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) left us in a situation with the aircraft in manual flight with the electric trim disconnected by the stab trim cutout switches.</p><p>Immediate action items are steps on a non-normal checklist that must be performed from memory due to their urgent nature. The Runaway Trim checklist contains several of these steps which include disengaging the autopilot and autothrottles, controlling aircraft pitch and airspeed, and disconnecting the stab trim cutout switches if necessary. This checklist has remained largely unchanged over the many different models of the 737.</p><p>At this point, the aircraft had to be flown and trimmed manually using the trim wheel. There is a note in the checklist which emphasizes that reducing airspeed helps to relieve the air loads on the stabilizer which reduces the efforts needed to manually trim. Our malfunction was introduced at about 250 knots. Manual trim at this speed took some effort, but was easily achieved. Slowing to 210 kts allowed the flying pilot to easily fly and trim without assistance from the non-flying pilot.</p><p>Close crew coordination is of course required to split the duties of trimming and flying depending upon the situation. Flight in instrument conditions might require the flying pilot to direct the non-flying pilot to manipulate the trim. Instructive to me was the ease with which trim changes through the configuration process were able to be made. We were directed to go around on short final to see the trim changes needed for that maneuver. Using less than full power for the go-around made the maneuver very smooth and controllable.</p><p><b>Unreliable Airspeed Demonstration</b></p><p>One of the most disconcerting and dangerous malfunctions any pilot can face is the loss of reliable airspeed. Airspeed is the oxygen of controlled flight, and loss of reliable airspeed must be quickly recognized and corrected or ameliorated for a successful outcome. The importance of this instrument is why there is a lot of redundancy built in. The 737 has two primary and one auxiliary pitot probes used to measure dynamic air pressure which is then converted to airspeed measurement for the pilot's primary airspeed indicators along with an auxiliary airspeed indicator.</p><p>In addition to the direct measurement of airspeed, the 737 has displays of groundspeed derived from the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU). While airspeed and groundspeed are not the same, at low altitudes, they are close enough to be useful.</p><p>Our demonstration simulated a bird strike or similar damage on takeoff which disabled the captain's alpha vane AOA transmitter though we were not informed of this beforehand. Immediately after rotation, a cacophony of alerts sounded accompanied by numerous messages on the displays. The indications included AOA Disagree, ALT Disagree, IAS Disagree, Speed Trim Fail, Feel Diff Press, along with erroneous airspeed, altitude, and flight director indications. The stick shaker sounded and did not cease for the entire demonstration.</p><p>As I mentioned above, the most important thing in any non-normal situation is to recognize what has failed and more importantly, what has not failed. A quick scan of the first officer's and auxiliary airspeed indicators told us that it was my instruments that had failed as the other two instruments were in agreement. I transferred control of the aircraft to the first officer who continued the climbout as I then referenced the Unreliable Airspeed checklist.</p><p>This checklist is fairly straightforward directing the autopilot and autothrottles to be disengaged if engaged. The flight directors are not to be used as they may also give erroneous information, and lastly for complete airspeed failure, some known pitch and power settings are given which are calculated to keep the aircraft from stalling or overspeeding.</p><p>We explored setting these values to see the performance of the aircraft with flaps both retracted and extended. The checklist values will keep the aircraft safe until a more detailed chart in the quick reference handbook, which uses aircraft weight, altitude, and phase of flight to set pitch and power, can be referenced.</p><p>Since our situation resulted in useable airspeed indications for the first officer, returning the aircraft to the airport was a matter of accounting for the nuisance stick shaker and other alerts, accomplishing the appropriate checklists and landing. We had been advised to bring ear protection for this segment, and it was worthwhile advice.</p><p><b>Changes Made to the MAX</b></p><p>The changes made to the MAX center around added redundancy to the Speed Trim System (including MCAS), and the Flight Control Computer. Input is now used from both AOA vanes and compared before being routed to the MCAS system. Previously, MCAS received input from only one AOA vane. A difference between input values from the two sensors will inhibit the system. New logic has been added which limits the amount of trim that the MCAS system can add. An exceedance of this limit also inhibits the system. </p><p>Additional safeguards, redundancies and self monitors have been added to the flight control computers themselves to prevent erroneous stabilizer trim commands. The odds of a runaway trim scenario are now effectively nil, but the runaway trim procedures and checklists will remain as immediate action items on the quick reference cards and handbooks.</p><p><b>Conclusion</b></p><p>I published my impressions of flying the MAX back in 2018 after I first flew the aircraft. I thought it was a great flying machine back then and I think it will be better than ever after its return. Was the aircraft as well designed as it could have been? Perhaps not, but then in no human endeavor is perfection ever achieved. I do not mean to denigrate the seriousness of the accidents that occurred nor the memory of those lost. Airline crashes are nightmares for all involved.</p><p>That said, underlying causes of any accident are complex and many differing narratives develop, some with agendas of their own. Causal chains behind any accident must be considered in total. A focus upon one aspect of an accident in isolation will inevitably lead to a missed or wrong conclusion. </p><p>Having now flown both the old and newer versions of the MAX, I am more convinced than ever that this aircraft is rock solid, whatever discrepancies there were have been corrected, and that it has a bright future as the preeminent narrow body airliner.</p><p><br /></p><p><i>Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 30 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com.</i></p><p><i><br /></i></p><p style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; border: 0px; box-sizing: inherit; color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.75); font-family: "Source Serif Pro", serif; font-size: 2rem; line-height: 3.2rem; margin: 3.2rem 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;"><br style="background-color: white; box-sizing: inherit; font-size: 20px;" /></p>The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-28331258834795567622020-03-19T16:57:00.002-05:002020-03-19T17:33:09.216-05:00Dispatch from the Front: Flying in a Pandemic<br />
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Yesterday I finished my eighth day of flying out of the past eleven, and to say it's been a bit crazy would be an understatement. The travel industry, having endured the lost decade of the 2000s following 9/11 and finally regaining its footing, is being thrown back into disarray. Entire fleets of aircraft are being grounded and aircrews are being asked to take leave without pay or are being furloughed outright. Several airlines have already ceased operations.<br />
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To those of us who lived through 9/11 and its aftermath, this all seems eerily familiar. In a few short weeks we've gone from celebrating a new widebody captain bid (my wife) to investigating how to secure a new home equity line of credit. We'll be fine, but to the new kids who are experiencing their first major industry disruption, I say welcome to the lifeboat party! You will find that an airline career is really just a game of Chutes and Ladders writ large.<br />
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The first change I noted back on March 8th was that my commute flight to work was wide open. On a plane which usually has less than ten open seats, there were over a hundred empties. In fact, for those hardy souls who are still out there commuting to or from work by plane, social distancing will be a breeze on empty planes. My flight home from Chicago last night had perhaps a half a dozen passengers and my good friends over at American gave me a first class seat. I felt the thrill of an adrenaline junkie by ordering a glass of water.<br />
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Once at work, things seemed more normal. Our first two legs, a Cancun roundtrip, actually had pretty good loads. At the earliest stages of the crisis, it seems that bargaining or denial held sway, making vacationers reluctant to abandon already paid for accommodations. This view rapidly gave way to a desire to not be stuck at a vacation destination should airline service be curtailed, or the fear of becoming sick while away from home. This was evidenced by our last trip, to the Dominican Republic, which carried only a few dozen intrepid souls down, but was full coming home.<br />
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Resigned to Illness</h4>
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Pilots, by their nature, routinely employ a certain insouciance, or gallows humor, when referencing the inherent risks in aviation. Failing to check the terrain charts could "ruin your whole day", or a statement like "it's better to die than to screw up on the radio" has been known to be overheard in a ready room or two. Tied up in this sentiment is a certain fatalism, but also confidence in one's ability to avoid the fate of someone who "bought the farm", even though an outcome might have little to do with ability and more with just lady luck.</div>
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These sentiments are in some ways a simple defense mechanism used to ease the knowledge of being at risk. Now that aircrew are being stalked by an unseen menace by virtue of being at work, this defense mechanism has been repurposed from mitigating aviation risks to those of catching the virus. It seemed that most of the aircrew I've spoken to over the past several weeks are resigned to the idea of coming down with the virus regardless of their actions to stay healthy.</div>
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Oh, we're all still washing our hands and making herculean efforts to not touch our faces, but we also realize that commercial aircraft, especially with dozens of switches in the cockpit, are flying Petri dishes. From waiting in line at security, to the jet bridge, to sitting in proximity to other people for hours on end, opportunities to pick up a viral hitch hiker seem manifest. Reports that the virus can be spread by simple breathing near an infected individual do little to allay this fatalism.</div>
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And why do the TSA agents need to touch everyone's ID? I used to tell my kiddos to look with their eyes, not their hands. Yuck.</div>
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Ten Cities in Eleven Days</h4>
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My last eleven days of flying included seven domestic cities, three international destinations, and overnights in six hotels. I feel perfectly fine, but let's assume that the virus can be contracted and spread for a few days before symptoms appear. Should this have happened, then I've probably left quite a wide wake of disease behind. Could I have just called in sick and stayed home? Sure, but someone else would've been tapped to fly the trip. Agree or not with whether airlines should be shut down, at least some commercial flights will continue to operate.</div>
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The economic pain imposed by this event is going to be far reaching and deep. Unknown is how long lasting it will be. One analogy I overheard is that the economy is not sick per se, but rather has been put into a medical coma until the crisis passes. I'm hopeful that this is true, though it is also possible that after being forced by the virus to conduct more business online and through teleconferencing, business travel may never recover to pre-pandemic levels.</div>
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Airlines, of course, are large corporations and do have resources and credit lines to weather the storm, unlike many smaller businesses such as restaurants and hotels. I've been reliably informed that aircrew are the only guests in some of our crew hotels and the only business keeping the doors open. Food venues have been ordered closed which is a problem for overnighting aircrew who have no other ability to eat as my airline serves no meals.</div>
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9/11 Redux?</h4>
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a gut punch to the airline industry which didn't fully get back on its feet until ten years later. Career progression was on hold for many for what is now called the "lost decade". This pandemic has already caused a deeper loss of revenue for the industry than did the brief industry shutdown in the wake of the attacks. When and how a recovery will unfold is an open question.</div>
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Life changing or life delaying setbacks are emblematic of a career in commercial aviation. My first officer this trip was lamenting the unfolding events, and while he maintained a great attitude, I could sense his frustration. Let's call him Fred.</div>
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Fred has a less conventional background than many first officers with whom I fly. Somewhat of a bon vivant, he grew up on St Thomas and splits his time between the islands, a condo in Chicago, and a farm in the Carolinas. He spent some time on commercial fishing boats where he picked up enough Spanish to be useful in flirting with the waitresses in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. A story he tells of bartering with the crew of a Japanese fishing boat in the south Pacific for some soy sauce for the Korean sailors on his boat was quite entertaining.</div>
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He was a captain at his previous airline before it was merged with my airline and as a result he was bounced back to the right seat. Due to several career detours, he is older than I am and is close to having seniority to move back to the left seat for his few remaining years before mandatory retirement. This will now likely be delayed. The fallout for him is real.</div>
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Our flight attendants on the trip seemed to have varying degrees of stress due to the crisis. One of them, Bev, seemed to take it all in stride. She has a knack for poker apparently and has played semi-professionally. She was in a good mood having won about $400 in the resort casino, about half being Fred's. I don't gamble and was safely in bed when all this transpired. Tracey, on the other hand, was much more junior and had just purchased a condo. She was quite concerned about financial events though not as much about the virus itself, which makes sense as she is young and hale.</div>
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Call Dispatch</h4>
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Upon arrival at the airport on our last leg home, I received a message to call our dispatch before departing. Given the choice of using the gate agent's dirty and broken screen mobile phone or activating international calling on my phone, I chose the latter.</div>
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The control tower at Chicago's Midway airport had been shut down due to three workers there being diagnosed with the virus. The airport was still operating but without a control tower. Think of an intersection where the traffic light goes out. You treat it like a four-way stop sign, but not nearly as much traffic can pass. It's just as safe. I had to get a briefing by a chief pilot concerning the different procedures.</div>
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The flight and landing were uneventful, but traffic had been severely restricted due to the closed tower. We were the only aircraft moving on the entire airport after landing. This also meant that my flight home had been cancelled. A quick check on FlightView revealed both an American and United flight were still operating from O'Hare to my hometown.</div>
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A Useful Prophylactic</h4>
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James was my Uber driver from Midway to O'Hare. As I was in uniform, the subject of aviation came up. It turns out that he had been a flight attendant with ATA airlines for 20 years before that airline ceased operations. Family obligations forced his departure from the industry, but he remembered his years fondly. His income from driving has recently fallen drastically as a result of the pandemic. He has applied for a position with Target and has an upcoming interview. I wished him luck.</div>
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James was an older gentleman, and I asked if the virus concerned him. He assured me that drinking hot water would serve as an internal cleanse to remove any virus infection. Furthermore, using a hair dryer on the face and nostrils would then remove any offending virus thus ensuring safe passage in our newly infectious landscape. </div>
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The more you know...</div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-49909603909420543382019-10-20T14:59:00.001-05:002019-10-20T17:33:20.886-05:00Chemtrails: A Little Truth Goes a Long Way<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Proof of chemtrail's existence [Source: the internet]</td></tr>
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Running a modest (~3600 follower) aviation themed Facebook page for the past four years has been quite an education in human online behavior. I have a following of fellow professional aviators, air traffic controllers, aviation industry employees and general lovers of aviation. Most everyone abides by the unwritten laws of "netiquette" but there are of course always a few of the usual characters who don't play well with others.<br />
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Pedants will pick out a minor mistake or unimportant nuance to trumpet superiority. Last worders must always finish any argument, and reading comprehension aficionados will repeat your point back to you as if it was their idea. Sometimes just not responding to a provocative comment will make the person doing the commenting explode. I don't use the ban hammer often but rather try to talk excitable respondents down off the ledge. But occasionally I get a live conspiracy theorist to happen by. These guys are the most fun of all.<br />
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Pick Your Conspiracy</h4>
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There are many flavors of conspiracies out there from 9/11 "truthers" to flat Earthers to the ur-conspiracy surrounding the Kennedy assassination. Rather than the dissipation of pockets of unknowing as you might expect now that we have the sum total of human science and discovery in our phones, access to the internet only seems to have injected steroids into many conspiracy theories. Confirmation bias kicks into overdrive as whole communities spring up around crazy ideas.<br />
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Joseph Pierre, a psychiatrist writing in <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/psych-unseen/201702/flat-earthers-belief-skepticism-and-denialism">Psychology Today</a>, makes the point that conspiracy believers venture from a healthy scientific skepticism into nihilistic denialism. Any and all facts are subject to question regardless of any evidence, no matter how convincing, as a matter of principle. I suppose there's an attraction to walking around believing that you have secret knowledge to which few others are privy.<br />
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Chemtrails</h4>
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In aviation circles, the conspiracy of choice is known as the "chemtrail" conspiracy. A portmanteau of chemical and contrails, itself a combination of "condensation trails", the chemtrail conspiracy posits that the lines in the sky which originate behind high flying aircraft are not condensation from the moisture in aircraft exhaust, but actually a chemical spray of nefarious origin designed for a sinister end.<br />
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These chemicals can be either psychotropic substances which are designed to keep a restive population compliant, or a melange of metallic particles which are used to control the weather or "geoengineer" the planetary climate by blocking solar radiation. This particular conspiracy dates back to the late 90s and appears to have been sparked by a military research paper speculating about a future method of warfare that might include chemical dispersion from aircraft.<br />
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A Kernel of Truth</h4>
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The use of aircraft to spray chemicals, usually fertilizers and pesticides, has a history dating back to the 1920s. The first aerial application of agricultural chemicals took place in 1921 from McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio. More recently, the US military undertook a large scale defoliation effort from 1962 to 1971 during the Vietnam conflict. Dubbed Operation Ranch Hand, Air Force C-123 Provider aircraft dispensed an estimated total of 20 million gallons of herbicides over Vietnam jungles.</div>
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Given this history, it isn't too great of a jump for the conspiracy minded to believe that the government has just upped their game and is now using commercial aircraft to poison the population or control the climate. Adherents will often conflate high altitude contrails which are a product of jet exhaust with low altitude wing top mist generation which is a result of the generation of lift in high humidity environments. Entire <a href="https://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/">websites</a> complete with well produced video content exist to promulgate chemtrail theories.</div>
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My Very Own Conspiracist</h4>
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As I'd had thoughts about addressing this subject for awhile, I had the good fortune to have a true believer find his way onto my page. Let's call him Rob (name changed). Rob started out sending me private messages asking how it was that an attitude indicator (artificial horizon) could stay erect to the horizon if an aircraft is actually travelling over a globe.</div>
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It's actually a fair question and a real issue. He was unknowingly describing an actual phenomenon called "Earth rate" or "Earth transport" precession. An uncorrected gyro actually would slowly become inaccurate if it stayed true to its starting location as an aircraft travelled the globe. Both of these effects are accounted and corrected for in modern flight management computers. </div>
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This explanation was answered by an angry response that he'd taken an attitude indicator apart and saw no such correction mechanism. This was probably true in that general aviation aircraft don't need such mechanisms due to their high cost and short range. A link to a Wikipedia article was met with a scoff. I didn't really expect him to believe in anything from Wikipedia, did I? How stupid did I think he was after all?</div>
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The conversation continued in this fashion. He'd ask why an aircraft travelling in a straight line over a globe wouldn't simply leave the atmosphere as if on a tangent line. The reply that aircraft don't fly in straight lines but use barometric pressure to maintain altitude in the atmosphere which is curved over the planet was also scoffed at. I hadn't "proved" anything.</div>
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It then occurred to me that he was a flat Earth believer. Rather than chase him off, I asked how he had come to his views. He mentioned that a ride in a helicopter some years past had provided him with his epiphany. He never did say exactly how that ride convinced him of the flatness of the Earth though. </div>
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I then asked for some reference material. A trove of internet memes and links to videos followed. These memes would show things like graphic representations of an aircraft flying off into space on a straight line course, or a picture of drain or fuel dump vents on airliners as proof of the conspiracy.</div>
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Concerning chemtrails, he eventually conceded that rather than a conscious conspiracy of many thousands of commercial pilots and aircraft mechanics, the chemtrail chemicals might actually be added into the fuel directly, thereby limiting the conspiracy to fuel handlers and refiners.</div>
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The Pendulum</h4>
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Looking for a simple way to demonstrate the Earth was not flat which would not rely on technology which he mistrusted, I recalled seeing a heavy four story pendulum hung in a stairwell in the Franklin Institute science museum in Philadelphia. Every morning employees would set up a circle of chess pieces under the pendulum and set it swinging. The pendulum would knock down the chess pieces as the day progressed thereby demonstrating the rotation of the Earth. There was no way to ignore that!</div>
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The answer came back that Franklin was a Freemason and, well, nothing that he touched could be trusted. Interestingly, that was followed by several videos showing Masonic iconography which depicts the sun the same size as the moon with a flat horizon in the background, so it was difficult to know whether the Masons were with him or against him. What was clear was that a thread of mystical religiosity informed his world view and he was not going to let anyone pop the bubble.</div>
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What was also clear was that he wasn't going to attempt to address any incongruities that I raised such as how I could video call my wife from China where it was clearly dark at noon. This was just fascinating to me. I clearly didn't want to know the "truth" of his "research" which consisted of internet memes and videos posted by like-minded conspiracists.</div>
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Is It Harmless?</h4>
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By all accounts my interlocutor seemed like a nice guy who got on well enough in society to hold a job and function normally. He mentioned that his job involved some sort of mechanical proficiency, and he did spend quite a bit of time on Facebook, so he wasn't obviously a technophobe. I even admired his inquisitiveness about the world. </div>
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He was thinking about things that many people never consider, but at some point he wouldn't make the leap to the rational conclusion. Many of his positions started with a bit of truth which was then extrapolated to fantasy. The Psychology Today article referenced above noted that a confusion of the notions of "believe in" versus "believe that" might be part of the cause of these belief systems.</div>
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I can't say that walking around believing in a flat Earth or chemtrails is an unalloyed tragedy. If it works for him, then great. In the words of that great 20th century philosopher, John Lennon: "Whatever gets you through the night is alright."</div>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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One of the attributes which is emblematic of all conspiracies is that they're unfalsifiable. Any time an explanation is offered, there will be a counter-explanation which can't be verified. One of the best depictions of this was the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZF2T_5L3Z8">scene</a> from the first Terminator movie where Michael Biehn tries to explain to an incredulous prison doctor how robots from the future are coming to kill Sarah Connor.</div>
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Of course the joke here is that there actually were robots coming from the future to commit mayhem. But then, it was only a movie. Or was it?</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-15354947764968593362019-10-13T15:32:00.000-05:002019-10-28T13:40:55.833-05:00Did Bad Grammar Doom the Max?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsN6lHdGIYX33pFfY1SAh2dqhA14oVPWRr27gBhOuRRb0pugpccLRxPxuO3gnQrQulGZiC1Q15Zdp6faX_G3svTkaiVmPdU_j7r3-MHUc7pttuk0DBpGzIuW8TLVmDPXC6bgeUGQ/s1600/IMG_0379.PNG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="emergency checklist to be used for a runaway stabilizer trim malfunction" border="0" data-original-height="1239" data-original-width="1536" height="258" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjsN6lHdGIYX33pFfY1SAh2dqhA14oVPWRr27gBhOuRRb0pugpccLRxPxuO3gnQrQulGZiC1Q15Zdp6faX_G3svTkaiVmPdU_j7r3-MHUc7pttuk0DBpGzIuW8TLVmDPXC6bgeUGQ/s320/IMG_0379.PNG" title="Runaway Stabilizer Checklist" width="320" /></a></div>
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As of this writing, the 737 MAX remains grounded with projected return dates now stretching into the first quarter of 2020. Boeing has not as of yet submitted the software fix for the controversial MCAS system to the FAA for evaluation. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) recently indicated that they will seek their own additional testing of the software fix possibly resulting in a staggered return of the aircraft to service.</div>
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The post-mortem examinations of what went wrong at Boeing and the assumptions that were made concerning the flawed MCAS software continue. At issue is one <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-four-second-catastrophe-how-boeing-doomed-the-737-max-11565966629?mod=article_inline">assumption</a> made early on that any malfunction in the MCAS system would be immediately recognized by average pilots as a malfunction known as "runaway stabilizer" for which a checklist already exists.</div>
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The stabilizer trim system is used by the pilots or the autopilot to keep the horizontal stabilizer in "trim" which means keeping the stabilizer aligned with the slipstream of air. It does this by actually moving the entire stabilizer a through a range of angles which change with airspeed. An "out of trim" stabilizer means the stabilizer is not perfectly aligned with the passing wind. This results in the need to hold force on the control column to maintain altitude. Letting go of the controls in such a condition would result in an undesired climb or descent. A well trimmed aircraft will stay where you put it.</div>
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In the 737, the stabilizer trim is normally controlled electrically through a motor, but can also be adjusted manually through a wheel and handle on the center stand. This system has a failure mode known as "runaway trim" wherein the motor runs after the control column electric trim switch has been released most likely due to a sticky or failed switch. This malfunction can result in an unflyable condition if not quickly corrected. It is this failure mode which is addressed by the "runaway stabilizer" checklist reproduced above.</div>
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Continuously or Continually?</h4>
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Boeing engineers were also counting on pilots using this same runaway stabilizer checklist in the event that the MCAS system, which also uses the stabilizer trim, malfunctioned. The problem with this assumption is that the two malfunctions can appear to be very different things. During a classic stuck switch runaway trim, the trim wheel in the cockpit starts spinning and does not stop. That's the definition of "continuously" and is correctly annotated as one of the conditions on the top of the checklist.</div>
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An MCAS malfunction, however, presented quite differently. During that malfunction, the MCAS system would spin the trim wheel forward for a specified amount and then stop. If the pilot then used the trim switches to adjust the trim in a nose up direction, a malfunctioning MCAS would wait five seconds and trim forward again after each input by the pilot. This "very often; at regular or frequent intervals" behavior of the MCAS system is the definition of "continually", not "continuously". </div>
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This is exactly what happened to Lion 610. After reversing the MCAS inputs multiple times, the captain passed control of the aircraft to his first officer who was apparently unaware of the inputs the captain had been making. He never countered the next MCAS input which doomed them.</div>
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From Dictionary [dot] com:</div>
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In formal contexts, continually should be used to mean “very often; at regular or frequent intervals,” and continuously to mean “unceasingly; constantly; without interruption.”</blockquote>
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Is this a minor and pedantic point? Perhaps, but perhaps not. English is the international language of aviation, and all pilots are expected to be proficient in English to be qualified to fly in international airspace. The pilots of both Lion 610 and Ethiopian 302 were likely not native English speakers and were highly unlikely to be aware of such a nuance as the difference in meaning of these two words.<br />
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They were, however trained in the various failure modes of their aircraft, and were not likely to be expecting the intermittent behavior of the failed MCAS system. The pilots of Lion 610 had no knowledge of the existence of the MCAS system as it was not included in their flight manuals. The pilots of Ethiopian 302 did have the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) published by Boeing describing the MCAS system, but were still slow to recognize that their problem originated from a bad MCAS system until too late.<br />
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In Conclusion</h4>
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Aircraft flight manuals should contain all the information needed by pilots to safely operate their aircraft. This information should include accurate descriptions of possible failures, the recognizance of such failures, and best practices on how to solve or mitigate problems that arise. The omission of the existence and description of MCAS from the MAX airplane flight manual only compounded the problems faced by the two mishap aircrews. Faced with a fusillade of warnings and distractions which served to conceal the real nature of their problem, they were defenseless against a poorly designed and undocumented but deadly adversary.</div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-32703377092096371192019-05-12T12:20:00.000-05:002019-05-12T12:39:40.728-05:00737 MAX Update<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-glYINBG7jOc/XNhRaQII5lI/AAAAAAAEa0Y/2HWuuys12dUsT44gpXj4bhm8GIoEt_2tACLcBGAs/s1600/799px-N7379E_-_Boeing_737_MAX_9.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="324" data-original-width="799" height="259" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-glYINBG7jOc/XNhRaQII5lI/AAAAAAAEa0Y/2HWuuys12dUsT44gpXj4bhm8GIoEt_2tACLcBGAs/s640/799px-N7379E_-_Boeing_737_MAX_9.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #999999; font-size: xx-small;">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en</span></td></tr>
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I haven't written about the saga of the MAX lately because there hasn't been much change in the situation concerning the grounded airliner. Progress is being made in fixing the MCAS system implicated in the two 737 MAX crashes, and estimates for the ungrounding of the aircraft range into the July-August timeframe.<br />
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The FAA recently convened a multi-agency Technical Advisory Board to review Boeing's proposed software fix for the MCAS system. The results of that review will be needed prior to FAA approval of the design changes.<br />
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That said, there have been a number of stories brought to light as to how the MCAS system came to be designed, and some more disturbing revelations about Boeing failing to disclose an inoperative warning feature to its customer airlines.<br />
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MCAS: What It Is and What It Is Not</h4>
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The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) has been routinely described in popular media stories as a stall prevention or mitigation device. It is really neither, but rather is a system designed to make the MAX "handle" just like the older Boeing NG series aircraft it replaces.</div>
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During flight testing of the MAX, test pilots and engineers noticed that in a very small corner of the flight envelope: lightweight, aft center of gravity (CG) and approaching a stall, the forces on the stick varied from the NG version of the aircraft. MCAS was introduced in order to counter this divergence in longitudinal stability between the two models to make them "feel" the same. The genesis for the difference in handling is due to the MAX having larger, heavier engines which are set further forward on the wing for ground clearance.</div>
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The need for identical handling between the two aircraft was to maintain a common "type rating" on both aircraft thereby allowing pilots qualified on earlier versions of the 737 to fly the new aircraft without extensive training. Airline pilots, unlike, say, flight attendants, cannot fly separate types of aircraft but are generally only qualified on one "type" of aircraft (at a time).</div>
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The word "type" has a very specific technical definition in that the FAA designates which aircraft fall under the specific "type rating". For instance, being "type rated" in the 737 allows pilots to operate all the various sub-models of that series (-200, -300, -400, etc) without an extensive course of study for each sub-model. The Boeing 757 and 767 were also given a shared type rating as those aircraft were considered similar enough that pilots could fly both of them under a single "type rating". These ratings are annotated on all pilots' licenses. The same is true for the Airbus A320 series of aircraft.</div>
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As we now know, the MCAS system was flawed in its design due to being able to be triggered by a single angle of attack (AOA) indicator, and also by the ability of the system to reset itself and re-engage multiple times without limit. The question of how and why this design flaw happened is the subject of multiple investigations into the certification process.</div>
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Inoperative Angle of Attack Warnings</h4>
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The WSJ has done some excellent investigative reporting on the MAX story and revealed recently that not only did the MAX aircraft not have a specific AOA warning indication which had been included on the earlier NG, models but that Boeing engineers were unaware that the warning on the MAX was inoperative. Furthermore, Boeing delayed notifying their customer airlines of the situation for nearly a year.</div>
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Angle of attack cockpit indicators are not known as what are "primary flight instruments" such as airspeed, altitude, and attitude. Pilots use primary flight instruments to directly fly the aircraft. An angle of attack indicator, however, is not required to safely operate most aircraft and is usually not included in cockpit displays. </div>
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An analogy might be to a tachometer in your car. Nice to have but not needed. Much outrage has been vented over Boeing's not including this cockpit indicator as standard equipment, but I don't see it that way. AOA cockpit indicators are simply not needed for safe flight.</div>
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Angle of attack sensors, small vanes on the exterior of the aircraft, are traditionally used to send AOA information to an airliner's flight control computers and are used to provide "stick shaker" stall warnings. There are two installed on the 737 and the cockpit warning "AOA Disagree" would display should the two indicators return different readings, indicating a malfunction in one or both.</div>
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It was this "AOA Disagree" warning which was inadvertently deactivated on the MAX aircraft. Had the AOA only served its previous function of activating stall warning, this would be no big deal. But because the MCAS system was triggered by a single AOA sensor, not having this warning quickly became a very big deal. </div>
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A single malfunctioning AOA indicator has been implicated as a possible cause for the inadvertent activation of the MCAS system on both the Lion and Ethiopian crashes. Having this alert enabled might have aided the pilots of those aircraft to figure out what was going wrong.</div>
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Pinto, Tylenol, MAX?</h4>
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It is becoming apparent that the MAX will be back flying at some point, but the question now arises as to how well Boeing will weather the ongoing tsunami of negative PR. Even President Trump weighed in on this question recommending that Boeing rebrand the aircraft.</div>
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If you recall, the Ford Pinto never rose above safety concerns after several accident caused fires and the model was eventually terminated. The response to the Tylenol poisonings, however, is now considered a textbook example of how to manage a public relations crisis. One thing learned is that transparency and being forthcoming in light of a tragedy is essential. Boeing has only made matters worse by their perceived lack of candor.</div>
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My guess is that once the MAX is back in the air, the crisis will be quickly forgotten. My reasoning is that the public has a notoriously short memory for these sorts of things. Other aircraft have had spotty beginnings and went on to become successful. The MAX, which is still a 737 at heart, has a long and enviable safety record. As the parable states, the dogs may bark, but the caravan moves on.</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-87394025589134165192019-03-31T14:59:00.000-05:002019-03-31T15:19:16.930-05:00Flight Data Results from Ethiopia 302 and the MCAS System - Smoking Gun or False Lead?<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">737 MAX throttle quadrant showing trim wheel and stab trim cutout switches (lower right).</td></tr>
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The Wall Street Journal is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-believe-737-max-stall-prevention-feature-activated-in-ethiopian-crash-11553836204?mod=hp_lead_pos3">reporting</a> that, after preliminary analysis of flight data from the downed Ethiopian 737 (ET302), investigators now believe the controversial Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) activated and may have played a part in the accident. This finding is significant because the MCAS system has now been implicated in both this crash and the Lion Air crash which occurred last year.<br />
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MCAS - What is It?</h4>
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To recap, the MCAS system was installed on the 737 Max aircraft to mitigate some unique handling characteristics of the new model which differed from older 737s. Boeing originally chose not to document this new system in the aircraft flight manual, but has since briefed all Max operators on the existence and function of the system in the aftermath of the Lion Air crash.<br />
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Among the reasons Boeing engineers may have had for not including the system in the flight manual are that the system was only supposed to ever activate during aerodynamic stall conditions in manually controlled flight, which in normal operations would never be seen. Entire careers are flown without ever seeing an actual stall, so this rationale might have been thought sound.<br />
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The problem for the MCAS system wasn't necessarily its intended operation, which was to be rarely if ever seen, but rather any potential failure modes. Unintended activation of the system due to a mechanical fault has now been suggested as a factor in both Max crashes. Flight data from the Lion Air crash show the pilots repeatedly fighting the inputs from a misfiring MCAS system, and according to latest reports, the MCAS system also activated on the mishap Ethiopian airliner.<br />
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Adding to the controversy of the existence of an undocumented system is the revelation that the system can be activated by a single angle of attack (AOA) sensor. Angle of attack sensors measure the angle of the relative wind over the wings. Too great of an angle between the wing and the airflow over it will result in an aerodynamic stall wherein the wing stops producing lift.<br />
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The questions being asked involve the engineering decision to use the input of a single AOA sensor to trigger the MCAS system to operate. There are two (or more) AOA sensors installed on all airliners which among other things are used to provide "stick shaker" stall warning to pilots if they get too slow or approach a stall. Again, a stall is something that most airline pilots will never see outside of a training simulator where stall recovery is practiced routinely.<br />
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What Did the ET302 Pilots Know about the MCAS System?</h4>
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Lion Air JT-610 crashed on October 29, 2018. The investigation of that crash first brought the MCAS system and a malfunctioning AOA sensor to light. On November 7th, Boeing released an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) to all 737 Max operators. This bulletin mentioned that erroneous AOA signals can cause the trim to run uncommanded by the pilot. The directed remedy is to apply the runaway stabilizer trim checklist which directs the use of the center pedestal mounted stabilizer trim cutout switches. The text of the bulletin is as follows:</div>
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The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous AOA data. Boeing would like to call attention to an AOA failure condition that can occur during manual flight only.</blockquote>
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This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition. In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputs and both STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT.<br />
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of the following indications and effects:</blockquote>
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<blockquote>
- Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.<br />
- Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.<br />
- Increasing nose down control forces.<br />
- Inability to engage autopilot.<br />
- Automatic disengagement of autopilot.<br />
- IAS DISAGREE alert.<br />
- ALT DISAGREE alert.<br />
- AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)<br />
- FEEL DIFF PRESS light.</blockquote>
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In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the 737 - 8 / - 9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight.</blockquote>
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A subsequent Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) directed this information to be included in the flight manual of all Max aircraft within three days.<br />
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In my view, it is reasonable to assume that the ET302 pilots were well aware of the MCAS system, its possible failure mode due to an erroneous AOA sensor, and the steps to be taken to remedy the malfunction.<br />
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Why Didn't They Just Turn it Off?</h4>
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The investigation of the Lion Air crash has revealed that on the flight immediately preceding the mishap flight, an off-duty 737 qualified pilot was occupying the jumpseat. That aircraft also suffered the same malfunction of the AOA sensor resulting in uncommanded nose down trim. On that flight, however, the guest pilot recommended that the operating pilots use the stabilizer trim cutout switches, which they did. That flight landed uneventfully.</div>
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The pilots on the subsequent Lion Air flight fought against the nose down trim commands continually, but never did deactivate the electric stabilizer trim with the cutout switches. The errant automated trim commands eventually trimmed the aircraft into an unflyable condition.</div>
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It would seem easy to Monday morning QB the actions of the Lion Air mishap pilots, but it must be remembered that there were many other things happening at the same time. One important thing to note is that the stick shaker activated right at liftoff and continued for the entire flight. The stick shaker is a device that literally vibrates the control yoke when an aircraft approaches an actual stall. It is loud and disconcerting when activated. The pilots were no doubt startled and distracted.</div>
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Another point to note is that the MCAS inputs would not "present" like a traditional runaway trim situation. Typically, a runaway trim malfunction in a simulator would simulate a stuck switch where the trim wheel would run continuously in one direction. During the mishap Lion flight, the flight data recorder showed the pilot actively trimming back against the MCAS inputs followed by a few seconds delay when the MCAS system would reactivate and start trimming forward again.</div>
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Another system called "speed trim" installed on earlier and subsequent 737 models can also run the electric trim with the autopilot disengaged, so it is not completely unusual to see the trim wheel spinning by itself with the autopilot off. This "negative training" may have contributed to the pilots not focusing on the uncommanded movement of the trim wheel even though speed trim only functions with flaps extended while the MCAS system only functions with the flaps retracted.</div>
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What Happened Then on ET302?</h4>
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The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorders from ET302 have been recovered and sent to France where they were downloaded and decoded by the BEA, the French equivalent of the NTSB. The data from the recorders have not been released to the public, however investigators have an "emerging consensus" that the MCAS system activated and contributed to the accident. The story also noted that this preliminary finding is subject to revision.</div>
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The pilots of ET302, however, had something that the Lion pilots did not, and that is a detailed description and knowledge of the MCAS system and the procedure to disable it by throwing two easily reached switches. Without more information from the accident investigation, it is simply too early to reach any definitive conclusions about the fate of that airliner.</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-59066926936754807702019-03-14T18:10:00.000-05:002019-03-14T18:51:17.040-05:00What's Next for the Max?<br />
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As an aviation blogger, the past few days have been simultaneously hope inspiring and depressing. Hope inspiring as many people understand, or make a good faith attempt to understand, the underlying issues surrounding the 737 Max. But also depressing as random fanbois, trolls, and low information, yet self proclaimed experts, happen by my comments section to disgorge their dubious wisdom on things about which they know little or nothing.<br />
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<h4>
Mencken was Right: No One Ever went Broke Underestimating the Intelligence of the Public</h4>
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One commenter offered, based on no information other than two 737s had crashed, that all of them should be grounded. I pointed out that by that logic, it would be even more beneficial to ground all airplanes everywhere as it would be safer still. The response was "I didn't say all airplanes should be grounded" displaying an ironclad grip on logical fallacies.<br />
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When I noted that the MCAS system could be completely deactivated using two switches mounted on the center console, a commenter replied that well, "maybe the switches reconnected themselves". Other than the testing of those switches being a mandatory preflight item, this commenter has obviously confused the Boeing 737 with the SkyNet model T-1000 Terminator which can rewire itself automatically.<br />
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Lastly, when one commenter [Hi Scott!] boldly opined that the 737 was the worst airplane he'd ever flown on, I replied that my passenger experience is usually more dependent upon the particular airline and class of service rather than the aircraft type. This big brained person assured me, however, that no, none of that mattered. He apparently would rather sit in a non reclining 28 inch pitch economy seat on a Spirit A320 than a first class seat on a JAL 737. [Sigh]<br />
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Public Relations and Marketing Wins</h4>
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So the FAA bowed to international and media pressure and grounded all Max aircraft, which is proving to be a minor inconvenience to most operators of the aircraft. I was personally walking out to a Max to fly to Phoenix when the announcement came. Someone somewhere had done some preparations and an -800 was towed to the gate by maintenance about 10 minutes later for a slightly delayed departure.</div>
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We of course are now treated to the circular logic of all the "I told you so" stories. The process starts as media sensationalism whips up a gullible and credulous public followed by outraged calls for the aircraft to be grounded. After weather-vaning politicians cave into public pressure, preening media talking heads then get to state that something must have been really been wrong. And so it goes.</div>
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Make no mistake: this grounding has more to do with public relations and marketing than safety. As of yet, there is very little evidence that the two Max crashes are in any way related other than the most superficial of circumstances. But the tsunami of media scare stories and sensationalism showed no signs of abatement, so this was the correct decision. </div>
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The FAA cited "newly" discovered satellite data which finally swayed their decision.They are referring to the ADS-B tracking system which relays flight parameters to air traffic control through satellite. This information, however, was publicly available shortly after the crash and it does show some minor altitude excursions, though nothing is conclusive.</div>
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The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder from the Ethiopian crash have been recovered and sent to France for analysis. Again, prescient commenters noted that this was a good thing because, of course, had they been sent to the US, American investigators would falsify any result finding the US producer of the aircraft at fault. I actually agree with this decision in spite of the slander against the integrity of the NTSB and other US investigators. Having French investigators analyze the data will deflect the inevitable cries of bias should the investigation find fault in anything except the aircraft itself.</div>
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What Next?</h4>
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What happens next is we wait for the data from ET302 to be downloaded and released. When that happens and a likely cause of the accident can be discerned, the Max will be cleared to fly. Notice that I didn't say that this clearance will in any way be dependent on the outcome of the investigation. The aircraft will be flying again in a matter of weeks regardless of the findings.</div>
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Why you ask? Should the MCAS system be implicated in this crash (unlikely in my opinion), there will be software fixes and training updates offered. As I've noted many times, the system can be deactivated completely through the use of two center console mounted switches. Even then, the system should only activate in the case of gross pilot negligence resulting in an aerodynamic stall or, as in the case of the Lion crash, an errant sensor input due to a mechanical malfunction. </div>
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The software fixes will preclude the activation of the system due to the failure of a single sensor. The training updates will reemphasize to all operators that undesirable electric trim inputs can be inhibited through the use of the center console mounted stab cutout switches. </div>
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Should the MCAS system not be implicated in the ET302 crash, the Max will be back in the air that much sooner. Make no mistake, all airline crashes are tragedies of the highest order for everyone involved. The object of any investigation is to find out what happened and to take measures to prevent any future recurrence. Commercial aviation is one of the safest, if not the safest means of transportation available. </div>
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What will be left is a mopping up by the lawyers.<br />
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<i style="background-color: white; font-family: "Crimson Text";">Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. </i></div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-53222610059786261432019-03-12T10:02:00.000-05:002019-03-12T10:40:25.901-05:00Is the Boeing 737 Max 8 Safe?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">737 Max 8</td></tr>
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This past Sunday, an Ethiopian Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa to Nairobi with 157 passengers and crew. There were no survivors. This is the second crash of a Max 8 variant of the 737 in five months after the crash of a Lion Air Max 8 last October.<br />
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An undocumented system was brought under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash and now questions are being raised as to whether this same system, known as maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), might have played a roll in this latest crash. If that is found to be the case, the safety of the aircraft itself will be called into question.<br />
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<h4>
What We Know</h4>
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At the current time, the cause of both accidents is unknown as the accident investigation is still underway on the Lion Air crash and the Ethiopian Air crash investigation is just getting under way. The flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders have been recovered from both accidents and are being analyzed.</div>
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The flight recorder data from the Lion Air crash suggests that the pilots were having control difficulty due to erroneous inputs from the aircraft's MCAS system which itself received faulty inputs from a malfunctioning angle of attack (AOA) sensor. It is this errant sensor and its maintenance history that investigators are focusing on.</div>
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Initial reports from the Ethiopian Air crash suggest that the aircraft experienced control difficulties shortly after takeoff. Data from a flight tracking and reporting system known as ADS-B show highly unstable vertical velocity and airspeed readouts which were similar to the airspeed and altitude excursions of the Lion Air mishap aircraft.</div>
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Unconfirmed reports from listeners on the frequency reported that the Ethiopian pilots stated that they had unreliable airspeed indications and were declaring an emergency.</div>
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And right now, that's it. There are similarities, but no confirmation that the same system brought down both aircraft.</div>
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Is It Safe?</h4>
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Given that we know little about the cause of the first accident and nothing about the cause of the second, a grounding of this model aircraft is premature. I am qualified and current in this model aircraft and am confident that it is as safe as any aircraft flying. Airplanes sometimes crash. It is always a tragedy when they do, but barring a definitive indictment of the design, there is no reason to overreact.</div>
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Even should the MCAS system be found primarily at fault, the system can be completely deactivated by two easily reached switches on the center console of the cockpit. Why the Lion Air pilots didn't take this action is unknown, but the investigation should eventually reveal the cause. A similar malfunction occurred on a previous flight of the mishap aircraft, and those pilots took the correct action and landed uneventfully. Questions as to why the aircraft flew again without being properly repaired should be asked.</div>
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In the event of unreliable airspeed, which can happen to any aircraft independent of model, routine practice of this malfunction in the simulator should make it a non-event. I recently underwent this training myself, but the basics of pitch and power date back to Wilbur and Orville. Recognition is the toughest part, but after that, known pitch and power settings will keep the aircraft from stalling and in control.</div>
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I don't mention these questions to cast blame, but rather to answer critics who don't understand aviation or engage in magical thinking. The Max is still a 737 at heart and flies nearly identically to the other four models of the aircraft that I have flown. So yes, it is safe, and I'd gladly put my family on one and fly it myself with no reservations.<br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. </i></span><br />
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com17tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-37341284735430298782019-02-16T14:49:00.001-06:002019-02-17T23:12:57.815-06:00It Shouldn't Have Flown<br />
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By Steven W. Freimuth, former Captain, USAF<br />
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<h4>
PROLOGUE</h4>
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The following is my recollection of the events that occurred during a takeoff and flight on a September day in 1973 while flying out of U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield (UT) in Thailand. This was after the war was over. But we were still flying missions to maintain the peace. While these events happened over forty-five years ago, most of them were so etched in my mind, that I can still recall them as if it were yesterday.<br />
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I am finally following up on my years of “intentions” and reducing this to paper as a result attending two Arc Light / Young Tiger reunions. It was there I met Tommy Towery and acquired the many “We Were Crew Dogs” books which he edited. He wondered why a KC-135 pilot would be interested in reading these short stories mostly about B-52 crew experiences. Well, I learned a lot more of the bigger picture in SEA (Southeast Asia) and stateside. Often we were so busy in our own activities, and in accordance with SAC’s (Strategic Air Command) “need to know” policies, that we (I) didn’t know much about the details of the roles of my fellow airmen. And our shared suffering. But more of that in another article.<br />
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I have chosen to use “full width” paragraphs to write the sequence of events as they occurred and what my thoughts were at that moment. I have included “indented sections” to further explain various aircraft and performance details. This is to assist the reader who isn’t as familiar with them to gain a better understanding of both what was going through my mind and happening to the aircraft. Thus, read just the expanded text to get a blow by blow description.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The Aircraft: I was going to write about the KC-135A aircraft so the reader would have a better understanding of some of its quirks and limitations. However, I came across the following written by Robert Graves who flew them in the 1980’s. His description included everything I wanted to say and written better. He wrote:</blockquote>
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The First All Jet Tanker</blockquote>
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The KC-135 Stratotanker, produced between the years of 1956 and 1965, was a derivative of Boeing's test bed aircraft, the 367-80. From this early test aircraft, both the KC-135 and 707 were derived which is why the KC-135 has a strong resemblance to the 707, though the tanker was smaller and lighter. Still, the tanker could carry 135,000 lbs of fuel and weighed in at just under 300,000 lbs fully loaded.</blockquote>
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Part of the impetus for the Air Force to acquire this aircraft was the cold war. The nuclear arms race was in full swing in the late '50s and the Air Force wanted to have a tanker which could refuel its new intercontinental bomber, the B-52, to allow it to reach Russia. The old KC-97, a derivative of the WWII era B-29, just wasn't up to the task.</blockquote>
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In fact, because the angst of quickly fielding a nuclear deterrent was so high during that time, several compromises and shortcuts were made in the design of the KC-135 to get it operational faster. These were compromises which I came to despise acutely nearly thirty years later.</blockquote>
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The first compromise was the engines. Engine manufacturer Pratt and Whitney was working on a new engine design at the time known as the bypass fan engine. This new engine was to become the basis for all modern engines and was eventually used on the 707, but it just wasn't going to be ready in time for the tanker. So the KC-135 was outfitted with older engines which incorporated a technology known as water injection to produce enough thrust. Yes, you heard that right...they pumped water into the engine.</blockquote>
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Without getting too detailed, high pressure pumps injected water into the engines during takeoff which increased thrust by means of an increased mass flow rate. Still, the airplane was grossly underpowered. While the airplane did usually get airborne, it would take most of the runway to do so when heavy. I have seen the departure end of the runway coming under the nose during rotation more times than I care to remember.<br />
To give you an idea of how puny the engines were, the CFM-56 engines fitted on a 737 today produce about 34,000 lbs of thrust while the tanker's original P&W J-57s produced a mere 12,000 lbs. Due to its underpowered nature, the aircraft gathered unflattering monikers such as "The Silver Sow" or "The Steam Jet". My personal favorite was "Strato-Bladder" for the bladder type fuel cells in the body tanks. </blockquote>
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The KC-135A was eventually re-engined in the 1980s with those same CFM engines and was redesignated the KC-135R. The new "R" models are quite sporty now and even hold some time to climb records for transport category aircraft.</blockquote>
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This first compromise of using water injected engines led to the compromise which I came to hate the most. To feed the water injection system, a water tank was needed. Since most of the body of the aircraft where cargo bins are on a normal plane were taken up with fuel tanks, a decision was made to remove one of the two air conditioning units, or packs. This meant that the airplane was hot, and I don't mean hot as in cool, but rather hot as in fetid.</blockquote>
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I was stationed in Okinawa, remember, which is in a subtropical climate zone. This means warm and damp winters followed by hot and damp summers. The lack of A/C on the aircraft was most pronounced when flying hour after hour of "transition" training, or touch and go practice. It wasn't uncommon to get off the airplane soaking wet. Boeing didn't even have the courtesy to install an air vent to blow on the pilots' faces. The air outlets were under the seat where what little cool air that did emanate did no one any good at all.</blockquote>
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Old Technology</blockquote>
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As I flew the airplane in the early 80s, it had undergone a number of technology updates to its original systems but many vestiges of older technology were still on board. We still had a navigator assigned to the crew, but he had at his disposal an inertial navigation system, or INS which made his job more or less obsolete. Airliners were crossing oceans then with similar systems which had their accuracy measured in yards while GPS was still on the design table.</blockquote>
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The aircraft also had, however, a sextant and an overhead port with which to view the stars. Celestial navigation dates back to the time of Magellan and was the reason the navigators were still on board. Remember, this aircraft was designed to fight a nuclear war and at the time it was thought that a nuclear detonation might render all electronics useless. Therefore, the navigator was trained to use the ancient technology of celestial navigation with a sextant to determine our course while flying to nuclear armageddon. My one regret is never having had our nav teach me how to shoot the stars with the sextant.</blockquote>
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Over-water communications were also rather dated. While we had a high frequency or HF radio which could bounce signals long distances, ours was an old tube-type radio requiring a warmup and without a squelch control. This meant maintaining a "listening watch" on air traffic control frequencies which were always full of static, whistles and pops. Of course this was a copilot duty. When the air traffic frequencies became too unusable, I might have inadvertently tuned the radio to an awesome rock station beamed out of Saipan.</blockquote>
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The standard for overseas communications is through the use of satellites today.</blockquote>
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Flying the Beast</blockquote>
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As I mentioned above, the airplane was underpowered. This meant that it had to be flown very smoothly and deliberately when it was heavy, which was most of the time. There were restrictions on the angle of bank that one could use after takeoff for instance, and multiple warnings concerning what to do or not do should an engine fail on takeoff.<br />
There were so many red warnings on the engine failure pages that I think most of us flying the beast were convinced that an engine failure was pretty much game over. Thankfully I never got the opportunity to test out that proposition. …”</blockquote>
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Another former crew member has described the takeoff in the following manner: “I realize that this was a long time ago but when I was stationed at Robins AFB back in the mid-1960s our KC-135A s would use between 11000 and 12000 on T/O. It was closer to the latter on hot days. Sometimes they would return after their missions and still have some pine needles in the intakes from the tops of trees at the end of the runway. Of course these were fully loaded airplanes. If anyone here ever witnessed a fully loaded “water wagon” they were truly something to behold.”<br />
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And, as an additional piece of information for the B-52 crew members reading this, I have gleaned, your maximum takeoff weight was about 488,000 lbs. From what I have read in “We Were Crew Dogs” the maximum weight at UT was about 454,000 lbs. (with twice the engines and water). Half of that weight would be 227,000 lbs. My takeoff weight in the follow story was about 262,000 lbs. The base weight of a 135 was between 105,000 and 107,000.<br />
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As a final comment before I start my tale, there was a saying in SAC: “If someone could construct a runway that would actually encircle the entire earth, SAC would could come up with a mission plan that would use every inch of it”.<br />
<br />
<h4>
AND MY STORY BEGINS</h4>
<br />
This was to be our second flight of the day. We were assigned to fly a KC-135A, tail number 59-1475, using a water takeoff with a max fuel load of 156,000 pounds on runway 18.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
THE RUNWAY: Runway 18 is a 11,500-foot runway that ends with the overrun (or approach portion (when landing to the north on 36) followed by a sandy beach and the Gulf of Thailand. Normal departure after takeoff is to the north.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
WATER TAKEOFF AND JET ENGINES: The KC-135A aircraft had four J-57 jet engines. These engines were not turbofan jets In order to provide more thrust for takeoff, a 670 gallon tank of water was installed in the belly of the plane. Electrically driven pumps furnished approximately 80 gallons per minute to each engine. Accordingly, we normally had about two minutes of water before run out. This increased the mass flow through the engines providing substantially more thrust. Each engine (dry) should be able to provide a maximum of about 12,845 lbs. of thrust within a temperature range of -65 to 5 degrees. The dry thrust would diminish substantially as the temperature rose above 5 degrees. Water (wet takeoff) should be able to provide a maximum of about 12,925 lbs. within the 20 to 100 degree range. </blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
GENERATOR LOADS: Three of the engines had generators to provide electricity while no. 4 had a cartridge start system in its place. All the normal aircraft electrical loads could be met from the output of only one generator. According to the charts, it would use about 94% of the rated capacity of a one generator during the highest usage period of a mission - except a wet takeoff. The water injection pumps, that were needed for the critical two minute period, consumed about 100% of the capacity of a generator. Thus, during a wet takeoff, about 175% of the available output of one generator was consumed with three available. Safety and redundancy had been built in.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
MAX FUEL LOAD: According to the charts, the maximum fuel load (capacity) is 202,800 lbs. for aircraft with an upper deck aft fuel tank installed. However, I recall that at UT, the max load was 156,000. This lower load was the maximum that we could get airborne given the runway length and warm temperatures.</blockquote>
<br />
The Form 781 maintenance log indicated that this was the first flight for this aircraft after going through “corrosion control”. I didn’t know what that was and believe the crew chief said something about “taking the aircraft apart, looking for corrosion, and then putting it back together”. I thought about a FSAGA (first sortie after ground alert).<br />
<br />
I also need to insert at some point that at a safety briefing, probably within the prior week or so, there was a 135 out of Grand Forks or Minot that kept popping circuit breakers during a flight. The crew continued resetting them several times and they continued to trip. The crew found an electrical fire.<br />
The preflight proceeded normally until we got to the Control and Trim Check. With the control wheel rotated to the left, Ground reported “Left ailerons up, tabs down, left spoilers 40 degrees, right spoilers down, right ailerons down, tabs up”. (A correct call and indications.) When I then rotated the yoke to the right I got something like “Left ailerons down, tabs up, left spoilers up, right spoilers 40 degrees, right ailerons up, tabs down”. Something in the all so familiar call given in a standard cadence seemed wrong. “Aah Ground, would you repeat that call.” It was repeated the same and Ground, this time, seemed to realize that something was wrong. After a short conversation, I believe Ground said something like “Sir, we must have a stuck actuator, let me get a ladder and a hammer to fix it.”<br />
<br />
As we waited on maintenance, I believe at some point we may have decided to continue to complete a few of the items left in the Interior Inspection checklist that we could do without Ground i.e. altimeters check, etc. And we waited on the ramp in the afternoon sun (usually between 84 and 88 degrees). Think of sitting in an auto in this position with two windows open while wearing a Nomex (a non-breathing plastic bag that provided fire protection) flight suit. Because of this, we delayed putting on the SAC required inflatable life jackets that were to be worn on all overwater takeoffs.<br />
<br />
Maintenance must have had problems finding the appropriate SAC specified hammer as start engine time (30 minutes before scheduled takeoff time?) came and went. I believe it was between ten and fifteen minutes before takeoff time that maintenance finished “fixing” the problem.<br />
At this point I should point out to those unfamiliar with this fact that takeoff times are important in SAC, almost sacred. My recollection is that the scheduled time plus up to five minutes was okay. I never knew if it went all the way up to those under CINCSAC but at least I had been told that everyone at UT got a black mark after their name when there was a late takeoff. And, as was the custom, one “awe sh*t” wipes out 10,000 at-a-boys.<br />
<br />
As a SAC trained professional - and a person whose Mother taught him to “do the right thing”- my crew and I finished the Interior Inspection checklist, and began the Starting Engines and Before Taxiing checklist, and Before Takeoff checklist in record time. While switches were being thrown and settings made, clearance was requested for taxiing.<br />
<br />
I started to taxi as soon as clearance was given. My co-pilot started the Before Takeoff checklist while we were taxiing. We continued to run the checklists, throw switches, verify systems, and adjust settings. Now there is a saying in SAC that there is only one thing worse than having a taxiing accident, that is living through it. While well aware of that, I must admit that I made a “high speed” taxi. In fact, a very high-speed taxi. I think it was about four times faster than I had ever taxied before or since for scheduled flights. Probably twice as fast as an alert taxi exercise. I thought we might skid around the corners as we headed to the runway. But I was going to make an on-time take off if at all possible.<br />
<br />
As we approached the hammer head we called and received takeoff clearance. No stopping before taking the active. As we turned to the runway heading of 18, I brought the throttles back and my Co started the water injection. I believe my Nav called that we crossed the threshold between four and five minutes after our scheduled takeoff time. My crew had saved the day!<br />
<br />
As I advance the throttles, water kicked in and we were off. Air speed slowly increased as we rumbled down the runway. S1 was called as our takeoff continued.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
S1 is a calculated speed (V1 to the rest of the world) where if you encounter a major problem prior to reaching, you can abort and stop within the remaining runway length.</blockquote>
<br />
Then, just at the start of rotation, the aircraft became very quiet. At least very quiet for a KC-135A making a water takeoff.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Water takeoff’s noise was about 126 decibels. </blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
“The KC-135R is a dramatically quiet aircraft in comparison to the KC-135A, which is one of the worst noise offenders in the USAF inventory. … The noise footprint has been reduced from the "A" model by 95%”</blockquote>
<br />
Within a fraction of second later, the boom was out of his seat and standing between the pilot’s and co-pilot’s seats with his hands on each of our head rests. “Generators!” I looked up and saw all three had tripped off line. Later, I found the Nav had attempted to make a similar call but he had crushed his mic switch attached to his flight suit with an alligator clip.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
It is a crew duty for the Nav and Boom to monitor the generators on takeoff as the panel is overhead between the pilots.</blockquote>
<br />
At this moment in my life, everything slowed and every sense was at its keenest.<br />
<br />
My first thought was that there was no way this aircraft would fly. I thought the loss of water was about the same as losing one and a half engines while making a heavy weight takeoff. Next, did we have a fire on board that caused the loss of electrical? At that moment, I caught a glimpse of my Mae West life jacket on the floor next to the center control column out of the corner of my eye. In the rush to complete the checklists following the maintenance delay, I hadn’t put mine on for the very first time. I will accept that glimpse as Divine intervention. Here I was about to crash a 263,000 pound aircraft into the Gulf of Thailand and I didn’t have my life jacket on. We’re going to fly!!<br />
How to do that? Throttles, I reached over and firewalled them.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Normal takeoff procedures required the pilot to keep his left hand on the nose gear steering wheel (until about 90 KIAS), advance the throttles with his right hand to about takeoff EPR (engine pressure ratio) and then return his right hand to the yoke. The co-pilot would follow the advance of the throttles with his left hand and fine tune them to about 2.85 EPR. Takeoff thrust was determined by the EPR setting. This was normally reached with a 94-98% RPM. According to the Dash 1, the overspeed limit of 102% RPM should not be exceeded at any time. If an engine overspeeds between 102-104% consideration should be given to operating on reduced power and shutting down the engine as soon as safety of crew and airplane permits. If an overspeed exceeding 104% occurs, the danger of complete engine failure is more imminent. The normal runway distance from the start of rotation to unstick is about 1,000 feet.</blockquote>
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I then tapped my Co’s hand that was on the throttles. No electrical, no intercom! He knew to check the RPM and pull them back if we were over 102%. We were mushing through the air, over the overrun, sandy beach and then the water. To this day, I believe it was the ground effect that kept us in the air.<br />
<br />
Next, gear! Normally the flying pilot calls over the intercom for the other pilot to raise the gear. No intercom. I immediately reached for the gear handle. It wouldn’t come up! We must have a hanging truck. If I raise the gear using emergency override procedures, the gear will come up. I will most likely lose all hydraulics as the gear will rip out all the hydraulic lines that are routed through the wheel wells for maintenance purposes. The gear will be jammed in the wheel wells and may not come down. I can worry about landing later, I need to fly now. I pulled the emergency override trigger. The handle and the gear went up. No loud crunching sounds.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The KC-135 has two main landing gear and a nose gear. Each main gear has four tires, two forward and two aft. These four tires are mounted in an assembly called a truck. Each truck has actuators that level each truck after becoming airborne. If a truck is not level, it is referred to as a hanging truck. Raising the gear with a hanging truck using the 3,025 psi hydraulic pressure will cause the gear to be retracted. Wheel well damage may result from emergency retraction if the main gear trucks are not level, the oleos are not sufficiently extended, or the nose gear is not centered.</blockquote>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
According to a chart I just reviewed, the takeoff four engine maximum climb rate at sea level was 1,290 fpm and the three engine rate was 580 fpm. The emergency procedures section of the Dash 1 states that gear drag lowers the rate of climb approximately 300 fpm at takeoff with flaps down. An engine failure decreases the rate of climb approximately an additional 900 fpm. The opening of the gear doors reduces the rate of climb even more while the gear is being raised. According to this, 300 fpm plus 900 fpm equals 1,200 fpm reduction without considering the door effect. A chart amount of 90 fpm does not provide a lot of flight cushion. Paper calculations have never provided an iota of actual lift or thrust. And we had lost water, even worse in my mind than an engine.</blockquote>
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The later modifications to the KC-135R designation provided a maximum climb rate of 5,000 fpm even after considering the allowable increase in aircraft and fuel weights.</blockquote>
<br />
While doing these procedures, I was looking out my window. (No flight director system – no electrical power.) I saw a Thai fishing boat. It was a small boat with a tiny cabin leading below deck. As we were about to fly over it, I saw the captain coming up from below deck with a white bucket full of something. He looked into my eyes and I saw the whites of his. (Maybe you B-52 types are used to this low-level flying, this was a first for me.) His bucket went up as he dove back down below deck.<br />
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Flaps! With the gear up we were beginning to gain airspeed. I reached over and raised the flaps. On one of the two gauges that monitored the inboard and out board flap position (one gauge and for the inboards, a second gauge for the out boards), both needles went from about the three o’clock position to the twelve o’clock position. On the other gauge, one needle went to twelve, the other to nine o’clock. Asymmetrical flaps! Brace for the rolling motion! No roll detected, bad gauge?<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Asymmetrical flaps is a condition where the flaps do not retract or extend at the same rate. This difference has the same effect as imputing a “turn” using the ailerons via the yoke. This is extremely dangerous when at very low altitudes. A bank angle of 30 degrees at climbout speed with flaps down could reduce climb capability by as much as 400 fpm. As speed decreases, the effect becomes more severe, particularly in the clean configuration.</blockquote>
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Assess your flight condition. Gear up, flaps up, somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 feet AGL and accelerating to over 200 KIAS. Okay, now what.<br />
<br />
Declare an emergency. Battery switch emergency. Listen to the UHF radio “click” as it cycles and tries to lock on the preset frequency. Not enough power in the battery to lock on a frequency. Go to “guard” position on the radio. Still not enough power to lock on. Dead battery.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The UHF radios had preset frequencies for items like ground control, tower, command post, etc. To change from one preset to another you would rotate a dial with numbers, similar to an old-fashioned TV dial. Guard was an emergency frequency that could be both monitored and transmitted on.</blockquote>
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Shout at the Co to try and get some generators on line. He successfully gets number 1 and 2 on line and mated to the bus. Number 3 is toast. This provides power to all the equipment. Get a TACAN DME (distance measuring equipment) lock at about 12 miles. That is a long way to swim! (Even for a Minnesotan used to 10,000 lakes). “This is _____ declaring an emergency in a left turn to 360 at 2,000 feet”.<br />
<br />
So here we are rolling out on a 360 heading and describing to the Command Post the nature of our emergency. About this point I told the Boom and Nav to go back in the plane and see if we had a fire, etc. They reported no issues. When we got back even with the base and are down wind, the Command Post asks me what is our current condition. “Gear up, flaps up, two generators on line”. “Roger”, is the response, “that is a go condition”. I didn’t tell them my legs were shaking on the rudder pedals. I don’t think that would have changed their opinion. I was thinking “land, go to bar”.<br />
We are now north of the base climbing through 8,000. My number two engine oil pressure gauge starts to fluctuate and soon goes to zero.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Because more engines in the 135 were apparently shut down because of faulty oil gauges than actual loss of oil pressure, the fleet was in the process of being modified with a second low pressure sensor and indicator, a red warning light. This aircraft had been modified.</blockquote>
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<br />
And the number two oil light was illuminated. Time to shut down number two engine. Must have blown an engine seal after going to increase thrust.<br />
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“Command Post, this is _____, declaring an emergency.” A short pause. “Roger ____, didn’t you just terminate your emergency?” “That’s a roger but now we are declaring a new one.” And in addition to shutting down the engine, it caused us to lose a good generator. We were down to one generator. We are given clearance to dump fuel and return to land.<br />
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But, as I earlier mentioned, my Mother taught me to do the right thing. Two things would have been wrong if we just hit the dump switch. First, the JP-4 fuel we would dump, about 60,000 pounds (or about 9,230 gallons) to get down to maximum landing weight for braking limit purposes, would not evaporate prior to returning to earth. There would be a whole lot of rice paddies covered with a film (or more) of JP-4. Second, if we dump fuel with the boom up and in trail, fuel gets into the tail assembly and it needs to be cleaned somehow.<br />
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So I requested clearance to 21,000 feet. After being granted, we start the slow, wallowing struggle to climb to that altitude. It takes quite a while to get there but we finally make it. “Boom, go back and lower the boom so we can dump”. I soon get a call back over the intercom. “Pilot, I am having control problems with the boom. One of the ruddervators isn’t working. We may have to land with the boom in trail”. <br />
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About this point in the flight, I am beginning to have doubts as to the air worthiness of this plane. And more specifically, what’s next. Systems just don’t seem to be functioning as designed. But we successfully dump the fuel and the Boom is able to get it up and locked.<br />
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We now begin our decent. We lower the gear handle and the gear comes down. Again, I send the Nav and Boom back to check the visual down and locked stripes that can be seen from inside the cargo area. I speculated that the gear wouldn’t come up, not because of a hanging truck, but rather to the fact that we must have lost electrical power while we still had the “weight on wheels” (WOW) safety interlock switch in the “on ground” position. That prevents the gear handle from being raised using normal procedures.<br />
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Next, the flaps are lowered. They extend without an issue. It was a faulty gauge. This is followed by a successful three engine landing.<br />
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Because of the previous events, we are were met by the squadron or wing commander after taxiing in and shutting down. He was kind enough to present our crew with a six pack of beer for doing a good job. (Or for saving his promotion?)<br />
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We then had to endure a longer than usual maintenance debriefing. I can’t recall if any of the above qualified for a “red X” in the 781. But we did make a few entries. Someone brought to our attention that maintenance was aware of a circuit board defect that could cause a generator to trip offline. If this board experienced a vibration equivalent to that of slamming a fist on a table, it could trip a generator. Because of the location of this board, they were replacing them only when an engine was required to be replaced. I believe all further recollections of comments made would be censored.<br />
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<h4>
EPILOGUE</h4>
<br />
For the next week or so, every evening after a flight we would be in our trailer and my co-pilot would go into the performance charts and say “it shouldn’t have flown!”.<br />
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This was very unsettling to my five-month pregnant wife, Melanie, who I had brought over for about six weeks. She was staying at the Swan Lake Hotel but came to our trailer during the day time. She found more to do on base as she waited for us to return from flights. Since the war was over, I wanted to share with her some adventures in Thailand that I had on my prior two TDY’s. This was NOT one of them I planned on sharing with her. She did gain a greater appreciation for the risks any airman encounters when they “slip the surly bonds”.<br />
<br />
My Co did buy me a nice lobster dinner at Camp Samae San (the Thai Marine Corps Base with US Army units adjacent to UT) with a deep-water port. I believe the fuel and weapons for the UT aircraft came through this unit. It was my first and only trip to their O Club, but what a club! Real linen table cloths and napkins, real (non-plastic) silverware including salad and desert forks, real glass glasses, candle lamps on the tables, waiters, etc. It was as good or better than any restaurant in Bangkok. And twelve lobster tails. Okay, they were one ounce each but tasted wonderful. And all paid for by my co-pilot because - even though I didn’t follow SAC policy for over water takeoffs; and whether through luck, skill or Divine intervention - I was at the controls and now we were able to eat the lobsters rather than them eating us.<br />
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Shortly after my return to Ellsworth, I put in my paperwork for a January separation. The war was over, I heard rumors of a RIF (reduction in force), and recalled the two to three weeks of pulling Alert (with the possibility of only one to a max of three flights) a month that seem to happen whenever I was back stateside. I don’t believe I was notified of the above citation that appeared in the December 1973 issue of SAC Combat Crew magazine until it was sent to me by my former squadron commander several months after my separation.<br />
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“YOU NEVER LIVED, UNTIL YOU ALMOST DIED. FOR THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR IT, LIFE HAS A FLAVOR THE PROTECTED WILL NEVER KNOW.” Vietnam 1959-1975<br />
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-71057697914127079482019-01-31T11:28:00.001-06:002019-01-31T14:00:13.740-06:00What Do You Want from an Airline Career as a Pilot?<br />
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I'm getting to the end of my airline career. Oh, I'm not quite there yet, but I am close to the final turn and the PAPIs will soon be in sight. The FAA mandated retirement age is currently 65, and I'll be turning 60 next year. The retirement age was adjusted from 60 to 65 in 2007 and there are rumors that as the pilot shortage worsens, industry lobbyists will push to have the age adjusted to something like 67. Either way, I don't see myself schlepping my rollaboard through the southside 'hood to the crash pad into my dotage. 65 will be it for me assuming I pass a medical until then.<br />
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People often ask why I don't retire now. These are usually pilots junior to me, but it's a fair question. The reason I give is that the airline is a great part-time job. I generally fly only three days a week and rarely pick up flying. And if I wasn't flying, I'd probably just find a local cigar bar or doctor's waiting room to spend time chatting up other retirees on how good the old days were or how the darn kids are screwing everything up.<br />
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So with (much) more of my flying career behind rather than in front of me, I am able to look back and assess how things have turned out, and perhaps to give some perspective or advice to those who might be just starting out.<br />
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Without a doubt, I have had a blessed and charmed flying career. Starting in 1982 as a second lieutenant in the Air Force, and having never touched an airplane, I've spent every year since then at the controls of a jet aircraft. Hired by my airline at age 30, I found myself in the left seat of a 737 four years to the month of being hired. I now find myself close to the top ten in the seniority list in my domicile. With about 600 captains below me, this means I usually get the schedule I want assuming the company publishes it and Charlie C. doesn't take the line I want. C'mon Charlie, retire already!<br />
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There are some things, though, that I won't get to do. I won't ever be a widebody captain because my airline doesn't fly them. That means that I won't get to enjoy the over-water widebody lifestyle of 30 hour layovers touring in some exotic foreign locale or on a white sand beach. I also won't get the downside of back side of the clock flying nor the several day recovery period adjusting back to local time. (I did spend over a decade flying jumbos for Uncle Sam so I have that t-shirt.) Tradeoff? That depends on what you're looking for.<br />
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<h4>
Which is the Best Airline to Work For?</h4>
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This question gets asked quite often, and I've always maintained that the best airline is the one that hires you. But beyond that pithy answer, the best airline will be the one that gives you the things you value the most; the things you want out of a flying career. That answer will necessarily be different for just about everyone.<br />
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Do you want to upgrade to captain quickly? At all? Is widebody flying on your list? Where will you make the most money? Does money matter, or is job security more important? If your spouse is a surgeon or other professional, maybe job security isn't as much of a concern. If you are the sole breadwinner, perhaps it's higher on the list. Where do you want to live? Does your chosen airline have a domicile there or are you willing to commute? Do you want to be home when your kids are awake? How about being able to bid vacation when they're on summer break?<br />
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All these are questions that you have to ask yourself, and many times you may not get a choice, but end up taking what is offered. If another offer comes along you'll then have a choice. Leaving an airline that hired you for another is a tough call, but it only gets tougher as you gain seniority. I've flown with profoundly unhappy pilots who wish that they'd jumped early on in their career but are not willing to give up the seniority they have to start again. This is a bit of the "sunk costs" fallacy, but you are only issued one life and have to make the most of it.<br />
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<h4>
Keep Your Priorities in Order</h4>
<br />
I also flew with a young pilot some years ago who, at the end of our month together, announced that he was quitting to go to another carrier. He was a senior first officer looking at a captain class in a few months. He didn't dislike where he was, but rather was entranced by the thought of flying widebodies for another airline. In fact, he said that the toughest part about leaving was he really did like the people where he was.<br />
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That was in the spring of 2001. After 9/11 he was quickly furloughed by his new airline and probably spent years getting back into a cockpit. Was it worth it for him? We lost contact, so I don't know. Perhaps. Will there be another lost decade like the one that followed 9/11? Which airlines are best positioned to weather another storm like that?<br />
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<h4>
A Perspective</h4>
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I started looking for an airline job after leaving the active duty Air Force with just north of 2500 total hours, all of it in jet aircraft. I applied to all the major passenger and cargo airlines and a few of the minor ones. I got a job offer from only one, a minor regional airline, and the one with which I'm still employed nearly 30 years later.</div>
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Shortly after being hired in the early 90s, there was a mideast war and a bit of a recession. Most of the airlines with which I'd interviewed quickly started furloughing pilots, including many pilots I knew. Taking a job with a guard or reserve unit was considered furlough insurance so that's what I did as well. I never had to use that insurance policy, but knew many who did.</div>
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The quickest way to gain seniority is to find an airline with either lots of upcoming retirements, or lots of growth. My airline had virtually none of the former but lots of the latter. This allowed for a very fast four year upgrade to captain. It was, though, the last formal schoolhouse course I would take.</div>
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Even though my pay rate was not quite as good at times as some other major airlines, the time value of making that money for longer more than made up the gap. As a general rule, widebody first officer pay is roughly equivalent to narrow body captain pay, so when comparing airlines, look at your time to either widebody first officer or narrow body captain.</div>
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Consider also in your choice schedule flexibility and the ability to pick up flying. This varies greatly between airlines, but can significantly enhance your quality of life and pay. I don't pick up much flying, but we have some enterprising pilots who can routinely top 150 hours of monthly pay by working their schedules and taking advantage of premium pay rules.</div>
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<h4>
The Lost Decade</h4>
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It is difficult to convey the disaster in the commercial aviation community in the years following 9/11, unless, of course, you lived through it. Then you know all too well of the furloughs, bankruptcies, career stagnations and reversals that were emblematic of that dark time. It was also the time when mainline contract loopholes were exploited allowing an explosion of regional jet flying with pay so low that some pilots qualified for food stamp programs.<br />
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My airline was relatively unscathed by the carnage of that time, so while job security wasn't a huge concern, there were no significant raises coming either. A comparison with my wife's career is instructive here. She took a job with a major airline shortly after I got hired at my airline.<br />
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A Career Comparison</h4>
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For a short while prior to 9/11, she outearned me in the right seat of a 75/767 by a significant amount. That didn't last. A few short years later, while she was in the right seat of a 747, I outearned not only her, but also the captains with which she was flying. Her line guarantee had also been slashed to the low 60s after the bankruptcy while my guarantee was at 85 hours, but my line flying was almost always above that number.<br />
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The tear in the fabric of universe has mostly healed since then, and our pay is roughly equivalent again with her holding down a senior 777 F/O seat. She'll lap me in pay once she takes a widebody left seat which is almost attainable for her, but it will be back to working weekends and holidays for awhile albeit for a lot more money. It will be her first left seat job after 25+ years of commercial flying.<br />
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Who won? That's a tough call. I'm jealous of her 30 hr HKG layovers and license with type ratings of all the Boeings save for the 717 and 787. We sure were thankful, though, to not have to worry about a furlough or bankruptcy after 9/11. I've also never flown a redeye from SFO to EWR for an eight hour layover, or any redeye for that matter. Twenty five years in the left seat of a Boeing has to count for something as well. Judging by the 401s (she lost her pension with the bankruptcy of her airline) the money will probably end up being close to equal.<br />
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In Conclusion</h4>
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As I mentioned at the start of this essay, I've had a charmed aviation career. I'd like to say I was smart about it all, but plain dumb luck probably played a larger part than I'd like to admit. That said, if you're just starting out, take a few moments of serious reflection to decide what is most important to you, and then make your decision of how to structure your career. Good luck! I'm here for you.</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-69380538762663114312018-12-04T19:42:00.000-06:002018-12-05T09:29:49.100-06:00 The Lion Air Crash: What You Need to Know<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-RFDqXWu6SBA/XAcUaI8axnI/AAAAAAAERqY/b20nDckjNFAMRAIVr-JtS6cFP4E8_1rNQCLcBGAs/s1600/800px-Lion_Air_Boeing_737-MAX8%253B_%2540CGK_2018_%252831333957778%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="PK-REN from Jakarta, Indonesia [CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons" border="0" data-original-height="465" data-original-width="800" height="185" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-RFDqXWu6SBA/XAcUaI8axnI/AAAAAAAERqY/b20nDckjNFAMRAIVr-JtS6cFP4E8_1rNQCLcBGAs/s320/800px-Lion_Air_Boeing_737-MAX8%253B_%2540CGK_2018_%252831333957778%2529.jpg" title="" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Lion Air B737 MAX 8 (Wikimedia Commons)</td></tr>
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On October 29 of this year, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea 11 minutes after departing Jakarta for <span style="background-color: white; font-family: "times" , "time new roman" , sans-serif; text-align: center;">Pangkal Pinang with the loss of all 189 souls on board. What first called special attention to this accident was that the mishap aircraft was a brand new MAX 8 version of the venerable Boeing 737, and had been delivered to the airline less than a year earlier.</span><br />
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Also of note has been the revelation in the wake of the ongoing accident investigation that a new safety system designed to prevent stalls had been installed on the aircraft, but had not been publicized nor documented in the flight manuals used by flight crews. The flight data recorder (FDR) from the mishap aircraft has been recovered and data from that recorder shows that an errant sensor on the aircraft may have provided bad data to this new system possibly implicating it in the accident. </div>
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The investigation is ongoing and it is inappropriate to assign blame to any system or persons until the completion of the accident review, but as there is much misunderstanding concerning what information is already known, we can take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.</div>
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An Undocumented System</h4>
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The new safety system installed on the MAX version of the 737 known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS, was designed to provide a nose-down trim input during manual flight as the aircraft approached a stall. What this means in simple terms is that if a pilot is flying the aircraft without the autopilot, and is for whatever reason flying the aircraft well below a safe speed, the aircraft will automatically run the stabilizer trim forward which will have the effect of making the controls heavier to hold.<br />
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In addition, once full power is eventually applied to recover from the stall, the forward trim assists the pilot in keeping the more powerful engines on the MAX from overpowering the recovery by exceeding elevator authority. The nose tends to want to rise during a stall recovery and forward trim lessens that effect.</div>
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Here is an excerpt from the multi-user message sent by Boeing on November 10 to all 737 MAX operators:</div>
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A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.</blockquote>
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It is also important to note that any pilot finding him or herself in this position has real problems and has already disregarded the "stick shaker" stall warning system which vibrates the control column well before reaching stall speed. The reason the system was installed on the newest MAX 8 versions of the 737 and not earlier models is apparently the discovery during flight testing of some unfavorable stall characteristics on the new aircraft that did not exist on earlier models.</div>
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<h4>
Angle of Attack</h4>
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Ok, so far so good. A new safety system was installed. Who can argue with a safety system? The problem that the Lion Air flight encountered, however, was some sort of malfunction in information coming from a sensor being fed to the new system. This sensor is known as the "angle of attack" or AOA sensor. The angle of attack of a wing is the angle between the chord line of a wing and the relative wind moving across that wing. A chord line is an imaginary line which runs from the leading edge to the trailing edge of a cross section of a wing. </div>
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A wing which exceeds the critical angle of attack stalls, which is where boundary layer separation occurs and the wing stops producing lift. If you've ever stuck your hand out the window of a moving car and made a wing with it, you've experienced how changing the angle of attack changes lift. For more on AOA, see <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angle_of_attack">here</a>.</div>
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The angle of attack sensor is essentially a very small wing on a hinge mounted on the fuselage which measures direction of the relative wind passing the aircraft. You can see them installed near the pitot tubes on most airliners and there are usually at least two installed for redundancy. AOA data is used by a number of systems on an airliner, but happened to be one of the primary inputs to the MCAS system on the MAX 8 aircraft. It is here where problems occurred.</div>
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Faulty Input Means Faulty Output (GIGO)</h4>
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Analysis of the flight data recorder from the Lion Air flight revealed that the data from the two AOA sensors installed on the aircraft did not match. The left AOA sensor was recorded as giving erroneous information during the entire flight. An erroneous AOA information feed or some other malfunction is suspected to have caused the activation of the MCAS system resulting in the system trimming the aircraft in a nose down direction. During the entire flight the pilots trimmed in a nose up direction to keep the aircraft flyable, but at some point stopped trimming and allowed the MCAS system to trim the aircraft nose down to an unflyable condition.</div>
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The reason for this is unknown and may be determined when the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is recovered. Also unknown is why the pilots never used the two stabilizer cutout switches located on the center stand just behind the throttles. These switches remove all electric power from the stabilizer trim motor and would thereby deactivate the MCAS trim inputs.</div>
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In fact, on the previous flight of the mishap aircraft, a failure of a similar nature also resulted in uncommanded nose down trim inputs and required the pilots of that flight to use the cutout switches to deactivate the electric trim system. The 737 has a large manual trim control wheel mounted on the center stand that can be turned to adjust the stabilizer trim. It is normally not touched but spins as the electric trim motor is engaged. The pilots on that previous flight used the manual trim wheel to adjust the trim to safely land.</div>
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The aircraft did have maintenance performed on various airspeed, AOA and other systems in the days leading up to the mishap flight in response to several defects being written up on previous flights. The exact nature of the malfunctions and degraded systems on the mishap aircraft has yet to be determined as the investigation proceeds, but an AOA sensor had been replaced in response to writeups on the previous flight. A closer look at the flight data from both the mishap flight and the previous flight can be found <a href="https://www.satcom.guru/2018/11/first-look-at-jt610-flight-data.html">here</a>.</div>
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<h4>
Protecting Pilots From Themselves</h4>
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There is an ongoing debate in the aviation community about the benefits and liabilities of cockpit automation. This debate has centered on the effect that highly automated cockpits have tended to make pilots rusty in their "stick and rudder" or basic flying skills. Make no mistake, automation has been a boon to both aviation economics and safety, but it is now being realized that it is not an unmitigated benefit.<br />
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At question is the design philosophy incorporated into automation. Years ago, the two main commercial airframe manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, diverged in their approach to flight control automation. While Boeing aircraft have always incorporated the ability to disconnect all automation, Airbus on the other hand was a pioneer in designing "fly by wire" flight controls into their aircraft. This meant that pilot inputs were sent to a computer and the computer controlled the aircraft. There was no ability to completely bypass the computer and control the aircraft directly.<br />
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The revelation that a safety system designed to prevent an inattentive pilot from stalling the aircraft was surreptitiously installed will raise questions as to whether Boeing has decided to follow Airbus down the road of incorporating behind the scenes automation to prevent pilots from doing stupid things. Remember, the original anti-stall device was always the pilot. Warning systems could signal that the airplane was getting slow, but the pilot was always the backstop. Given that the MCAS system can be disabled by the trim cutout switches makes the above scenario less likely.<br />
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The alternate explanation to the installation of the MCAS system is that it is simply designed for the mitigation of unfavorable stall characteristics as mentioned above. This raises the question, though, of why the system would not be documented in the aircraft flight manual. Surely pilots would want to know of these unfavorable characteristics and also of the existence a system designed to compensate for those effects. Since the system was undocumented, the pilots of the mishap flight likely had no idea why their trim kept running forward nor were they expecting such behavior.<br />
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What's It Doing Now?</h4>
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It is imperative, then, that pilots are well versed in not only the normal operation of their aircraft, but also in any possible failure mode and are ready and able to assume complete command at any time that the automation is not performing as expected.<br />
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Several high profile accidents such as Air France 447 and Asiana 214 serve to highlight the potential pitfalls of flying highly automated aircraft. Part of the problem confronting pilots of these aircraft is the danger of becoming confused about what the aircraft automation is doing. Known as "mode confusion", pilots can make the mistake of assuming that the automation will perform in a certain manner and become confused if it doesn't.<br />
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This was one of the findings in the accident review of Asiana 214 which crashed into the seawall at San Francisco. The pilots realized too late that the mode that had been selected would not do what they were expecting. They were then unable to prevent the aircraft from crashing short of the runway.<br />
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Now extrapolate mode confusion to a malfunctioning system which the pilots were unaware was even installed, and you can see the difficult situation they faced.<br />
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In Conclusion</h4>
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The cause(s) for the crash of Lion Air 610 are currently unknown and will remain so until the investigation is complete. In the interim, new knowledge of the existence of an undocumented safety system installed on the 737 MAX should serve to further the debate on the appropriate role of cockpit automation.</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-15789763329747354112018-11-08T13:37:00.000-06:002018-11-09T10:55:13.085-06:00How Fast are We Really Going?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img alt="Airspeed is more than in interesting detail...it keeps you alive." height="395" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c9/True_airspeed_indicator.svg/2000px-True_airspeed_indicator.svg.png" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" title="Airspeed is Life!" width="400" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Airspeed is Life!</td></tr>
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One of the most common questions we get asked by passengers is how fast we're going. Usually it is asked about takeoff or landing as it is easy to find out how fast we're going at cruise. For that, simply look at the inflight entertainment system which gives a readout from the onboard GPS system. When I give an answer to the takeoff or landing speed, I'll say it depends. On what you may ask? It depends on many factors, to include the weight of the aircraft, the wind, the airport elevation, the runway conditions (wet or dry) and even the terrain surrounding the airport.<br />
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Even after explaining all that, I have to give an approximate answer because our airspeed up front is given to us in knots and not the more familiar miles or kilometers per hour. A "knot" is a nautical measure of speed which means nautical miles per hour. A nautical mile is 6076 feet as opposed to a statute or "normal" mile which is 5280 feet. In ancient days, sailors would feed a rope over the side of their ship for a specified amount of time and then measure the number of knots (which had been tied into the rope at regular intervals) that had been pulled overboard. The number of knots pulled over was proportional to the speed of the ship.<br />
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Later on, a nautical mile was defined as one minute of arc along a meridian (north-south line) on a nautical chart. This made chart reading easier and was picked up by aviation as a standard navigation protocol since early overwater aviators would have to use the same charts as used for surface navigation.<br />
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That all sounds very interesting, but are we really using the GPS readout to determine our takeoff and landing speeds? No. We are not. Airplanes stay in the air by virtue of the wind moving over the wings. Not enough wind, the wing stalls and it drops like a rock. The question is how do we know how much wind is moving over the wing?<br />
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Wind Over the Wings</h4>
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To determine how much wind is flowing over the wings we use an airspeed indicator which is simply a sensor connected by plastic tubing to those odd shaped pointy things you see attached to the fuselage near the front of any airliner. Those are called pitot tubes. The tip of a pitot tube has a small opening which is connected by tubing to a pressure sensor. A measure of the air pressure from the pitot tube when compared to the ambient pressure is proportional to the speed of the aircraft through the air.<br />
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Pitot tubes, in combination with static ports (which measure ambient pressure) and their related indicators, are collectively known as the pitot-static system, and constitute one of the most vital systems on any airplane. This is why you usually see so many pitot tubes on the front of airliners. They provide redundancy.<br />
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At this point you may be raising an objection: But isn't air a compressible fluid, and wouldn't this compressibility skew the results as, say, temperature changed or other conditions changed? Why yes, yes they would Poindexter. Move to the front row and give yourself a star.<br />
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ICE-T (Not a drink from Long Island)</h4>
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Pilots of a certain age will remember the torture inflicted by their instructors by being required to perform the dreaded "ICE-T" problem using the E6B government issue "whizz wheel" circular slide rule. This usually occurred as they were struggling to realize their dream of being a jet pilot while attempting to not throw up in the flying sterno can known as the T-37 in the west Texas summer heat. ICE-T was not an exotic drink from Long Island, but rather an acronym which stood for <b>I</b>ndicated <b>C</b>alibrated <b>E</b>quivalent <b>T</b>rue airspeed. These terms referred to an airspeed conversion from the indicated speed shown on your panel to your actual velocity through the air known as "true" airspeed.<br />
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Performing this calculation was a drawn out process using inputs such as your pressure altitude and temperature deviation (from a standard day). It was necessary because your "true" airspeed was used in navigation calculations such as time-distance-fuel determinations.<br />
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Today, of course, those calculations are all automated by an onboard computer known as the air data inertial reference unit or ADIRU. This system takes all the pitot static input data and combines it with attitude and position data from the inertial reference units (IRUs) to provide one stop shopping data supply to the pilots' displays, the autopilot, and even the engines which use the data to optimize things like fuel burn.<br />
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Do We Have Enough Gas?</h4>
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Once you know your "true" airspeed or actual velocity through the air, you need to apply your known wind correction to determine your actual velocity across the ground. This is important, because if the headwind is, say, 30 knots stronger than what you planned for, you might not have enough fuel to reach your destination. This can ruin your day on a long overwater leg.<br />
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In years gone by, flight plans would be "winded" with the latest forecast from aviation meteorologists. The plan was only as good as the forecast, and fuel needed to be closely monitored to determine if actual headwinds were greater than forecast. INS (inertial navigation) and GPS systems have greatly increased the accuracy of fuel planning as they give real time wind readouts. You instantly know if your plan was accurate.<br />
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Wind correction data input, as you might imagine, is also automated on modern transport aircraft and fed into the aircraft's flight management system (FMS) through an automatic data upload. This system will give you a helpful INSUFFICIENT FUEL warning if it thinks you're not going to make it. Usually this warning means that you fat-fingered your flight plan input and told the airplane that you're going back to your origination as your destination or some similar easily rectified mistake.<br />
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In Conclusion</h4>
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Airspeed is important for reasons beyond satisfying the curiosity of aviation fans. In the immediate short term, it keeps airplanes aloft by informing pilots when they are getting slow, which is an unforgivable sin in aviation. In the long term, knowing ground speed, which is derived from airspeed plus wind inputs, lets pilots know that they will arrive at their destination with enough fuel.</div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-84017383006028086302018-04-09T18:30:00.000-05:002018-04-09T18:30:13.598-05:00Is the Airline Hub History?<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wNPmjMDMins/Wsv1E8aJXRI/AAAAAAAEJK8/mM_XWbqojSocMBqnszveKdaAb8_xsqAZgCLcBGAs/s1600/Bombardier%252C_BD-500_CSeries_CS300%252C_C-FFDK_%252818777967098%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="683" data-original-width="1024" height="213" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wNPmjMDMins/Wsv1E8aJXRI/AAAAAAAEJK8/mM_XWbqojSocMBqnszveKdaAb8_xsqAZgCLcBGAs/s320/Bombardier%252C_BD-500_CSeries_CS300%252C_C-FFDK_%252818777967098%2529.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Photo - Eric Salard CC BY-SA 2.0</span></td></tr>
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A reader sent me <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/escape-from-hell-you-will-never-have-to-land-in-a-hub-airport-again">this article</a> from the Daily Beast (good God, man! What are you reading <i>that</i> for?) which foresees the denouement of the airline hub due to the arrival of a new class of commuter jets which can hop from destination to destination while skipping hubs.<br />
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Once those [smaller] jets reach the airlines they will have the same hub-killing effect in the rest of the world as here. Given the choice of flying a straight line from A to B instead of having to change airplanes on the way is a no-brainer in any language.</blockquote>
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While the article gives a decent roundup of the recent history of the airline industry and the introduction of smaller yet longer range commuter jets, it should have been written about 15 years ago. The Canadair CRJ-200 first flew in 1991 and along with the Embraer ERJ series of regional aircraft came to dominate the regional airline market through the 2000s.<br />
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These smaller, faster jets held promise to both serve smaller markets from fortress hub airports, or to skip the hub entirely and fly point to point. Analysts thought they'd be handy in poaching passengers from a rival's hub as well. As it turned out, the hub killer commuter jet was anything but.<br />
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Primarily deployed by regional airlines which wet-leased their aircraft and crews to a major airline partner, commuter jets mostly enhanced hub operations by offering service to smaller "spoke" airports which couldn't support full narrow body service.<br />
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Airline hubs have always been inefficient in their use of crews and equipment, but very efficient in revenue generation using the ability to create many different city pairs. Point to point regional operations were never embraced by the major airlines which viewed those operations as subtracting value from sizable investments in their hubs.<br />
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The old Canadair and Embraer CRJ and ERJ jets are now being replaced by newer more comfortable "C" and "E" series jets but I don't see the economics changing much. In fact, an ongoing pilot shortage seems to be making some major airlines reconsider their relationships with their regional partners. Bringing their regional operations in-house means that they're more likely to retain the pilots they have brought onto their master seniority lists.<br />
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For instance, both United and Delta have recently purchased regional aircraft directly, though United may still have their regional aircraft flown by one of their regional partners.<br />
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However it shakes out, it doesn't appear, though, that the airline hub will be going anywhere soon.<br />
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-47767878719345355992018-04-05T14:01:00.000-05:002018-04-05T14:14:00.352-05:00The Deadly Flaw Hiding in Self Driving Cars and Pilotless Airplanes (Hint: It's Humans)<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-t-NZU9J_mAo/WsZvm42UxhI/AAAAAAAEJJo/QFSgolLcGrgYWaW6mk9ijsoEnNx0sUFQACLcBGAs/s1600/Uber_car_with_lidar-001.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="612" data-original-width="750" height="261" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-t-NZU9J_mAo/WsZvm42UxhI/AAAAAAAEJJo/QFSgolLcGrgYWaW6mk9ijsoEnNx0sUFQACLcBGAs/s320/Uber_car_with_lidar-001.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">Photo: Timtempleton CC BY-SA 4.0</span></td></tr>
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A common theme on this blog has been about the promise—and pitfalls, of automation in aviation. Pilotless airplanes have been trumpeted simultaneously as the final nail in the coffin of aviation accidents and as the solution to the ongoing worldwide pilot shortage.<br />
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Not to be outdone in the hyperbole of the future department, driverless cars are heralded as the end of everything from traffic jams and fatalities to the need to even own an automobile. Simply summon one on your smartphone and away you go to the opera or to work.<br />
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The reality of the future, while not thwarting all those dreams outright, may be riding the brakes a bit.<br />
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The fatal collision between a driverless Uber car and a pedestrian last month is calling into question the idea that driverless technology is ready for prime time. And the interesting part is that Uber, for their part, thought the same thing. Their driverless car wasn't really driverless, but had a driver hired for the purpose of sitting behind the wheel to take over if the machine made a mistake.<br />
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Well, the machine made a mistake when a woman crossed the road outside of a crosswalk and was hit and later died of her injuries. Tragic as that was, it is inevitable that these types of accidents are going to occur. Sensor technology, while good and getting better, still has a long way to go. If you find it difficult to drive in heavy rain or snow, machines have even more <a href="https://www.edmunds.com/car-news/ford-google-self-driving-cars-tackle-challenges-of-snow-and-rain.html">difficulty</a>.<br />
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These problems will eventually be solved, but in the interim, it will be up to humans, whether in the car, or at a remote facility, to monitor the machines. In this case, the human monitor was not able to avert the crash. This, then, is the flaw in the system: humans make lousy monitors of machines, be it an autonomous car or an automation flown airliner.<br />
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A recent article in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/most-stressful-job-on-the-road-not-driving-an-autonomous-car-1522000393?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=13">WSJ</a> highlighted the stressful nature of the job for which Uber's monitor/drivers were responsible:<br />
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“The computer is fallible, so it’s the human who is supposed to be perfect,” one former Uber test driver said. “It’s kind of the reverse of what you think about computers.”</blockquote>
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Also, as autonomous technology improves, the need for drivers to take action diminishes, making it harder to stay focused, test drivers said.</blockquote>
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Humans, being human, become bored and distracted after a very short period of time. Well, then, you might say, we should employ other machines to watch the machines. This begs the question of what the monitor machine (or more likely software) should watch and why couldn't this functionality be incorporated into the primary control software.<br />
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This also gets to the nature of how machines think versus how humans think. Humans are better than machines at processing ambiguous information and confronting situations which are new to them. AI, or artificial intelligence, is how software engineers hope to emulate the human ability to make decisions when confronted with novel situations which haven't been pre-programmed.<br />
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This capability is getting better all the time, but has a way to go before humans can be completely written out of the equation. In the meantime, humans will need to be somewhere in the control loop. We should all hope that the human monitor isn't dozing when the sun gets in the eyes of the computer driven car while we're crossing the street.<br />
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-20231134663523942242018-04-04T16:32:00.000-05:002018-04-04T16:36:08.317-05:00Air Force Reserve Adds New Commitment for Pilots and Maintainers<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;">U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo</span></td></tr>
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The Air Force Reserve just added an additional six month <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force-reserve-adds-6-month-service-commitment-for-pilots-maintainers-1.520320">commitment</a> for pilots and maintainers who wish to separate or retire.<br />
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While being careful to not call this new requirement a "stop-loss", the AF Reserve is adding on six months of involuntary service in addition to whatever service requirements were previously imposed. The military typically adds mandatory service requirements for things like aircraft qualification courses, professional development courses, and permanent change of station moves.<br />
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I find it interesting that the AF Reserve has to implement controls like this as membership as a traditional reservist typically requires as little as a few days per month up to about a week and a half per month for combat ready flight crews. In addition, reservists are protected from discrimination or firing by their civilian employers by a law known as USERRA.<br />
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What this telegraphs is that as the commitments, deployments, and tasking of the reserve forces increases, reservists, who already have a civilian career as a pilot or maintainer, are calling it quits.<br />
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What military planners seem to fail to realize is that pushing on the combined active/reserve water balloon in one place will result in a bulge in another place. That is to say that there is no free lunch. Higher tasking and deployments for the guard and reserves, most of whose members came from the active forces, will force an exodus from those organizations as well.<br />
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The military should either accept higher personnel loss rates in a good economy and spend the money and resources on training replacements, or, here is a novel idea: just start to say no to increased tasking, though that would require a higher degree of testicular fortitude than is normally displayed in the flag ranks.<br />
<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-90281686123696330072018-04-02T14:15:00.002-05:002018-04-02T14:15:18.024-05:00The Dominoes Fall: Goodbye Great Lakes Airlines<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJqcN9rGkoLjPkBZNma_rwkFGNsKDF4148bjMxCf6xs63JulRXui1ODTl3XPNvBbTNZSYUwSts1FNXEDcjFQ0huiepIMxzfu6NfG6W_sozf4E8VizHqPLWIhQM_guXgtobRY6IKw/s1600/1200px-Great_Lakes_Airlines_-_N201GL_-_B1900D_%2528QUINTIN_SOLOVIEV_-_QFS_AVIATION%2529.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img alt="By Quintin Soloviev - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=58727240" border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="1200" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJqcN9rGkoLjPkBZNma_rwkFGNsKDF4148bjMxCf6xs63JulRXui1ODTl3XPNvBbTNZSYUwSts1FNXEDcjFQ0huiepIMxzfu6NfG6W_sozf4E8VizHqPLWIhQM_guXgtobRY6IKw/s320/1200px-Great_Lakes_Airlines_-_N201GL_-_B1900D_%2528QUINTIN_SOLOVIEV_-_QFS_AVIATION%2529.jpg" title="" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="background: none rgb(248, 249, 250); color: #a55858; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: xx-small; text-align: start;">Photo - <a class="new" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Quinti9&action=edit&redlink=1" style="background: none rgb(248, 249, 250); color: #a55858; font-family: sans-serif; text-align: start;" title="User:Quinti9 (page does not exist)">Quintin Soloviev</a> </span></td></tr>
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Great Lakes Airlines, a regional airline serving the upper midwest part of the US has <a href="https://tinyurl.com/yce2b2rv">shut down</a> operations as of last week.<br />
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In a statement released, the management of the airline blamed their woes on the 1500 minimum hour for pilots rule imposed by Congress in the wake of the 2009 crash of a Colgan commuter aircraft. Great Lakes management has had trouble finding pilots to fly their Beech 1900 aircraft.<br />
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A lively debate currently continues as to the efficacy of the 1500 hr rule which mandates that all pilots have a minimum of 1500 hours of experience before being able to serve as a pilot on a commercial passenger carrying aircraft. It has been noted by opponents of the rule that both pilots on the fated Colgan airliner had the minimum 1500 hours and that the rule would not have prevented that crash. The accident review blamed fatigue and training issues with the captain of that flight.<br />
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I am personally agnostic about this rule noting that the USAF and other military services can produce competent pilots with about 200 hours of experience. On the other hand, their training is estimated to cost about $1 million per pilot.<br />
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Also, there is an ongoing worldwide pilot shortage occurring in many countries without such an onerous hours requirement. The pilot shortage is a multi-faceted problem which will not likely be solved with the repeal of the 1500 hour rule.<br />
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-74631612471435398702018-03-22T23:07:00.000-05:002019-03-14T12:37:37.416-05:00Boeing 737 MAX 8 Pilot Report<br />
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The Boeing 737 first flew in 1967 and since then has become the world's best selling airliner with Boeing just recently delivering the 10,000th 737 to Southwest Airlines. Major updates and enhancements over the decades mean that the newest generation of 737s, the MAX series, while bearing a family resemblance to the earliest models, is packed with the latest technology in avionics and propulsion.<br />
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I recently had the opportunity to fly a 737 MAX 8 for the first time. We had been scheduled to fly a 737-800 for the sequence, so when a MAX 8 showed up I was quite pleasantly surprised. My next concern was whether I'd remember anything about the new features of the airplane. Our differences training had been accomplished months earlier through an online course. As it turned out, there was little to be concerned about as the cockpit displays, while larger, incorporate all of the familiar elements from the NexGen series with a few welcome additions. (The NexGen 737s consist of the 600-900 series first introduced in the late 90s) I felt at home in the MAX cockpit right away.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Pilot's primary NAV display with terrain mode selected</td></tr>
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The MAX 8 in our configuration has a 175 seat single class capacity with a standard crew complement of four flight attendants and two pilots. The layout and galleys are very similar to our -800s. There are two lavs aft and one forward. The MAX comes equipped with Boeing's new Sky Interior which features programmable LED lighting and mood music for boarding and deplaning. The seats themselves have adjustable headrests and a generous 32" seat pitch and 17.6" width, the widest of any 737 variant.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Boeing Sky Interior with programmable LED lighting</td></tr>
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Moving back up front, the most dramatic feature of the MAX is the cockpit displays. The six 7 inch square display units in the NexGen (NG) aircraft have been replaced by four 15 inch wide display units. Separate mechanical features of the NG such as the flap indicators and clock are now displayed on these larger units. The gear handle and standby flight instruments have been relocated between the center displays and are now equidistant from both pilots.<br />
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Preflight, Engine Start, and Taxi Out</h4>
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We were scheduled to operate as WN 5599 from DCA (Washington Reagan) to MCO (Orlando). The enroute burn was planned at 1+59 and 9000 lbs at an altitude of FL400 or 40,000 ft. The aircraft was carrying two deferred maintenance items, the onboard network system, and the first officer's ILS system resulting in a downgrade to CAT I ILS status. As the weather was VMC at both our departure and destination, this was not a concern.<br />
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Our takeoff weight was planned at 144,400 lbs, well below our max allowable of 159,800 lbs departing from runway 1 in DCA. Our maximum takeoff weight was determined by the maximum allowable structural landing weight of 150,800 lbs plus our planned burn of 9000 lbs. The planned fuel was 14,900 lbs which included 2000 lbs of contingency fuel in addition to the standard 45 minutes of FAR reserve or 3200 lbs. I was immediately impressed in how little fuel it was going to take us to get to Florida.<br />
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The LEAP-1B engines deployed on the MAX are 15% more fuel efficient than the CFM56 series engines on the NG aircraft. These efficiencies are the result of an increase in the bypass ratio from five on the CFM56 to nine on the LEAP-1B and an internal pressure ratio increase from 11:1 to 22:1. A significant weight reduction in the rotor of the LEAP-1B adds to the fuel efficiency of the engine but also adds some restrictions on start and shutdown which I'll address later.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Fan blades of the LEAP-1B</td></tr>
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Our preflight checks and flows were nearly identical to our NG aircraft. Our clearance from DCA was on the Boock2 RNAV departure. Departing to the north from DC always requires extra vigilance due to the proximity of the prohibited areas around the White House and the Naval Observatory where the vice president's residence is located. The authorities have an extreme lack of understanding and humor should an airliner even brush into one of these areas. The departure requires an immediate left turn after liftoff to track the Potomac. As the wind was gusting out of the northwest, I elected to engage LNAV lateral navigation on the ground to have lateral guidance immediately after takeoff.<br />
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Once we were loaded and had clearance from ground control, we started the pushback and start sequence. The restrictions on starting which I noted above now came into play. The rotor, or the spinning center shaft of the engine, had so much weight shaved off that it could have a tendency to bow when hot after shutdown. This bowing could cause the compressor blades to rub against the engine housing resulting in excess wear and possible compressor stalls on start due to air leaking around the gaps.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">A view from the wheel well</td></tr>
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To mitigate against this thermal bow effect, the computer will motor the engine before introducing fuel during the start sequence. The amount of anti-bow motoring is determined by the computer but can be up to several minutes before the fuel lever can be raised to start each engine. Once started, there is an additional three minute warm up period before takeoff thrust can be applied. This restriction is five minutes when the engine is started cold. There is also a firm three minute cool down period required before shut down as well. These restrictions will most likely not pose a problem except perhaps when you've pushed back onto a taxiway where other aircraft have to wait for you.<br />
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The quietness of the aircraft became immediately apparent as soon as the engines were started. It is truly a quiet airplane. I fly with a Bose noise cancelling headset and didn't notice until we were nearly level at 40,000 ft that I hadn't turned on the noise cancelling feature. It was that quiet. The LEAP-1B engine employs the same scalloped or saw tooth pattern on the trailing edge of the cowling that is evident on the 787. This design smooths the mixing of the core and fan airflows, significantly reducing turbulent flow and noise.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Scalloped cowling decreases engine noise (and looks cool)</td></tr>
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The aircraft steering had a nice tight feel to it, but any new aircraft should. I won't miss the wobbly shopping-cart nosewheel steering of our old -300s, which were retired last year. We were cleared for takeoff with little delay and were on our way.<br />
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Takeoff and Climbout</h4>
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The takeoff roll was unremarkable save for the quietness of the engines. We had calculated a reduced thrust takeoff power setting, but the aircraft accelerated and lifted off smartly. The LNAV course became active almost immediately and we started our left turnout on the departure. I hand flew the aircraft up to about 18,000 ft before engaging the autopilot. I thought the aircraft responded to manual controls similarly to our 800 series aircraft.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Pilot's inboard display with vertical situation and enhanced engine instrument display</td></tr>
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The Boock2 departure tracks north and then makes a right turn for a nice view of the city...from the right seat! We quickly arrived at our cruise altitude of 40,000 ft, turned off the seat belt sign, and had some time to look at the new features on the displays. Other than being nearly twice as large as the NG displays, some new features such as a vertical situation display are included. When activated, this feature displays a side view of the aircraft's altitude and planned vertical navigation. It should come in handy for keeping situational awareness during complicated arrivals or when given a "descend via" clearance.<br />
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<h4>
Descent and Approach</h4>
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Our flight plan had us flying the Cwrld4 arrival from over Ormond Beach. This arrival set us up nicely for a VFR downwind arrival to Orlando's Rwy 35R. The arrival went smoothly with the autopilot easily staying on path in VNAV. Our arrival weight was very close to the planned 135,400 lbs and we had planned for a flaps 30 visual approach. We were just about abeam the field at perhaps 3000 ft when we got the clearance for a visual approach, my favorite kind of clearance.</div>
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Depending on controller preferences and traffic load, some controllers will call your every turn around the pattern. This type of hand holding can be annoying, especially if there is no other traffic in the pattern. Other controllers will just let you go to turn your own base and final. This was one of the other guys and he cut us loose. The key is to not screw it up and fly a bomber (wide) pattern or to cut in so tight that you end up going around. I disengaged the autopilot and autothrottles, and proceeded to fly the pattern by hand to get a feel for how the MAX flew in the slow speed regime.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The engine instruments display can be selected for either side </td></tr>
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Flying a visual approach cross cockpit can have its own challenges as you can't readily see the runway, which is the primary reference in any visual pattern. Inside cockpit references can be used such as the FMC glidepath, wind arrow, runway DME (distance), and of course the best resource, the guy or gal sitting on that side of the airplane.</div>
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I'd been descending on downwind with flaps at position 1 for extra drag. While I'll use the speedbrakes if I need them, my preference is to avoid using them if possible. Pulling the nose up, dropping the gear and extending flaps on schedule is my preferred technique for getting configured quickly. The MAX went through her paces brilliantly and we were lined up on glidepath about three miles out when I brought the power up. While I had to take a second look or two to see the electronic flap gauge and newly positioned gear indicator lights, I quickly adjusted to their new locations.</div>
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Landing and Taxi In</h4>
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The landing was uneventful and rather smooth if I do say so myself. The aircraft decelerated smoothly with the reversers and auto-brakes while the quietness of the engines again made itself apparent. We exited on the high speed and taxied to our gate. We had to start the timer after leaving the runway to ensure that we complied with the mandatory three minute cool down period before shutting down the engines. It wasn't a factor in this case as the taxi time was longer than three minutes.</div>
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The LEAP-1B engines are eight inches in diameter larger than the CFM engines on the NG, so in order to maintain the same ground clearance, the nose gear was lengthened about eight inches. This gives a slightly different picture while taxiing, but I found the landing picture to be very similar to the -800. The longer nose strut becomes apparent after lowering the nose to the runway but it was not disconcerting.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-HSoqEJVulPs/WrR1sky98KI/AAAAAAAEIkY/L07-E022Aw01y5xBGI3ZtjWTYbtvr1V-QCKgBGAs/s1600/DSCF4591-Edit.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1600" data-original-width="1067" height="320" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-HSoqEJVulPs/WrR1sky98KI/AAAAAAAEIkY/L07-E022Aw01y5xBGI3ZtjWTYbtvr1V-QCKgBGAs/s320/DSCF4591-Edit.jpg" width="213" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">APU fairing</td></tr>
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After shut down, we had a 45 or so minute turn at the gate before our next leg which was to Philadelphia. I took this time to walk outside and take a few photos of the jet. The most obvious difference in the MAX is the larger engines and slightly different looking winglets than those installed on our -800s. Also different is the APU fairing which resembles that of the 767 or 787 more so than earlier model 737s. Other than that, there are not a lot of obvious tells to set a MAX apart from its NG sistren.</div>
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The Mighty MAX Strikes Out</h4>
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Our flight to Philly was completely full at 175 passengers plus crew. Once loaded and ready to go, we pushed back and went through the lengthened start up process. It was on taxi out to the runway that the MAX let us down. Shortly after leaving the ramp and joining the parallel taxiway to Rwy 35L, the Master Caution and the L Elev Pitot heat light came on. This meant that a fault had occurred in the heating element for the elevator pitot tube which provides airspeed inputs to the elevator feel system.</div>
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As Orlando is a maintenance base for us, I made the decision to return to the gate and have our mechanics look at the problem. As it turns out, this malfunction can be deferred through the use of the minimum equipment list (MEL). There are two of these systems installed and only one is required for flight with some restrictions. It was this restriction that sank us.</div>
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The mechanics noted that this tail number had a history of this particular malfunction, but they had the deferral paperwork done very quickly and we were ready to go...or so I thought. The next thing we heard over the gate agent's radio was that the airplane was being taken out of service. I quickly called dispatch and our dispatcher didn't even know what was happening. A phone call to the supervisor of dispatch revealed that while the flight to Philly was fine, it was the subsequent flight to Chicago that was the problem.</div>
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The restriction for this maintenance deferral was that the aircraft couldn't be operated in forecast or actual icing conditions. And it turns out that the forecast for Chicago was a broken cloud layer with temperatures below freezing. The supervisor of dispatch didn't want the airplane stuck in Philly, so we lost our beautiful MAX. Luckily for us (and 175 passengers), another airplane was available. Tail swapping a full airplane took about an hour, but we were glad to be going again, only this time in an 800 series.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-VVN3u_x_wwU/WrR3-z-f4SI/AAAAAAAEIko/vr1EfKWHaH8ky6zY46nWMkG_ICaGSRUogCKgBGAs/s1600/DSCF4552.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1067" data-original-width="1600" height="213" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-VVN3u_x_wwU/WrR3-z-f4SI/AAAAAAAEIko/vr1EfKWHaH8ky6zY46nWMkG_ICaGSRUogCKgBGAs/s320/DSCF4552.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The author in the corner office</td></tr>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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The 737 MAX is loaded with new technology which makes it a pleasure to fly and saves a bunch of money in fuel costs which should make airline managements happy. But even with all the new technology, the airplane is still a 737 at heart and was quite easy to fly. The LEAP-1B engines are whisper quiet and the large displays present data in an elegant and easy to understand format. Of course, as we discovered, there will always be some bugs that need to be squashed in a new system, but I am quite confident that the MAX has a long and productive future in front of her.<br />
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<i style="background-color: white; font-family: "Crimson Text";">Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. All photos by Robert Graves.</i></div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-5339821798716583802018-03-16T15:41:00.000-05:002018-03-16T15:53:19.191-05:00Will the Air Force Ever Get Their New Tanker Aircraft?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img alt="Image result for kc-46" height="212" src="https://media.defense.gov/2013/Apr/09/2000060258/-1/-1/0/130409-F-ZU869-003.JPG" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" width="320" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">KC-46 [Official USAF illustration]</td></tr>
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The Air Force has been trying to replace their aging KC-135 tanker aircraft...for decades. There is a replacement aircraft, the KC-46, which is nearly ready to go, but the program has been plagued by scandal and delays for many years. And now, on the eve of the new aircraft's introduction into operational service, more delays have been announced. Let's take a look at the long and sorry history of this program.</div>
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First fielded in the late 1950s, the KC-135 Stratotanker has been the mainstay of the Air Force's aerial tanker fleet. Supplemented by the addition of the KC-10 tanker variant of the DC-10 airliner in the early 80s, USAF's tanker fleet has grown advanced in age and maintenance requirements to stay mission ready. A re-engining program which replaced the original Pratt and Whitney J-57 turbojets with modern CFM-56 high bypass turbofans did help to extend the life of the KC-135, but these 1950s era aircraft are entering their seventh decade of service and are in need of replacement.</div>
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Enter the KC-767</h4>
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Starting in 2002, the Air Force explored the replacement of the KC-135 with a tanker variant of the Boeing 767 airliner to be known as the KC-767. Other potential aircraft considered to be used as a platform for the new tanker were the 747, the MD-11, the A-310, which had already been converted into a tanker in Germany, and the C-17. An Airbus version of the A-330 airliner to be known as the KC-330 was also evaluated with the decision eventually made to go with the Boeing KC-767 plane.</div>
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After the decision awarding the contract to Boeing was announced, allegations of corruption surfaced. A resulting congressional investigation turned up evidence that the competition had been rigged in favor of Boeing. An Air Force program manager and Boeing executive were eventually convicted and served jail time for their roles in the scandal. KC-767 aircraft went on to be built by Boeing and sold to the Italian Air Force and Japanese Self Defense Force.</div>
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The KC-767 acquisition program was cancelled by the Air Force in 2006 followed by a request for proposals for a new tanker replacement program to be known as the KC-X. Boeing offered a different variant of the 767 airliner after deciding against a 777 version. Airbus partnered with Northrup Grumman to propose an A-330 based tanker now known as the KC-30.</div>
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This time the contract was awarded to the Airbus tanker over the Boeing entry. Alleging bidding improprieties, Boeing started a public relations campaign to have the decision reversed. After the GAO confirmed Boeing's allegations, the program was opened for a rebid with Boeing winning the award over Airbus in February of 2011, nearly 10 years after the start of the process.</div>
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The KC-46 Pegasus Comes to Life (Sort of)</h4>
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Design work began on the new aircraft immediately with the contract calling for the first deliveries of operational aircraft in 2017. Snafus in the program followed shortly thereafter. In 2014 it was discovered that a significant amount of wiring had to be redesigned due to safety concerns. Boeing took a $425 million charge in 2014 due to the delays and extra costs essentially guaranteeing that the program would be unprofitable for the company after winning the contract on a fixed cost basis. </div>
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More delays and charges were taken in 2015 due to problems identified in the fuel system. The first flight of the aircraft in its final configuration occurred on September 25th of that year, but delays nearly ensured that an already aggressive test flight program would be difficult to achieve in the allotted time. In May of 2016, another six month delay was announced due to supply chain problems. By that time Boeing had already taken nearly $1.5 billion in cost overruns against the program.</div>
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By mid 2016 it became apparent that there was a growing likelihood that Boeing would not be able to deliver the first 18 KC-46 aircraft to the Air Force by the agreed upon date of August 2017. At that point discussions were started as to what sort of penalties would be levied against Boeing. Additional cost overruns by this time had raised Boeing's out of pocket costs for the program to about $1.9 billion.</div>
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New technical problems with the boom refueling system and delays in the certification of the centerline drogue and wing refueling pods pushed the projected delivery of the first 18 aircraft into the first half of 2018.</div>
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As the program currently stands, ongoing boom refueling control problems, lack of a supplemental FAA certification, and problems with the HF radio system which may result in arcing on the skin of the aircraft (generally bad in a refueling aircraft) are pushing initial delivery well into 2018, over a year late.</div>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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The military procurement system has always been somewhat of slow motion train wreck resulting in weapons systems designed by committee and costing taxpayers billions of dollars over what they should, but this program should win an award for dragging a simple tanker replacement out decades.<br />
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Many times the delivered systems then do not work as advertised or are so laden down with useless features so as to be worse than the systems they replace. Expensive fixes then need to be designed and installed to fix poor initial design. There has to be a better way.</div>
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Add to this the overly aggressive bidding and promises made by Boeing in order to ensure that they got the contract and it seems like this decades long disaster will leave no winners on the field. </div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-74115530707035127272018-03-08T15:49:00.000-06:002018-03-08T15:49:25.987-06:00 Do I Talk Too Much? A Primer on Airline PA Announcements <br />
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The chapter in Tom Wolfe's novel, <i><u>The Right Stuff</u></i>, which introduces us to Chuck Yeager, starts with this vignette:<br />
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">Anyone who travels very much on airlines in the United States soon gets to know the voice of the airline </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">pilot—coming over the intercom with a particular drawl, a particular folksiness, a particular down-home calmness that is so exaggerated it begins to parody itself (nevertheless!-it's reassuring) the voice that tells you, as the airliner is caught in thunderheads and goes bolting up and down a thousand feet at a single gulp, to check your seat belts because "it might get a little choppy"...</span></blockquote>
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Wolfe went on to describe how that drawl, which characterizes the "pilot voice", had its genesis in Chuck Yeager's West Virginia cool-as-a-cucumber mein and delivery.<br />
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That southern drawl style of voice can still occasionally be heard over an airline PA, but it seems to have been eclipsed in recent years by the nondescript mid-Atlantic patois of most television news anchors. And that is too bad. A certain cachet has been lost in my opinion, but then again, a fake accent is probably worse than no accent.<br />
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My real problem with airline PA announcements, however, has nothing to do with the delivery, but rather the content and timeliness. We actually do talk too much when we should probably shut up and not enough when something needs to be said. Let me explain:<br />
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Mandatory versus Optional</h4>
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Pilot PA announcements are prescribed in our manuals as either customer service announcements, which are mostly optional, or required safety announcements, which are mandatory. There is little that can be done about the mandatory safety announcements such as those required when the seat belt sign is cycled on or off, but it is the customer service announcements which can probably use the most improvement.<br />
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We are encouraged to give an opening PA to introduce ourselves and to give some information about the flight. My problem starts right away when pilots introduce themselves using first names only such as "Bob and Tom". Perhaps I'm just old school, but when I hear that, I can't help but think I've tapped into the Wiggles channel, or perhaps wandered into a birthday party at a Chuck E. Cheese joint. Our informality infection has progressed just a bit far. Professionals should try to look <i><b>and sound</b></i> the part.<br />
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After the introduction comes a several minute soliloquy about the length of the flight, the filed altitude, the expected ride enroute, the destination weather, and those super gals and guys serving you in the back. Perhaps there was a time in years past when this information was not publicly available to anyone who cared to know, but that time has long since passed. Nearly all that information is now easily available on the iPad that every passenger will now have to put down while Captain America, er, Bob, rambles on for interminable minutes.<br />
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Opening PAs should be short, to the point, and only offer information that is not already available through the internet or the airplane's entertainment center. If the destination weather must be given, "partly cloudy and breezy" will suffice rather than well, folks, there's a scattered layer at 3000 ft and a broken layer at 12,000 ft with 8 miles of visibility and the winds at 320 degrees at 8 gust 15 knots. Passengers' heads often cock when hearing such details much in the same way as your dog's head does when you try to explain the theory of relativity. Passengers aren't trained in pilot jargon.<br />
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Silence is Not Always Golden</h4>
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Now if things are going to be out of the ordinary, such as being so turbulent that the flight attendants won't be getting out of their seats, or there's an ATC departure delay, then that is worth passing along. This brings us to the times when something needs to be said and yet only golden silence prevails. If the push time is 0900 and it's, say, 0905 and we haven't pushed, a PA should be made to inform the customers that, yes, we know that we're now late, and here's the reason, and here, also, is when we expect to be moving. Not announcing those things makes it seem like the pilots are hoping that no one notices. They do.<br />
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This is especially important during lengthy ATC or maintenance delays. If we're stuck at the gate for an extended period of time, I personally like to give an update every 10 to 15 minutes. This won't be a long announcement but rather something along the lines of yes, the mechanics are still working the problem, but we expect that we will eventually be under way in so many minutes.<br />
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Honesty is (Usually) the Best Policy</h4>
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Many pilots prefer to use euphemisms when describing things like turbulence or maintenance issues. I personally prefer an honest but not too detailed description of weather and mechanical issues. If we're expecting moderate turbulence, I'll use that term instead of "really bumpy". If there is a line of thunderstorms ahead, I'll say that. If those terms scramble someone's eggs, perhaps they should not be flying. </div>
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Likewise, if we have a mechanical issue, I'll mention the system that is affected without going into unnecessary detail. "Folks, we have an electrical problem" is probably better understood rather than the number 2 transformer/rectifier is showing zero amperage (usually followed by a detailed discussion of what a T/R even is).</div>
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One thing to be careful about concerning maintenance announcements is the subject of deferrals. Most people expect that their airplane is perfectly functional all the time and will likely not understand the concept of redundant systems and deferred maintenance. In those cases, I'll usually announce that the mechanic has the problem squared away and we'll be departing soon.</div>
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Apologies</h4>
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Is there anything more annoying than modern day customer care speak? Endless <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9rkYiYPKKlQ">apologies</a> followed by assurances that your experience and well being are of the highest concern have become a ubiquitous soundtrack to life in our deracinated corporate infused existence. A bit of real talk is a great antidote and is usually well appreciated by people trapped in an aluminum tube for extended periods of time. </div>
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If we (the airline) screwed something up, I like to say so, but if that's not the case, I'll say that as well such as "our good friends at the FAA have instituted a flow control program". Another annoying tic that I hear occasionally on the PA is the airing of dirty internal laundry such as "well, folks, we're ready to go but the ground ops folks are dragging their feet getting the plane serviced." When speaking to customers, you are the voice of the corporation. They don't know or care about internecine tribal spats.</div>
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Flight Attendant Announcements</h4>
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Admittedly, most of the announcements you hear on an airliner come from the flight attendants. Cut them some slack because most of what they say is mandated by either the corporation or the FAA. And I wholly approve of pre-recorded safety videos that are now becoming common. I'd much rather watch a professionally produced safety video than listen to a harried flight attendant rush through a safety demo for the fourth time that day. Other announcements such as the mandatory seatbelt sign notification are also being automated on newer aircraft.</div>
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Humor of course always has its place in airline PAs, but like wearing Spandex, only certain people can pull it off. Unfortunately, most of those that do, probably shouldn't. Perhaps there should be an audition where aspiring comedians can go through their schtick and get feedback before inflicting their <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46fOtLfYC4Q">routine</a> on a captive public.</div>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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Airline PAs should convey valuable and timely information to customers who have no other means of gaining that information. Redundant, rambling, or lengthy announcements merely add insult to the injury of modern air travel. And of course, don't forget to bring your noise cancelling headset.</div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-602514100976689112018-03-07T10:24:00.000-06:002018-03-08T20:57:37.814-06:00When Choosing an Airline, Choose Wisely!<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpI6-ZzOkqqJmqby76NJLeec8ru9WW10rdC1G6z3haWEqp5Cdvb3OJX3BYrzWnnJu6FKEJJ32jQ1xZzWGLmHMwzNWKxUAe0Co9z5YdRVAjfx9BJD7uW6ZrUrydZCKD6XmntEyPaQ/s1600/sandy_777.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="1600" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhpI6-ZzOkqqJmqby76NJLeec8ru9WW10rdC1G6z3haWEqp5Cdvb3OJX3BYrzWnnJu6FKEJJ32jQ1xZzWGLmHMwzNWKxUAe0Co9z5YdRVAjfx9BJD7uW6ZrUrydZCKD6XmntEyPaQ/s320/sandy_777.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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It should not be news to anyone working as a pilot that the airlines are hiring. With many thousands of pilots retiring in the next decade, the major airlines need to hire thousands of pilots just to maintain their current manning levels. Any growth will mean hiring even more.<br />
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This hiring binge is causing headaches for the traditional sources of pilots, the commuter airlines and the military. For various reasons I've written about in recent posts, fewer young people are opting for a career in aviation, meaning that as the major airlines hire pilots away from the commuter airlines and the military, those organizations are having trouble maintaining their manning levels.<br />
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For the young pilot who has his or her ratings and is ready to make a move to a major airline, times could not be better. All the major airlines are currently hiring and are offering long and lucrative careers as an airline pilot. The question is, which airline is the best to work for?<br />
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The simple answer, of course, is that the best airline is the one that hires you. If you only have one offer from a major, then your choice is an easy one. All the major airlines will provide a secure and comfortable flying career. Should you be lucky enough to have offers from multiple carriers, which is increasingly likely, your choice becomes more complicated.<br />
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Seniority is Life</h4>
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Seniority, or the order in which you get hired, determines your quality of life for the next several decades. That guy or gal sitting in front of you in new hire class? He or she will be senior to you until one of you retires and there's nothing you can do to change that. Seniority will determine the days you fly, the quality of your layovers, which base you can hold, and the equipment you will operate. These all add up to quality of life and pay.</div>
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Being senior means you get both quality of life and better pay (by flying larger equipment or bidding better trips). Mid level seniority means you can have one of these or the other but not both, and being junior means you get nothing (and like it)! Obviously, being senior is better, but you can choose the airline at which you will gain the most seniority in the least amount of time by doing a little homework before accepting an offer.</div>
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The most important thing you will need to ascertain is the number of expected retirements of pilots senior to you when you get hired. For instance, if your prospective airline has not hired for a long while and is now just getting started, that means many of the pilots working there will retire after a short while, thereby clearing the way for you to become senior.</div>
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Conversely, if you are getting hired near the end of a long hiring binge, that means the relatively young pilots who were just hired, but are senior to you, will be there a long time before retiring, keeping you in the right seat or working weekends and holidays for a large part of your career. Getting hired at an airline full of old pilots is best.</div>
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Other Considerations</h4>
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You should consider the overall financial health of any carrier you wish to join. Currently, the big four US major airlines, Delta, American, United, and Southwest, make up about 80% of airline capacity and are all in great financial shape. But then again, they should be with a good economy and cheap fuel. You will want to consider what happens when the economy goes south or fuel gets expensive.</div>
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Smaller carriers such as Alaska and JetBlue may be positioned less well to weather a substantial economic downturn. Then there are the ultra low cost carriers such as Spirit and Frontier that have carved out niches with a bare bones product. They are small, but at least in the case of Spirit, they are growing fast. I've had several Spirit pilots on my jumpseat say that they are there for the long haul and not considering looking elsewhere.</div>
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You will also want to consider the equipment that your prospective airline flies. Widebody international flying will generally provide a better quality of life in terms of days worked and length of layovers, but back side of the clock flying can take its toll on your health over time. Many pilots consider being a widebody F/O as a career destination as the pay is close to narrow body captain pay and the schedules and layovers are good.</div>
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Take into account the type of bidding system your prospective airline employs. Preferential bid systems are generally reviled, but being senior under such a system means you always get everything you want. As an example, a good friend of mine, who is the number nine 737 captain at his airline with a PBS system, routinely gets four or more 30 hr Maui layovers monthly because he likes them. I, on the other hand am the number fourteen 737 captain at my airline with a traditional bidding system and can only bid the lines that the company publishes. To get longer layovers in warm locales, I have to suck up things like four day trips and 11 hour layovers in DTW.</div>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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There has never been a better time to be starting a career in aviation. There is a world wide pilot shortage and airlines are hiring pilots as fast as they can. Make sure to project your career aspirations at any carrier you are considering with an eye towards your seniority attainment to make the best decision. Good Luck!</div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-70580290320479003952018-03-07T08:15:00.000-06:002018-03-07T08:15:16.202-06:00Important Information from the TSA!!<blockquote style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;" type="cite">
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Airport Full Body Scan Status Report</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Finally, some useful facts<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">are coming out about all of those airport full body scans!<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>FULL BODY SCANS AT AIRPORTS</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172MsoNormalTable" id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yiv2974524375x_yiv8543711756m_-953155844074929850m_-4777698430899078830m_-4867124810259695480aolmail_m_-8809926847535421458aolmail_yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1516850775843_3033" style="border-collapse: collapse;"><tbody>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>TSA disclosed the following</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Airport Screening Results</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="3" class="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172MsoNormalTable" id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yiv2974524375x_yiv8543711756m_-953155844074929850m_-4777698430899078830m_-4867124810259695480aolmail_m_-8809926847535421458aolmail_yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1516850775843_3047"><tbody>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>2016 Statistics On Airport Full Body Screening From TSA :</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Terrorists Discovered</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">0<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Transvestites</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">133<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Hernias</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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</td><td style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">1,485<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<tr id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40440"><td id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40439" style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40438" style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Hemorrhoid Cases</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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</td><td style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">3,172<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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</td></tr>
<tr id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yiv2974524375x_yiv8543711756m_-953155844074929850m_-4777698430899078830m_-4867124810259695480aolmail_m_-8809926847535421458aolmail_yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1516850775843_3062"><td id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yiv2974524375x_yiv8543711756m_-953155844074929850m_-4777698430899078830m_-4867124810259695480aolmail_m_-8809926847535421458aolmail_yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1516850775843_3061" style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40442" style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Enlarged Prostates</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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</td><td style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">8,249<u></u><u></u></span></div>
</div>
</td></tr>
<tr id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40444"><td id="m_-3119919233402708602m_-6101083044306721172aolmail_m_1355086700775148377x_yiv4965744171x_ydp768b50a2yiv7480942597m_-1166053150192171897yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1518703196587_40443" style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Breast Implants</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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</td><td style="margin: 0px; padding: 0.75pt;" valign="top"><div style="margin-bottom: 5pt; margin-top: 5pt;">
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: center;">
<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">59,350<u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>Natural Blondes</strong><u></u><u></u></span></div>
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<span style="background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><strong>It was also discovered that 308 politicians</strong> <strong>had no balls.</strong></span></div>
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The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-66301617288386318722017-11-28T00:49:00.000-06:002017-11-28T01:11:37.498-06:00Will Computers Learn to Fly Well Enough Before Pilots Forget How?<br />
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<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-MnBBoJmalFY/Wg8ctZPanZI/AAAAAAAEDG8/KS7MT9Ev9-0Ynhdr-_2Aept1FqCpJz09wCLcBGAs/s1600/sullenberger1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-MnBBoJmalFY/Wg8ctZPanZI/AAAAAAAEDG8/KS7MT9Ev9-0Ynhdr-_2Aept1FqCpJz09wCLcBGAs/s320/sullenberger1.png" width="320" /></a></div>
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In my job, I get to fly with all different kinds of cats and dogs. And by cats and dogs, I don't mean the ubiquitous emotional support animals now being carried by passengers, but rather pilots. The guys and gals I fly with all have different backgrounds and stories. Over the years I've flown with pilots from every branch and sub-branch of the armed services, pilots with civilian-only backgrounds, and even pilots from foreign countries to include foreign military services. I even flew with a former submariner who managed to get out of a diesel stink boat and into an airplane.<br />
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No matter how diverse their backgrounds, we both get into the jet and within a few minutes it's like we've been flying together for years. That is the power of training to a common standard. We run checklists, make callouts, and fly the airplane in such a way that the other person knows exactly what to expect and when to expect it.<br />
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Over the years I've flown with some truly amazing pilots who could fly the machine like a virtuoso might play a finely tuned instrument. I've also flown with some, how shall we say, less <i>precise</i> pilots, who, while meeting standards, didn't go out of their way to make my or anyone else's eyes water at the sight of their aerial proficiency. This has usually been a case of lacking not skill, but rather the motivation for excellence. And I get it—it's nearly impossible to be always "on", but over time an average level of effort will be made apparent.<br />
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Automation, however, is changing things, and not unreservedly for the better in my opinion. Don't get me wrong; overall, automation is of great value in the cockpit and will be with us for the foreseeable future. The improvements to safety alone are real and well documented. There is, however, a fly or two in the automation ointment.<br />
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In today's highly automated aviation environment, it is becoming more difficult to tell who can fly the airplane well or not because we rarely do it. And when I use the term "fly" here, I mean to hand fly the aircraft without the use of the autopilot or automation. Hand flying, like any precise and complex human task, is a perishable skill. If you don't practice for a while, you'll get rusty. Any musician knows this.<br />
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Unfortunately, standard operating procedure at nearly every airline in the world to varying degrees is to employ automation to the maximum extent possible. So, if the automation flies as well as or better than a human (and it does, <i>most </i>of the time), what does it matter if pilots are losing their manual flying skills? To these hundreds of people I mention below, it mattered quite a bit. Consider the following.<br />
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A New Category of Crash</h4>
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After any aviation accident, investigators will pour over the wreckage trying to figure out what went wrong. They will also look closely at the pilots' backgrounds, their training, and their proficiency. What is becoming apparent is the discovery of a disturbingly new type of crash where one of the primary causes is either the pilot's interaction with automated systems, or even worse, a pilot's lack of proficiency in recovering an aircraft from an upset or automation failure.</div>
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The crash landing of Emirates 521 in 2016 is an example of the first type of failure which I explored in detail <a href="http://www.robertgraves.com/2016/09/is-aviation-automation-killing-us.html">here</a>. The pilot expected the automation to perform in a certain manner, but due to circumstances which he had evidently not anticipated nor been trained for, the throttles were never advanced on a go-around. This caused the airplane to settle onto the runway after the gear had been retracted. The aircraft was destroyed in the post-crash fire while luckily, there was only one fatality.<br />
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The crashes of Asiana 214, a Boeing 777, Air France 447, an Airbus A330, and AirAsia 8501, an Airbus A320, are examples of a lack of proficiency in basic flying skills. I wrote about those tragedies <a href="http://www.robertgraves.com/2013/07/no-pilots-aboard-today.html">here</a>, <a href="http://www.robertgraves.com/2013/04/airliners-today-just-about-fly.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.robertgraves.com/2015/12/air-asia-8501-automation-failed-first.html">here</a>. Collectively these crashes resulted in the deaths of 393 passengers and crew. The common link between these crashes is that all three airplanes were perfectly flyable when they went down. In each case, the pilots had profound misunderstandings about what was happening to their airplanes and were not equipped to remedy the situations.<br />
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Pilots Who Can't Fly?</h4>
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How have we arrived at this juncture where (some) pilots are lacking in basic stick and rudder skills? The short answer is through years of charging into a technological future without taking the time to think about where we're going, nor planning how to get there.<br />
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We can all anticipate a time at some point in the distant future where automation and software are so far advanced that manual flying skills will be relegated to wealthy hobbyists who maintain and fly antique aircraft for fun. We're not there yet and won't be for some time. Even though the automation on today's airliners is quite sophisticated, it just isn't ready for prime time. I find myself having to intervene multiple times on nearly every flight to correct automation generated errors on the state of the art Boeing aircraft I fly. Heck, having the automation attempt to exceed structural limits of the aircraft isn't that uncommon. I suspect my Airbus, Embraer, and Canadair flying compatriots have similar experiences.<br />
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Another problem with automation as it is currently deployed finds the machine doing most of the flying while the humans sit on their hands waiting for it to make a mistake. No one seems to have considered that humans are uniquely unsuited to monitor machines, but rather it is the machine which should be assisting and monitoring the humans. Humans become quickly bored and will mentally check out after a short amount of time staring at a machine that may randomly make a mistake at any time.<br />
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As alluded to by Sully in the above quote, a better deployment of technology might be to keep the pilots in the control loop as an active participant, and to relegate the automation to the role of watchdog, which machines can do quite well.<br />
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As an aside, I am always amused that many sci-fi movies still depict some sort of manual control in futuristic spacecraft. It was Luke's manual flying skills obtained from bulls eyeing womp rats that carried the day in the original Star Wars movie. And while Sulu never had a side stick controller in the original Star Trek, one was added in later incarnations of that franchise. (Be sure not to miss the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dGEEkGY3HiU">maiden voyage scene</a> from the Star Trek spoof movie Galaxy Quest.) Perhaps they were onto something. There will always be a certain romanticism attached to the idea of the steely eyed flying ace hand flying the machine.<br />
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Back to Basics: The FAA Reacts</h4>
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Alarmed by the recent spate of accidents attributed in part to the lack of pilot proficiency, the FAA recently created new rules for pilot training to address these deficiencies. Added in 2014, <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2014-title14-vol3/pdf/CFR-2014-title14-vol3-sec121-423.pdf">FAR 121.423</a> now mandates additional training for pilots which they call "Extended Envelope Training" (EET). This new training will now require pilots to demonstrate manually controlled proficiency in slow flight, loss of reliable airspeed, instrument departures and arrivals, upset recovery, and bounced landing recovery. Airlines were given a few years to upgrade their training programs and simulator capabilities to accommodate the new maneuvers.</div>
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Here's the sad part. All these maneuvers are Aviation 101, and are taught to beginning pilots. This actually reads like the syllabus I taught to pre-solo nuggets in the T-37 aircraft back in the 80s. What the FAA has inadvertently done is to validate the criticism that modern automated cockpits are causing pilots to become so rusty that they need to relearn basic airmanship.</div>
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In Conclusion</h4>
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Automation, while bringing many benefits and efficiencies to aviation, does have a downside. Over-reliance on automation has caused a gradual erosion in pilots' stick and rudder skills to such a degree that the safe operation of an aircraft can be jeopardized by automation failures. The FAA is now attempting a rear guard operation to restore basic skills to airmen whose acumen has been dulled by years of push-button flying.</div>
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There will eventually come a time when automation is robust enough and redundant enough to never need human intervention, but that time is still many years away. During this transition era, pilots will still need to maintain their skill set and be ready to assume control of the airplane with little or no warning. A smarter way to have humans and machines work together would see the machine deployed as an assistant to the humans who remain in direct control of the airplane, rather than the other way around.</div>
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<br />The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9023417.post-26307398094604229442017-10-23T15:51:00.001-05:002017-10-24T11:59:33.191-05:00Air Force to Recall 1000 Retired Pilots<br />
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<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-d1YSNV6V418/We5TWUGx9DI/AAAAAAAECas/JsMAkmdJdFs2MQ3KnpUrDi6WqJkvhQfnwCLcBGAs/s1600/B-1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="180" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-d1YSNV6V418/We5TWUGx9DI/AAAAAAAECas/JsMAkmdJdFs2MQ3KnpUrDi6WqJkvhQfnwCLcBGAs/s320/B-1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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The Air Force has a pilot problem. It doesn't have enough. The service says that the problem is reaching "crisis" levels with a current shortage of 1500 pilots. Having exhausted all means to convince their current pilot force to remain in the service, and unable to increase the number of new pilots produced, the Air Force appealed to the President to revise an executive order allowing for the recall of up to 1000 retired pilots to active duty. President Trump signed this order last Friday touching off a firestorm of social media commentary.<br />
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In many ways, this problem has existed for decades, even stretching back to the 1980s when I first wore the green bag (flight suit). The issues are the same and the same arguments get made over and over. What has changed is simply the intensity of each issue affecting pilot retention. As the saying goes, you can't tell who's swimming naked until the tide goes out. And the tide has indeed gone out.<br />
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Inflow Minus Outflow</h4>
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Air Force personnel managers are charged with managing the pilot force to maintain appropriate force levels. They not only manage the total number of pilots, but also the personnel levels existing at various career stages. They attempt to keep a surplus or deficit from existing anywhere along the career "pipeline". Tools at their disposal are the management of training rates, promotion rates, and incentive programs used to either retain pilots or to encourage them to separate.</div>
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Looking at the inflows, the number of pilots that the Air Force can train in a given year, there was a huge reduction in initial pilot training capacity dating from the end of the cold war. Training bases were closed and resources were reassigned. Total pilot production was reduced from about 1500 to 500 pilots annually in the early 1990s. That number has recovered somewhat; about 1100 pilots were produced in 2016. The Air Force is attempting to ramp this production back up, but planners estimate that a maximum of 1400 pilots per year is the ceiling given current numbers of training aircraft and other resources.</div>
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It is on the outflow side, however, that the problem becomes clear. In short, pilots are bailing out of the military to take airline jobs—just as they always have when the airlines come a calling. It is here where the pilot retention problem really looks like a rewind of the 1980s. Back in the late eighties, the airlines were on a hiring tear, scooping up as many ex-military pilots as they could get their hands on. </div>
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I specifically recall being asked to participate in a round table discussion with the wing commander to address the issues of why pilots were leaving the service. The complaints I heard back then are eerily similar to the ones being voiced today. Pilots chafed at too many non-flying additional duties (affectionately known as "queep"), not enough flying time, and a lack of leadership. Here is an example of the unrest from the comments of my blog (in the original):</div>
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...additional duties that have nothing to do with flying, PME <i>(professional military education-ed)</i> requirements to get promoted that have to be accomplished in off duty spare time, 24/7 on call status, exercises that have little to do with flying, PT <i>(physical training-ed)</i> requirements that have to be prepared for in spare time, mountains of regulations based on a single act of buffoonery with the goal of preventing bad judgement from ever happening again, i.e. The Shotgun Approach to problem solving, time off is time off. Not everyone wants to be a four star general/politician/professional staff officer but, the senior AF brass expect everyone to jump through time wasting hoops to be prepared for that minute possibility.</blockquote>
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One factor which currently helps to push pilots out of the service which largely did not exist back in the 1980s is the deployment rate. Deployments, or long term tours away from home lasting weeks or months, are now the rule rather than the exception. Air Force pilots flying tactical or theater based aircraft can expect multiple, lengthy, deployments during their career. No amount of incentive money will likely dissuade these pilots from exiting the service once their service commitment is over.<br />
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When the Airlines Hire, Pilots Leave</h4>
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So are pilots actually leaving the service in numbers greater than they have in past airline hiring surges? A 2015 <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1113/RAND_RR1113.pdf">Rand</a> study which examined the issue of fighter pilot retention, defined a measure of total active rated service (TARS) to measure the retention of pilots. Denoted in years, it measures the average length of time a pilot remains on active duty.<br />
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As you can see, the rate at which pilots leave the service (thereby shortening their active duty years) roughly corresponds with <a href="http://www.fapa.aero/hiringhistory.asp">airline hiring</a>, verifying that in spite of conditions in the military, when the airlines are hiring, pilots will leave.<br />
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This makes sense for many reasons. At the 10 year point of a military pilot's career, there are often many lifestyle changes including marriage and children. The excitement and travel which provide much of the allure of being a military pilot may have lost their lustre. The early part of a military pilot's career involves becoming an expert in the operation of their weapons system, but as time progresses, the focus will switch to grooming for leadership positions and away from flying.<br />
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At work here also is the psychology of the airline seniority system. Nearly every measure of quality of life in the airlines is determined by one's seniority, or hire date. Logic dictates that if a pilot has decided to eventually go the airline route, an earlier rather than later departure from the military will be better. This "fear of missing out" no doubt drives many pilots off the fence onto the side of the airlines, but it also presents an opportunity to help solve the problem.<br />
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Can it be Fixed?</h4>
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Anything can be fixed given enough money and imagination, which unfortunately, seem to be in short supply these days. From a merely economic point of view, matching airline pay rates dollar for dollar might help, but the calculus would then be why work harder for the same money? To beat this problem with money will require quite a bit more than the military is willing (or able) to pay.<br />
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To their credit, Air Force leadership has recognized the toll that nonstop deployments have taken on the force and are moving to reduce them. Other initiatives include keeping pilots in the cockpit and out of staff positions by utilizing non-pilots for those staff positions.</div>
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One possible solution to the airline seniority problem might be for the airlines to interview, provisionally hire, and guarantee military pilots a seniority position based on that interview date. This type of program would mirror the "flow-through" programs which some regional airlines have with their mainline counterparts.</div>
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Requiring a longer service commitment seems to be a well that has run dry. Currently at 10 years from completion of training (up from six when I joined in 1982), the length of that commitment will eventually dissuade the best and brightest who have other options. </div>
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Then, of course, there is the brute force method, of which an involuntary recall of retired pilots would be a showpiece. Other levers include the use of a "stop-loss" program which simply closes the door to pilots leaving the service prior to retirement. Invocation of a stop-loss seems the more likely course in lieu of a retirement recall. I have personal experience with that, being prevented from retiring for awhile back in 2003.</div>
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The last policy prescription I'll offer is to simply define the problem away. It still escapes me as to why we're deploying state of the art fighters against Pashtun goat herders in the Hindu Kush, especially when the place will look like we were never there a year after we leave.</div>
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<h4>
In Conclusion</h4>
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The Air Force's pilot retention problem is the same as it ever was. When the airlines hire, pilots leave. The complaints about the service being made today echo not only those I heard back in the 1980s, but also those of Joseph Heller's Yossarian voiced in Catch 22. Creative management and incentives will help stop the bleeding, but the tide of a world wide pilot shortage is a powerful force.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft.</i></blockquote>
The Captainhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03919928014165571837noreply@blogger.com1