Did Bad Grammar Doom the Max?

As of this writing, the 737 MAX remains grounded with projected return dates now stretching into the first quarter of 2020. Boeing has not as of yet submitted the software fix for the controversial MCAS system to the FAA for evaluation. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) recently indicated that they will seek their own additional testing of the software fix possibly resulting in a staggered return of the aircraft to service.

The post-mortem examinations of what went wrong at Boeing and the assumptions that were made concerning the flawed MCAS software continue. At issue is one assumption made early on that any malfunction in the MCAS system would be immediately recognized by average pilots as a malfunction known as "runaway stabilizer" for which a checklist already exists.

The stabilizer trim system is used by the pilots or the autopilot to keep the horizontal stabilizer in "trim" which means keeping the stabilizer aligned with the slipstream of air. It does this by actually moving the entire stabilizer a through a range of angles which change with airspeed. An "out of trim" stabilizer means the stabilizer is not perfectly aligned with the passing wind. This results in the need to hold force on the control column to maintain altitude. Letting go of the controls in such a condition would result in an undesired climb or descent. A well trimmed aircraft will stay where you put it.

In the 737, the stabilizer trim is normally controlled electrically through a motor, but can also be adjusted manually through a wheel and handle on the center stand. This system has a failure mode known as "runaway trim" wherein the motor runs after the control column electric trim switch has been released most likely due to a sticky or failed switch. This malfunction can result in an unflyable condition if not quickly corrected. It is this failure mode which is addressed by the "runaway stabilizer" checklist reproduced above.

Continuously or Continually?

Boeing engineers were also counting on pilots using this same runaway stabilizer checklist in the event that the MCAS system, which also uses the stabilizer trim, malfunctioned. The problem with this assumption is that the two malfunctions can appear to be very different things. During a classic stuck switch runaway trim, the trim wheel in the cockpit starts spinning and does not stop. That's the definition of "continuously" and is correctly annotated as one of the conditions on the top of the checklist.

An MCAS malfunction, however, presented quite differently. During that malfunction, the MCAS system would spin the trim wheel forward for a specified amount and then stop. If the pilot then used the trim switches to adjust the trim in a nose up direction, a malfunctioning MCAS would wait five seconds and trim forward again after each input by the pilot. This "very often; at regular or frequent intervals"  behavior of the MCAS system is the definition of "continually", not "continuously". 

This is exactly what happened to Lion 610. After reversing the MCAS inputs multiple times, the captain passed control of the aircraft to his first officer who was apparently unaware of the inputs the captain had been making. He never countered the next MCAS input which doomed them.

From Dictionary [dot] com:

In formal contexts, continually should be used to mean “very often; at regular or frequent intervals,” and continuously to mean “unceasingly; constantly; without interruption.”

Is this a minor and pedantic point? Perhaps, but perhaps not. English is the international language of aviation, and all pilots are expected to be proficient in English to be qualified to fly in international airspace. The pilots of both Lion 610 and Ethiopian 302 were likely not native English speakers and were highly unlikely to be aware of such a nuance as the difference in meaning of these two words.

They were, however trained in the various failure modes of their aircraft, and were not likely to be expecting the intermittent behavior of the failed MCAS system. The pilots of Lion 610 had no knowledge of the existence of the MCAS system as it was not included in their flight manuals. The pilots of Ethiopian 302 did have the Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) published by Boeing describing the MCAS system, but were still slow to recognize that their problem originated from a bad MCAS system until too late.

In Conclusion

Aircraft flight manuals should contain all the information needed by pilots to safely operate their aircraft. This information should include accurate descriptions of possible failures, the recognizance of such failures, and best practices on how to solve or mitigate problems that arise. The omission of the existence and description of MCAS from the MAX airplane flight manual only compounded the problems faced by the two mishap aircrews. Faced with a fusillade of warnings and distractions which served to conceal the real nature of their problem, they were defenseless against a poorly designed and undocumented but deadly adversary.

What's Next for the Max?

As an aviation blogger, the past few days have been simultaneously hope inspiring and depressing. Hope inspiring as many people understand, or make a good faith attempt to understand, the underlying issues surrounding the 737 Max. But also depressing as random fanbois, trolls, and low information, yet self proclaimed experts, happen by my comments section to disgorge their dubious wisdom on things about which they know little or nothing.

Mencken was Right: No One Ever went Broke Underestimating the Intelligence of the Public

One commenter offered, based on no information other than two 737s had crashed, that all of them should be grounded. I pointed out that by that logic, it would be even more beneficial to ground all airplanes everywhere as it would be safer still. The response was "I didn't say all airplanes should be grounded" displaying an ironclad grip on logical fallacies.

When I noted that the MCAS system could be completely deactivated using two switches mounted on the center console, a commenter replied that well, "maybe the switches reconnected themselves". Other than the testing of those switches being a mandatory preflight item, this commenter has obviously confused the Boeing 737 with the SkyNet model T-1000 Terminator which can rewire itself automatically.

Lastly, when one commenter [Hi Scott!] boldly opined that the 737 was the worst airplane he'd ever flown on, I replied that my passenger experience is usually more dependent upon the particular airline and class of service rather than the aircraft type. This big brained person assured me, however, that no, none of that mattered. He apparently would rather sit in a non reclining 28 inch pitch economy seat on a Spirit A320 than a first class seat on a JAL 737.  [Sigh]

Public Relations and Marketing Wins

So the FAA bowed to international and media pressure and grounded all Max aircraft, which is proving to be a minor inconvenience to most operators of the aircraft. I was personally walking out to a Max to fly to Phoenix when the announcement came. Someone somewhere had done some preparations and an -800 was towed to the gate by maintenance about 10 minutes later for a slightly delayed departure.

We of course are now treated to the circular logic of all the "I told you so" stories. The process starts as media sensationalism whips up a gullible and credulous public followed by outraged calls for the aircraft to be grounded. After weather-vaning politicians cave into public pressure, preening media talking heads then get to state that something must have been really been wrong. And so it goes.

Make no mistake: this grounding has more to do with public relations and marketing than safety. As of yet, there is very little evidence that the two Max crashes are in any way related other than the most superficial of circumstances. But the tsunami of media scare stories and sensationalism showed no signs of abatement, so this was the correct decision. 

The FAA cited "newly" discovered satellite data which finally swayed their decision.They are referring to the ADS-B tracking system which relays flight parameters to air traffic control through satellite. This information, however, was publicly available shortly after the crash and it does show some minor altitude excursions, though nothing is conclusive.

The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder from the Ethiopian crash have been recovered and sent to France for analysis. Again, prescient commenters noted that this was a good thing because, of course, had they been sent to the US, American investigators would falsify any result finding the US producer of the aircraft at fault. I actually agree with this decision in spite of the slander against the integrity of the NTSB and other US investigators. Having French investigators analyze the data will deflect the inevitable cries of bias should the investigation find fault in anything except the aircraft itself.

What Next?

What happens next is we wait for the data from ET302 to be downloaded and released. When that happens and a likely cause of the accident can be discerned, the Max will be cleared to fly. Notice that I didn't say that this clearance will in any way be dependent on the outcome of the investigation. The aircraft will be flying again in a matter of weeks regardless of the findings.

Why you ask? Should the MCAS system be implicated in this crash (unlikely in my opinion), there will be software fixes and training updates offered. As I've noted many times, the system can be deactivated completely through the use of two center console mounted switches. Even then, the system should only activate in the case of gross pilot negligence resulting in an aerodynamic stall or, as in the case of the Lion crash, an errant sensor input due to a mechanical malfunction. 

The software fixes will preclude the activation of the system due to the failure of a single sensor. The training updates will reemphasize to all operators that undesirable electric trim inputs can be inhibited through the use of the center console mounted stab cutout switches. 

Should the MCAS system not be implicated in the ET302 crash, the Max will be back in the air that much sooner. Make no mistake, all airline crashes are tragedies of the highest order for everyone involved. The object of any investigation is to find out what happened and to take measures to prevent any future recurrence. Commercial aviation is one of the safest, if not the safest means of transportation available. 

What will be left is a mopping up by the lawyers.


Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. 

Is the Boeing 737 Max 8 Safe?

737 Max 8

This past Sunday, an Ethiopian Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa to Nairobi with 157 passengers and crew. There were no survivors. This is the second crash of a Max 8 variant of the 737 in five months after the crash of a Lion Air Max 8 last October.

An undocumented system was brought under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash and now questions are being raised as to whether this same system, known as maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), might have played a roll in this latest crash. If that is found to be the case, the safety of the aircraft itself will be called into question.

What We Know

At the current time, the cause of both accidents is unknown as the accident investigation is still underway on the Lion Air crash and the Ethiopian Air crash investigation is just getting under way. The flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders have been recovered from both accidents and are being analyzed.

The flight recorder data from the Lion Air crash suggests that the pilots were having control difficulty due to erroneous inputs from the aircraft's MCAS system which itself received faulty inputs from a malfunctioning angle of attack (AOA) sensor. It is this errant sensor and its maintenance history that investigators are focusing on.

Initial reports from the Ethiopian Air crash suggest that the aircraft experienced control difficulties shortly after takeoff. Data from a flight tracking and reporting system known as ADS-B show highly unstable vertical velocity and airspeed readouts which were similar to the airspeed and altitude excursions of the Lion Air mishap aircraft.

Unconfirmed reports from listeners on the frequency reported that the Ethiopian pilots stated that they had unreliable airspeed indications and were declaring an emergency.

And right now, that's it. There are similarities, but no confirmation that the same system brought down both aircraft.

Is It Safe?

Given that we know little about the cause of the first accident and nothing about the cause of the second, a grounding of this model aircraft is premature. I am qualified and current in this model aircraft and am confident that it is as safe as any aircraft flying. Airplanes sometimes crash. It is always a tragedy when they do, but barring a definitive indictment of the design, there is no reason to overreact.

Even should the MCAS system be found primarily at fault, the system can be completely deactivated by two easily reached switches on the center console of the cockpit. Why the Lion Air pilots didn't take this action is unknown, but the investigation should eventually reveal the cause. A similar malfunction occurred on a previous flight of the mishap aircraft, and those pilots took the correct action and landed uneventfully. Questions as to why the aircraft flew again without being properly repaired should be asked.

In the event of unreliable airspeed, which can happen to any aircraft independent of model, routine practice of this malfunction in the simulator should make it a non-event. I recently underwent this training myself, but the basics of pitch and power date back to Wilbur and Orville. Recognition is the toughest part, but after that, known pitch and power settings will keep the aircraft from stalling and in control.

I don't mention these questions to cast blame, but rather to answer critics who don't understand aviation or engage in magical thinking. The Max is still a 737 at heart and flies nearly identically to the other four models of the aircraft that I have flown. So yes, it is safe, and I'd gladly put my family on one and fly it myself with no reservations.


Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft. He is the author of This is Your Captain Speaking, an aviation blog. It can be found at robertgraves.com. He also writes for Avgeekery.com. 

The Lion Air Crash: What You Need to Know

Lion Air B737 MAX 8 (Wikimedia Commons)

On October 29 of this year, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea 11 minutes after departing Jakarta for Pangkal Pinang with the loss of all 189 souls on board. What first called special attention to this accident was that the mishap aircraft was a brand new MAX 8 version of the venerable Boeing 737, and had been delivered to the airline less than a year earlier.

Also of note has been the revelation in the wake of the ongoing accident investigation that a new safety system designed to prevent stalls had been installed on the aircraft, but had not been publicized nor documented in the flight manuals used by flight crews. The flight data recorder (FDR) from the mishap aircraft has been recovered and data from that recorder shows that an errant sensor on the aircraft may have provided bad data to this new system possibly implicating it in the accident. 

The investigation is ongoing and it is inappropriate to assign blame to any system or persons until the completion of the accident review, but as there is much misunderstanding concerning what information is already known, we can take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.

An Undocumented System

The new safety system installed on the MAX version of the 737 known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System or MCAS, was designed to provide a nose-down trim input during manual flight as the aircraft approached a stall. What this means in simple terms is that if a pilot is flying the aircraft without the autopilot, and is for whatever reason flying the aircraft well below a safe speed, the aircraft will automatically run the stabilizer trim forward which will have the effect of making the controls heavier to hold.

In addition, once full power is eventually applied to recover from the stall, the forward trim assists the pilot in keeping the more powerful engines on the MAX from overpowering the recovery by exceeding elevator authority. The nose tends to want to rise during a stall recovery and forward trim lessens that effect.

Here is an excerpt from the multi-user message sent by Boeing on November 10 to all 737 MAX operators:

A pitch augmentation system function called 'Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS) is implemented on the 737-8, -9 (MAX) to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using Input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

It is also important to note that any pilot finding him or herself in this position has real problems and has already disregarded the "stick shaker" stall warning system which vibrates the control column well before reaching stall speed. The reason the system was installed on the newest MAX 8 versions of the 737 and not earlier models is apparently the discovery during flight testing of some unfavorable stall characteristics on the new aircraft that did not exist on earlier models.

Angle of Attack

Ok, so far so good. A new safety system was installed. Who can argue with a safety system? The problem that the Lion Air flight encountered, however, was some sort of malfunction in information coming from a sensor being fed to the new system. This sensor is known as the "angle of attack" or AOA sensor. The angle of attack of a wing is the angle between the chord line of a wing and the relative wind moving across that wing. A chord line is an imaginary line which runs from the leading edge to the trailing edge of a cross section of a wing. 

A wing which exceeds the critical angle of attack stalls, which is where boundary layer separation occurs and the wing stops producing lift. If you've ever stuck your hand out the window of a moving car and made a wing with it, you've experienced how changing the angle of attack changes lift. For more on AOA, see here.

The angle of attack sensor is essentially a very small wing on a hinge mounted on the fuselage which measures direction of the relative wind passing the aircraft. You can see them installed near the pitot tubes on most airliners and there are usually at least two installed for redundancy. AOA data is used by a number of systems on an airliner, but happened to be one of the primary inputs to the MCAS system on the MAX 8 aircraft. It is here where problems occurred.

Faulty Input Means Faulty Output (GIGO)

Analysis of the flight data recorder from the Lion Air flight revealed that the data from the two AOA sensors installed on the aircraft did not match. The left AOA sensor was recorded as giving erroneous information during the entire flight. An erroneous AOA information feed or some other malfunction is suspected to have caused the activation of the MCAS system resulting in the system trimming the aircraft in a nose down direction. During the entire flight the pilots trimmed in a nose up direction to keep the aircraft flyable, but at some point stopped trimming and allowed the MCAS system to trim the aircraft nose down to an unflyable condition.

The reason for this is unknown and may be determined when the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is recovered. Also unknown is why the pilots never used the two stabilizer cutout switches located on the center stand just behind the throttles. These switches remove all electric power from the stabilizer trim motor and would thereby deactivate the MCAS trim inputs.

In fact, on the previous flight of the mishap aircraft, a failure of a similar nature also resulted in uncommanded nose down trim inputs and required the pilots of that flight to use the cutout switches to deactivate the electric trim system. The 737 has a large manual trim control wheel mounted on the center stand that can be turned to adjust the stabilizer trim. It is normally not touched but spins as the electric trim motor is engaged. The pilots on that previous flight used the manual trim wheel to adjust the trim to safely land.

The aircraft did have maintenance performed on various airspeed, AOA and other systems in the days leading up to the mishap flight in response to several defects being written up on previous flights. The exact nature of the malfunctions and degraded systems on the mishap aircraft has yet to be determined as the investigation proceeds, but an AOA sensor had been replaced in response to writeups on the previous flight. A closer look at the flight data from both the mishap flight and the previous flight can be found here.

Protecting Pilots From Themselves

There is an ongoing debate in the aviation community about the benefits and liabilities of cockpit automation. This debate has centered on the effect that highly automated cockpits have tended to make pilots rusty in their "stick and rudder" or basic flying skills. Make no mistake, automation has been a boon to both aviation economics and safety, but it is now being realized that it is not an unmitigated benefit.

At question is the design philosophy incorporated into automation. Years ago, the two main commercial airframe manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus, diverged in their approach to flight control automation. While Boeing aircraft have always incorporated the ability to disconnect all automation, Airbus on the other hand was a pioneer in designing "fly by wire" flight controls into their aircraft. This meant that pilot inputs were sent to a computer and the computer controlled the aircraft. There was no ability to completely bypass the computer and control the aircraft directly.

The revelation that a safety system designed to prevent an inattentive pilot from stalling the aircraft was surreptitiously installed will raise questions as to whether Boeing has decided to follow Airbus down the road of incorporating behind the scenes automation to prevent pilots from doing stupid things. Remember, the original anti-stall device was always the pilot. Warning systems could signal that the airplane was getting slow, but the pilot was always the backstop. Given that the MCAS system can be disabled by the trim cutout switches makes the above scenario less likely.

The alternate explanation to the installation of the MCAS system is that it is simply designed for the mitigation of unfavorable stall characteristics as mentioned above. This raises the question, though, of why the system would not be documented in the aircraft flight manual. Surely pilots would want to know of these unfavorable characteristics and also of the existence a system designed to compensate for those effects. Since the system was undocumented, the pilots of the mishap flight likely had no idea why their trim kept running forward nor were they expecting such behavior.

What's It Doing Now?

It is imperative, then, that pilots are well versed in not only the normal operation of their aircraft, but also in any possible failure mode and are ready and able to assume complete command at any time that the automation is not performing as expected.

Several high profile accidents such as Air France 447 and Asiana 214 serve to highlight the potential pitfalls of flying highly automated aircraft. Part of the problem confronting pilots of these aircraft is the danger of becoming confused about what the aircraft automation is doing. Known as "mode confusion", pilots can make the mistake of assuming that the automation will perform in a certain manner and become confused if it doesn't.

This was one of the findings in the accident review of Asiana 214 which crashed into the seawall at San Francisco. The pilots realized too late that the mode that had been selected would not do what they were expecting. They were then unable to prevent the aircraft from crashing short of the runway.

Now extrapolate mode confusion to a malfunctioning system which the pilots were unaware was even installed, and you can see the difficult situation they faced.

In Conclusion

The cause(s) for the crash of Lion Air 610 are currently unknown and will remain so until the investigation is complete. In the interim, new knowledge of the existence of an undocumented safety system installed on the 737 MAX should serve to further the debate on the appropriate role of cockpit automation.

Air Force to Recall 1000 Retired Pilots

The Air Force has a pilot problem. It doesn't have enough. The service says that the problem is reaching "crisis" levels with a current shortage of 1500 pilots. Having exhausted all means to convince their current pilot force to remain in the service, and unable to increase the number of new pilots produced, the Air Force appealed to the President to revise an executive order allowing for the recall of up to 1000 retired pilots to active duty. President Trump signed this order last Friday touching off a firestorm of social media commentary.

In many ways, this problem has existed for decades, even stretching back to the 1980s when I first wore the green bag (flight suit). The issues are the same and the same arguments get made over and over. What has changed is simply the intensity of each issue affecting pilot retention. As the saying goes, you can't tell who's swimming naked until the tide goes out. And the tide has indeed gone out.

Inflow Minus Outflow

Air Force personnel managers are charged with managing the pilot force to maintain appropriate force levels. They not only manage the total number of pilots, but also the personnel levels existing at various career stages. They attempt to keep a surplus or deficit from existing anywhere along the career "pipeline". Tools at their disposal are the management of training rates, promotion rates, and incentive programs used to either retain pilots or to encourage them to separate.

Looking at the inflows, the number of pilots that the Air Force can train in a given year, there was a huge reduction in initial pilot training capacity dating from the end of the cold war. Training bases were closed and resources were reassigned. Total pilot production was reduced from about 1500 to 500 pilots annually in the early 1990s. That number has recovered somewhat; about 1100 pilots were produced in 2016. The Air Force is attempting to ramp this production back up, but planners estimate that a maximum of 1400 pilots per year is the ceiling given current numbers of training aircraft and other resources.

It is on the outflow side, however, that the problem becomes clear. In short, pilots are bailing out of the military to take airline jobs—just as they always have when the airlines come a calling. It is here where the pilot retention problem really looks like a rewind of the 1980s. Back in the late eighties, the airlines were on a hiring tear, scooping up as many ex-military pilots as they could get their hands on. 

I specifically recall being asked to participate in a round table discussion with the wing commander to address the issues of why pilots were leaving the service. The complaints I heard back then are eerily similar to the ones being voiced today. Pilots chafed at too many non-flying additional duties (affectionately known as "queep"), not enough flying time, and a lack of leadership. Here is an example of the unrest from the comments of my blog (in the original):

...additional duties that have nothing to do with flying, PME (professional military education-ed) requirements to get promoted that have to be accomplished in off duty spare time, 24/7 on call status, exercises that have little to do with flying, PT (physical training-ed) requirements that have to be prepared for in spare time, mountains of regulations based on a single act of buffoonery with the goal of preventing bad judgement from ever happening again, i.e. The Shotgun Approach to problem solving, time off is time off. Not everyone wants to be a four star general/politician/professional staff officer but, the senior AF brass expect everyone to jump through time wasting hoops to be prepared for that minute possibility.

One factor which currently helps to push pilots out of the service which largely did not exist back in the 1980s is the deployment rate. Deployments, or long term tours away from home lasting weeks or months, are now the rule rather than the exception. Air Force pilots flying tactical or theater based aircraft can expect multiple, lengthy, deployments during their career. No amount of incentive money will likely dissuade these pilots from exiting the service once their service commitment is over.

When the Airlines Hire, Pilots Leave

So are pilots actually leaving the service in numbers greater than they have in past airline hiring surges? A 2015 Rand study which examined the issue of fighter pilot retention, defined a measure of total active rated service (TARS) to measure the retention of pilots. Denoted in years, it measures the average length of time a pilot remains on active duty.

As you can see, the rate at which pilots leave the service (thereby shortening their active duty years) roughly corresponds with airline hiring, verifying that in spite of conditions in the military, when the airlines are hiring, pilots will leave.

This makes sense for many reasons. At the 10 year point of a military pilot's career, there are often many lifestyle changes including marriage and children. The excitement and travel which provide much of the allure of being a military pilot may have lost their lustre. The early part of a military pilot's career involves becoming an expert in the operation of their weapons system, but as time progresses, the focus will switch to grooming for leadership positions and away from flying.

At work here also is the psychology of the airline seniority system. Nearly every measure of quality of life in the airlines is determined by one's seniority, or hire date. Logic dictates that if a pilot has decided to eventually go the airline route, an earlier rather than later departure from the military will be better. This "fear of missing out" no doubt drives many pilots off the fence onto the side of the airlines, but it also presents an opportunity to help solve the problem.

Can it be Fixed?

Anything can be fixed given enough money and imagination, which unfortunately, seem to be in short supply these days. From a merely economic point of view, matching airline pay rates dollar for dollar might help, but the calculus would then be why work harder for the same money? To beat this problem with money will require quite a bit more than the military is willing (or able) to pay.

To their credit, Air Force leadership has recognized the toll that nonstop deployments have taken on the force and are moving to reduce them. Other initiatives include keeping pilots in the cockpit and out of staff positions by utilizing non-pilots for those staff positions.

One possible solution to the airline seniority problem might be for the airlines to interview, provisionally hire, and guarantee military pilots a seniority position based on that interview date. This type of program would mirror the "flow-through" programs which some regional airlines have with their mainline counterparts.

Requiring a longer service commitment seems to be a well that has run dry. Currently at 10 years from completion of training (up from six when I joined in 1982), the length of that commitment will eventually dissuade the best and brightest who have other options. 

Then, of course, there is the brute force method, of which an involuntary recall of retired pilots would be a showpiece. Other levers include the use of a "stop-loss" program which simply closes the door to pilots leaving the service prior to retirement. Invocation of a stop-loss seems the more likely course in lieu of a retirement recall. I have personal experience with that, being prevented from retiring for awhile back in 2003.

The last policy prescription I'll offer is to simply define the problem away. It still escapes me as to why we're deploying state of the art fighters against Pashtun goat herders in the Hindu Kush, especially when the place will look like we were never there a year after we leave.

In Conclusion

The Air Force's pilot retention problem is the same as it ever was. When the airlines hire, pilots leave. The complaints about the service being made today echo not only those I heard back in the 1980s, but also those of Joseph Heller's Yossarian voiced in Catch 22. Creative management and incentives will help stop the bleeding, but the tide of a world wide pilot shortage is a powerful force.

Captain Rob Graves is a veteran airline pilot and retired Air Force officer. He currently flies a Boeing 737 for a major American airline where he has over 25 years of experience. His Air Force career included instructing future USAF pilots in the T-37 primary jet trainer, aerial refueling in the KC-135 Stratotanker, and conducting worldwide logistics in the C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft.

Where are the Pilotless Airliners?

Peter Thiel, PayPal founder and tech evangelist, noted several years ago that "We wanted flying cars, but instead got 140 characters." He was, of course, talking about Twitter, but his larger point was that the technological advancements that seemed to be inevitable have—when they've even shown up— been underwhelming.

The pilotless airliner, like the driverless car, is one of those innovations that always seems to be close, but like a mirage in the desert, keeps receding into the distance. And it certainly isn't for lack of effort. DARPA has recently been testing a robot which occupies the space where a copilot sits on an airliner.

A recent headline proclaimed that this robot was able to fly (and land!) a 737. So that's that right? We can finally get on with the business of halving (or eliminating) our pilot force, solving the pilot shortage, and saving a ton of money to boot.

Well, I wouldn't be so quick to quit flight school and dust off that medical school application. We are still quite a ways away from single or no pilot airliners for a number of reasons. But first, I'd like to review where we've come from when it comes to cockpit automation and what we'll ultimately be asking our machines to do.

There was a time not too far removed when it took five or more crew members—in addition to flight attendants—to operate an airliner. Besides the two pilots up front, there were navigators to navigate, flight engineers to keep the engines running, and a radio operator to communicate. Over the years, these positions have been eliminated through the use of technology and automation.

The last airplane Boeing manufactured that had an engineer's panel in the cockpit was the 1960s era 727 which ceased production in 1984. Navigators and radio operators were eliminated decades earlier, replaced by inertial navigation systems and solid state radios.

Job Functions Were Consolidated, not Eliminated 

I think it important to note that none of the functions that those earlier crew members accomplished were actually eliminated, but rather consolidated into the job of pilot. Airplanes still needed to be navigated, engines needed to be started, monitored and kept running through fuel management, and radios still needed to be tuned and monitored. 

Automation has allowed pilots to assume all those duties while still flying the airplane. And as you've no doubt read somewhere on the internet, pilots only actually "fly" their airliners for just a few minutes per flight during takeoff and landing. For the most part this is true. I personally like to hand fly the jet more than most, but that is because I enjoy it. There is certainly no need to do so. For many, it is gear up, flaps up, autopilot on.

The dirty truth is the autopilot can fly better for longer than any human can. Sure, some pilots can fly a better final than "George" (the autopilot), but George doesn't get tired or rusty. This is a good thing, because it is that autopilot which frees up the two pilots to deal with things like a low oil pressure light during a diversion in bad weather.

Why Have Pilots at All?

Technology has eliminated all those other jobs on the airplane, and we have autopilots that routinely handle almost all the flying already, so what's the problem? Just make a machine that can handle the other three minutes of flying and we're done here.

This gets down to the fundamental reason pilots are really on the airplane, and that is decision making. The reason there are two pilots aboard? Collaboration and validation of the decision making process. Plus having two people up front has the added advantage that they help keep each other awake. (Laugh, but it will need to be addressed in a single pilot airliner.)

We will only need  to write some software that can handle the decisions that pilots are expected to make. This gets down to the question of things that machines do well versus the things that humans do well. They each have their strengths and weaknesses.

Pattern Recognition and Heuristics 

Computers are really good at tedious detail work such as, say, doing a spell check or a word find and replace on a blog post. What they're not so good at is deciding if you've buried the lede, or if your prose is somewhat leaden. That takes judgement, which is more difficult to code.

Have you ever wondered why all the fruits and vegetables in the supermarket have those little stickers on them used by the scanner? Why can't the scanner just look at a tomato and recognize it? The reason is that when you program the computer to recognize something that is "red" and "round" it will confuse tomatoes with apples (or red bell peppers). While humans will rarely mistake an apple for a tomato, getting a machine to routinely recognize the difference is more difficult, (and expensive) hence the stickers.

In short, humans are much better than machines at pattern recognition and heuristics, which is a fancy word for an educated guess or hunch. Humans are better decision makers in ambiguous situations. And many situations on an airliner can be ambiguous.

Canned Decision Making or AI

What is software other than prepackaged expertise and decisions? Automation is threatening whole sectors of the economy such as accounting because expertise and best practices can be distilled into code and sold to people who couldn't otherwise afford to hire a tireless expert. Accounting software, though, is unlikely to be presented a scenario which hasn't been preprogrammed. If it does come across such a situation, it would likely come to a halt state to await human intervention.

The software in a pilotless airplane would need to be either pre programmed with every possible scenario likely to ever be encountered, or to employ some sort of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a machine to be able to process information which it hasn't specifically been programmed to handle, i.e. to learn. In short, it is canned judgement.

Advances in AI are being made all the time but it does have a way to go. Imagine a piece of software which would have the judgement to tell the difference between a need to do a gate return for a woman who'd left her purse in the gate area versus one whose husband had been seriously injured (or one of several million other scenarios). I can't imagine that either. 

So it seems apparent to me that we're going to need humans available to make decisions on or about airliners for the foreseeable future. The question arises as to how many humans are required, and if they should they actually be on the airplane.

Pilot/Dispatcher/Controller

Our current commercial airline transportation system consists of at least four people watching over your flight at any one time. Two or more pilots are up front, a dispatcher has planned your flight and keeps watch over things like destination weather and other operational concerns, while air traffic controllers keep your airplane away from all the other airplanes flying around.

All of these jobs are supposedly ripe for replacement through automation. Back in my military days my crew would come in the day before a scheduled flight and spend the entire day flight planning. Dispatchers today plan and oversee many dozens of flights per shift using sophisticated software tools. They become extremely busy, though, when many airplanes under their control have to divert in the case of bad weather in one location.

Similar automation and technology advancements are impacting the job of the air traffic controller as well. The FAA has proposed using advanced data tools to have a flight fully cleared and deconflicted from all other airborne traffic before it has even taken off. Controllers would only be available to intervene in the case of rapidly changing weather or other unpredictable contingencies such as aircraft emergencies.

Virtual Copilots

In the most likely interim single pilot scenario, one pilot aboard an airliner would be coupled with a "copilot" assistant on the ground connected through datalink. A decision would need to be made as to how many airborne planes would be assigned to each assistant. If the ratio is one to one, there would be little cost savings as assistants would likely make about as much as copilots currently do. Perhaps two to one or four to one. An optimal number will need to be found though this would open a new cost versus safety frontier that does not now exist.

These assistants would be only available for voice or text consultation given the current state of deployed technology. Robust telecommunications networks allowing for remote control of airliners along with control systems aboard airliners to allow such control, while technically feasible, currently do not exist and would require a sizeable investment in hardware and infrastructure to implement. This is certainly doable, but there is little evidence of any movement towards this future other than pure research.

The trend is unmistakable though. Fewer humans will, over time, be involved in watching over your flight, and this may work out just fine. The advantages of automation are manifest: lower costs and higher productivity being two of the greatest. A third metric, however, safety, may be the fly in the ointment.

Is It Safe?

2016 was a record year in US commercial aviation as there were no fatalities on any US commercial airline anywhere in the world. It is also the seventh straight year that this feat has been attained. In 2015 that worked out to 7.6 billion miles flown with a (non-fatal) accident rate of 0.155 per 100,000 flight hours. There are about 24,000 commercial flights per day in the US. Flying is extremely safe and this is not by accident.

The current state of safety in the airline industry has been achieved over the years through dogged research into human factors, technical standards, preventative maintenance, training, and accident investigations. Aviation policies and procedures for operators, controllers, and maintainers have years of development and history behind them. 

One of the best reasons to cheer the introduction of driverless cars is the promise of a reduction in the 35,000 annual US auto accident deaths. The promise of the pilotless airliner is mostly economic. Our commercial aviation system is already nearly as safe as can reasonably be accomplished short of parking airplanes.

The burden of proof from a safety point of view will be upon those wishing to introduce large changes into this system for marginal economic gains. Measured in defects per operations accomplished, matching the current safety record will be a challenge. Not impossible, but the bar is pretty high.

I personally find myself having to intervene multiple times a day to correct "errors" made by our current state of the art automation. My experience is not unique. Automation is not nearly as automatic as advertised. This record of course must improve before the system can be fully autonomous.

The current pilot shortage, one of the justifications for increasing automation, is a mostly self inflicted injury by the US aviation industry compounded by Congress. It will eventually work itself out through rising wages and ab initio training programs for prospective pilots. It should also be noted that the shortage is currently only a problem facing regional airlines. Major airlines are poaching all the pilots they need from the regionals and military for the time being. 

In Conclusion

To deflect the inevitable charge that I am merely a dinosaur expressing indignation at my own extinction, I'll say that I have every confidence that the goal of pilotless airliners will eventually be achieved given enough time and money. I also believe that it will not be nearly as cheap nor as easy as some acolytes of pilotless airplanes believe. If you'll notice, I haven't even touched on the acceptance of this idea by the flying public. I leave that for you, dear reader, to discuss in the comments. In any event, I'll be retired long before then.

What Makes a Go-Around So Dangerous?

A FlyDubai 737-800

Even though the investigation into the crash of FlyDubai 981 is still in its preliminary stages, one of the more plausible accident scenarios being discussed is that the aircraft attempted a go-around from an approach and subsequently stalled causing the high descent rate and impact on the runway. Video which captured the accident shows the aircraft in an extremely steep descent which is indicative of a stalled condition. And in fact the last transmission from the aircraft to the tower was that it was going around. So why are go-arounds so dangerous?

A go-around is simply a maneuver whose purpose is implied by its name. If at any time during an approach the pilot feels that for whatever reason that landing isn't the best idea, he or she aborts the landing and "goes around" for another try. This involves adding power and climbing away from the runway for another shot while retracting the landing gear and flaps or "cleaning up" the aircraft.

Sounds simple, right? Well for various reasons go-arounds seem to be one of the most stress inducing maneuvers for pilots. It is also one of the most critiqued items during checkrides as a result of being performed incorrectly. But to be perfectly truthful, a search of the NTSB database turned up only three fatal accidents attributed directly to go-arounds since 1985, at least in airline, or Part 121 flying. In general aviation, however, the number is much higher at 273 fatal accidents since 1982 attributed to go-arounds.

Those accident results suggest that pilot experience may play a factor in the successful completion of go-arounds as many general aviation pilots don't have the experience that airline pilots do. Still the go-around can be deceptively difficult and due to the low altitude nature of the maneuver leaves very little room for error if performed incorrectly.

And while the NTSB results do not capture low-speed events which did not result in a stall or accident, those types of incidents are now being identified by new data recording and analysis equipment recently installed on most airliners. These data suggest that low speed and approach-to-stall events are more prevalent than previously thought.

So What is it About Go-Arounds that Makes Them Difficult?

There are two aspects to a go-around that can make them difficult to fly and costly to screw up. The first is that the maneuver is performed close to ground. Any mistake made at low altitude has less time to be corrected before terra firma ends the flight in an abrupt fashion. The second aspect of the maneuver is that the entire vertical vector of the aircraft has to change. 

By this I mean that your 30 ton airplane which is descending at perhaps a vertical velocity of 800 feet per minute while on approach has to have its downward momentum stopped, reversed and flung back into the air at perhaps 1000 to 2000 feet per minute. It is this reversal of momentum which causes the most problems. The problem is one of "energy management".

Energy management is best illustrated by thinking about an old style roller coaster and is central to flying an aircraft. As a roller coaster tops a hill, its speed is slow but the potential energy is high. As it hits the trough, the potential energy is low but the speed, or kinetic energy, is high. The same principle applies to an aircraft as pilots can often trade airspeed for altitude or vice versa.

During an approach, however, both the speed and altitude are necessarily low. The aircraft is flying at only 1.3 times its stall speed and has both gear and flaps extended which add drag. It has a low energy state. The only way to get the airplane back up in the air from this position is to add a lot of power from the engines. But this addition of power must be accompanied by a coordinated and precise pitch adjustment.

Pitch control during a go-around is extremely important. The use of insufficient pitch, or keeping the nose too low, may cause the aircraft to merely accelerate but not climb. Use too much pitch, or raise the nose too high, and the aircraft will climb, but the speed may drop. Remember that at this point the aircraft is already very close to stall speed. Stall the aircraft, and it drops like a rock with little chance for recovery at low altitude.

One last characteristic of most airliners is that their pod-mounted engines are hung below the wing. What this means is that an addition of power causes the nose to tend to come up as the thrust vector is being applied from below the wing. This tendency must be anticipated and countered to prevent the pitch from getting too high.

Distractions and Fatigue Don't Help

So we've decided to go around, put the power in and are climbing away from the ground. What happens next? It gets extremely busy is what happens next. The tower will be barking instructions at you with headings and altitudes to fly or you may be scrambling to read your previously issued climbout instructions and approach plate. You will also have to clean up the aircraft without overspeeding anything. This means retracting the gear and then the flaps on their speed schedule. You'll also be getting a frequency change right about now to return from tower to approach control. Not blowing through your assigned altitude is also somewhere on your plate since you are now climbing at full power.

There's a hierarchy of flying priorities that many a flight instructor attempts to instill in their students: Aviate, Navigate and Communicate (and in that order). Forgetting to do these tasks in the proper order can result in a bad outcome. Or as an old aviation commandment instructs: 

Thou must maintaineth thy airspeed lest the ground reach up and smite thee.

A mention of fatigue is in order here. All of these things are challenging to do on any given day, but being fatigued, as has been alleged of the FlyDubai pilots, makes them especially tough. My personal experience with fatigue is that while you might feel alert during a tricky approach and go-around, channelizing attention on one particular item is very easy to do when fatigued. This means that instead of simultaneously managing many different tasks in the cockpit during a go-around, it is easy to become fixated on one particular item at the expense of others

The danger of course is that of fixating on say a course change while dropping your pitch and airspeed out of your scan. This one mistake, if not corrected quickly, can doom an airplane. Recovering from a stalled condition takes many thousands of feet of altitude if the stall is severe enough, and that is altitude you just don't have.

Go-arounds, if you happen to be on an airplane when one happens, are really no big deal and I don't mean to make any nervous flyers more so. Many times they are for mundane things like spacing too close to the previous airplane or being directed by the tower. I personally like flying them as they're a challenge and something a little different from the routine. Just know that when they do happen, the guys or gals up front are really busy.

So You Want to Be a Pilot? Career Advice for Beginning Pilots (Pt 3)

An aviation career is rewarding but not without risk.

So let's say that you've graduated from high school or college and want to pursue a career in aviation. You want to "slip the surly bonds of earth" and spend your days with your head in the clouds. Well hold on just a second there, pardner.

I don't want to crush your dreams, kid, but I'd be remiss to not be brutally honest about the career field you are hoping to enter. Let's explore for a few moments some short and long term trends in aviation that you need to consider before chasing this particular dream.

Short Term Outlook: Big Opportunities but High Barriers to Entry 

As I mentioned in an earlier article in this series, there's never been a better time than now to get into commercial aviation jobs-wise. There are huge numbers of pilots retiring from the largest major airlines who need to be replaced in the next five to ten years. These pilots are mostly being replaced by pilots who are currently flying for regional carriers and to a lesser extent the military.

A huge vacuum is forming at the regional carriers who for various reasons are having trouble replacing those pilots with new hires. This means job opportunities for pilots who have or are willing to get their ratings and hours. I recently attended an aviation job fair and the competition for new pilots is fierce. Regional airlines are boosting pay, offering signing bonuses and even offering to pay for crash pads for commuting pilots, all unheard of for years.

Now for the reality check. You have two routes into an airline cockpit: military or civilian. Both routes will get you where you want to go but they both have high costs, one in time and the other in money.

Military Flight Training: Long Service Commitments

In years gone by, the majority of airline pilots came from the military. That is no longer even remotely true. While I don't have the exact numbers, the majority of pilots being hired by major airlines now have only a civilian background. Reductions in the size of the military along with lengthened pilot training commitments are two of the biggest reasons.

The Air Force requires a ten year service commitment in exchange for pilot training while the Navy has an eight year commitment. The Coasties, Army and Marines have similar commitments. These commitments don't start until after successful completion of flight training which takes about a year. Leaving the service on the day your commitment expires might not be completely realistic as well as you'll probably incur other service commitments for things like aircraft commander upgrade or training like fighter weapons school.

The military spends a ton of money on its pilots and wants to get a return on that investment. You also have to hope that the airlines are hiring when you are ready to leave the service. This was the route I took, spending a total of 10 years on active duty (the commitment was six years when I joined). On the bright side, when you leave the military you will have the hours and experience to apply directly to a major airline.

If this is the route you wish to pursue and haven't yet graduated from high school, your choices for commissioning are through either an ROTC program at a college, or one of the service academies such as USAFA, Annapolis or West Point. ROTC scholarships are available and the service academies are free. Upon completion, you will have a college degree and be commissioned as an officer. But getting into these programs is highly competitive and even then you are not guaranteed a pilot training slot. You must compete for those as well.

If you already have a college degree, you can join the military and be commissioned through an officer training program such as the Air Force's OTS or the Navy's OCS. This program was memorialized in the movie An Officer and a Gentleman. From there you would go to pilot training. This was my route. I had a degree and joined the Air Force after college (but never dated Debra Winger).

If you get selected for pilot training you will undergo a very intensive but comprehensive training course in advanced technology aircraft. Your training will involve all aspects of contact and instrument flying for starters. Should you perform well enough to be selected for a tactical aircraft, you will also be trained in formation flying. Once you graduate from a pilot training course you will be awarded your wings and then proceed on to your mission aircraft which may involve up to another year of mission training and qualification.

The training is fast and intense and offers very little tolerance for regression. Every simulator session and ride in the airplane is graded. Pilots who experience difficulties during the program are given some remedial training, but once the extra training has been expended, a quick dismissal from the program can be expected for pilots who can't keep up with the syllabus. When I was an undergraduate pilot training instructor in the Air Force, three busted rides in the airplane was all it took to get a ticket home.

Civilian Flight Training: It's Your Nickel, Spend it Wisely

Taking the civilian route will likely get you into an airline cockpit in less time than the military, but it is going to cost you a ton of money to get the ratings and hours to qualify for a job. The FAA recently started requiring all pilots hoping to fly for a commercial carrier to have a rating known as an airline transport rating or ATP. Here's the problem. You'll need 1500 hours of time to qualify for this rating. That number is reduced to 1000 hours if you graduate from an accredited aviation school. 

What kind of money? A quick internet search came back with numbers like five to nine thousand dollars for just a private pilot's license which only qualifies you to rent a plane to buzz around. Getting the full panoply of ratings that will allow you to start on your career will set you back something on the order of 60 to 80 thousand dollars.

After spending that kind of money you will still have to flight instruct or do another entry level flying job such as banner tow to build the 1000 (or 1500) hours you will need for your ATP. Simply purchasing those hours is not realistic at $100-$120 per hour airplane rental costs.  

No matter how you slice it, it will be expensive. But if you're willing to take on the debt, there's probably a job waiting for you. And while the pay at regional airlines is famously low, it is going up as regionals are engaged in a bidding war for the dwindling number of available pilots.

Another difference in taking the civilian route is that you will end up being the architect of your own career more so than the military route. You have to decide which aviation school you will attend, whether to take out loans or work a day job while pursuing your career and which flying jobs to take. Deciding between flying jobs such as corporate, regionals or night freight are some of the decisions that await you on your path to the majors.

My advice is to seek out mentors who are working pilots and can advise you on the best path to take. I took the military path and as a result would probably not be able to offer meaningful specific advice to someone in the civilian pipeline. But seek out someone who took the path you are contemplating. There are many aviation internet forums available where pilots like to hang out and many are willing to offer advice.

And you will need advice. There are dozens of schools all promising a path to an airline seat and all willing to take your money. Caveat emptor is the rule when vetting flying training programs.

Long Term Outlook: Automation and the Pilotless Airplane

So things look rosy for the short term, but what about the long term career outlook? That is an excellent question. If you are say, 20 years old and hoping to begin your career in aviation, you are planning on a career lasting 45 years (more if they raise the retirement age past 65).

We've all heard about drones and Google's driverless cars, but what about airplanes? Will there ever be a day when people line up to get on an airplane that has no pilot? The answer is unequivocally yes. There will eventually be pilotless airliners. The only question is when.

Balderdash and poppycock you say? Consider this: What would have been the reaction if you'd asked a railway passenger back in, say, 1890 if there would ever be engineer-less trains. I'm guessing the reaction would have been similar and yet we routinely get on trains with no humans driving and think nothing of it.

But, you retort, those are small applications such as airport transports on closed systems. Subways, passenger and freight trains still have human drivers! And you are absolutely right, but how many humans are driving those trains? A fraction of the number it used to take. And that's the key.

Simply look at the trend of how many humans it has taken to fly an airliner over the years. In the immediate postwar era it took four: two pilots, a navigator and an engineer. Navigators were quickly eliminated by INS systems and the engineers were next to go being replaced by ECAM systems. Now we all love first officers (well, most of them), but airline managements, maybe not so much.

Current research at places like DARPA is aimed at perfecting robots to eliminate first officers. And just eliminating copilots will slash the need for pilots by 50% overnight. Again the question isn't so much of if but rather of when. Estimates vary, but if you are just now embarking on a career that you hope will last for four decades, you will likely finish your career as a system monitor in the front of an airplane (or perhaps a flight center data linked to an airplane) if you have a job at all.

That's not what I'd call great aspects for career advancement or seniority. Food for thought. Still not convinced? Take a look at this video.

In Conclusion

This post concludes my series on career advice for pilots. I'll be the first to admit that even though I've had a charmed career and love flying, I'm not sure I can recommend a flying career without some reservations, especially to a bright kid who has other options. 

If you're already flying for a living, it's a great time to be in the profession. If you are thinking about starting on a career in aviation, some deep soul searching is in order. This profession has a knack for crushing souls and dreams, but should you pull the trigger and go for it, the view from your office window will be second to none. Good luck!

And if you have any questions at all about your own situation, leave me a message in the comments. I'm here for you!

Parts 1 and 2 of the series are here and here.

So You Want to Fly an Airliner? Career Advice for Pilots (Pt 1)

Charting a path to a successful aviation career can be daunting.

I often get asked for career advice by aspiring and younger pilots and thought it might be helpful to condense some thoughts in a post on aviation career strategy. The Women in Aviation Conference was recently held in Nashville and I gave jumpseat rides to a number of younger pilots making their way out there for some face time with the recruiters who were there. This got me thinking about where a young pilot might find some career advice. There is quite a bit of change currently underway in the aviation career field, and plotting a path to a successful career can be daunting.

The Timing has Never Been Better to be a Pilot

So you want to become a major airline pilot? Well the timing has never been better in terms of demand for pilots. Due to the mandatory retirement age of 65, US airlines will need to replace thousands of retiring pilots in the next five to ten years. The numbers are staggering. Estimates run to a need for over 18,000 pilots to be hired just to replace retiring US pilots in the next five years. Those numbers don't account for airline growth nor do they factor in early retirements and should therefore be considered minimums.

And it is unlikely that many of these pilots will be hired from overseas as the pilot shortage is a worldwide phenomenon. Boeing estimates the worldwide need for pilots at over 500,000 in the next 20 years. The major airlines have or are about to embark on a hiring binge to replace the thousands of retiring Vietnam era pilots currently flying their airplanes. They are hiring primarily from the ranks of regional airlines who in turn are scrambling to keep their airlines staffed. The military, a traditional source of trained pilots, is doing a better job of holding onto their people so those numbers will be made up primarily through the hiring of pilots with civilian backgrounds.

One need only search the term "pilot shortage" to see stories of regional airlines having to park airplanes due to a lack of pilots. Republic Airlines even cited the pilot shortage in its recent bankruptcy filing. In the meantime, a bidding war has broken out between regional airlines for the dwindling number of pilots who meet the new 1500 hour minimum requirements. Those requirements are dropped to 1000 hours for pilots who have graduated from an accredited aviation school, but those graduates will likely be carrying the better part of a hundred grand of debt for their schooling, which is why there aren't many of them.

The following comments are directed at currently qualified regional, military or corporate pilots who are looking to make a jump to a major airline. I'll address the subjects of entering the career field for non-pilots and special considerations for military pilots leaving the service in parts two and three.

Seniority is Life

As an old tale from aviation lore goes, a wise old captain was once advising a young copilot on the things which contributed the most to a fulfilling career. The captain said that a career flying airplanes was, besides a love of aviation, about time off and money. And he made sure to emphasize and in that order. 

A career in aviation means being away from home. A lot. It is a tradeoff that all pilots make. And while we understand that we will be at the bottom of the seniority list when starting out, the hope is that given enough time, we will eventually earn those coveted weekends off and summer vacation blocks and an upgrade to the left seat or a widebody. And that means seniority.

There are two ways to become senior at any airline. The first is through growth. If the airline you get hired by doubles in size in say five years, you will upgrade to captain in five years give or take. The second way to seniority is through the retirement of those pilots who are senior to you. Given the current state of the four largest airlines which control about 80% of the US domestic market and are not likely to grow any faster than the overall economy, it is retirements which will likely fuel your ticket to watching football in your own living room and not in the hotel bar on a layover.

This means that during any extended hiring binge, like the one which is just getting under way, getting your foot in the door as early as possible is of supreme importance. Getting ahead of a hiring wave means you will spend most of your career in the left seat enjoying the pay and prestige that comes with that position. Get hired at the end of the wave and you will likely spend years throwing the gear for captains who are just a few years older than you.

My advice, then, is to get on with your preferred carrier at the earliest possible time. This means getting your required PIC hours as soon as possible through whatever means. There's a land rush going on out there and you don't want to miss out.

For you regional pilots toiling away with the hope of getting a job through a flow-through program, my advice is to ignore those and do whatever it takes to get your hours and to then get your resume out on the street. A flow-through program is just a promise and not worth the paper it is written on if things change, and things change all the time.

Which is the Best Airline to Fly For?

That's an easy one. The best airline is the one that hires you. Don't ever turn down a job offer from any airline offering you a job flying equipment that is larger than what you currently fly. Show up to training, act like that airline is the only one you've ever wanted to fly for, and then should an offer show up from where you really want to work, just walk out the door. Of course be polite and gracious for the opportunity, but never forget that this is your career and life we're talking about here. It's just business.

But all else being equal, and assuming that you get an offer from the airlines you're considering, there are a host of factors which will influence your decision. As I mentioned above, the existing demographics and pending retirements will be one of your biggest considerations. Next you'll want to consider where your prospective airline has pilot domiciles. Pick the one which has a domicile in a city where you want to live. Yes, commuting is possible, but a career of it will effectively mean extra years sleeping in hotels and crash pads which could be spent in your own bed.

Next you should consider the equipment that the airline flies. Widebody flying pays the most and generally has the most days off. It will take some time to get into a widebody, but if the airline doesn't own any, you'll never fly one. And if you ever get sick of flying international routes, bidding back to domestic equipment is always there if you so desire.

Furloughs. Yes, the "F" word. No one can predict the future and fuel shocks, mideast wars and recessions are always possible. And when they happen, you might find yourself back on the street. Southwest is the only one of the big four US airlines which has never furloughed any pilots, but they are resembling a legacy carrier more each day, so past performance may not guarantee future results. In any event, getting on early with an airline that has the most retirements will move you up the list and away from the furlough zone the quickest.

In Conclusion

I've just barely scratched the surface here but have touched on some of what I feel are the most important considerations for pilots who are looking for a job at the majors. Since the topic is so large, I'll be doing several additional installments where I give my advice to military pilots who are leaving the service, and also to non-pilots who may be hoping to explore a career in aviation. Stay tuned!

Lastly, please feel free to ask any questions you might have about your own job search in the comments. Is there something you'd like to ask about your own career progression? Just let me know. I'm here for you!

Update: Part 2:  Career advice for pilots leaving the military is here.

Update: Part 3  Career advice for those looking  to start a career in aviation is here.

Do Pilots Have to Take Routine Tests?

The short answer is yes, of course they do. Anyone venturing into the field of aviation is also volunteering for a career of regular and comprehensive testing. These evaluations take the form of oral tests, written tests, simulator check rides, and line checks in the aircraft from both company designated "check airmen" and FAA inspectors. It's a never ending cavalcade of evaluations from before an aspiring pilot ever steps foot into an airplane all the way to a few months before retirement.

And oddly enough, aviation is one of the few professions that requires such comprehensive testing. Doctors and lawyers, for instance, are mostly good to go once they finish school, though some doctors are now having to test to maintain certification every five or ten years. As a general rule, most professional pilots undergo a formal exam or "checkride" every year, but are always subject to no-notice ride-alongs by evaluators.

Testing from the Start

Each and every certification that a pilot must achieve along the way from neophyte to seasoned captain is accompanied by both written and flying examinations. I took the military route which involved a year of intensive flight instruction to get my wings followed by months of more training in the specific aircraft I was assigned to fly. During USAF undergraduate pilot training (UPT) there were checks for the first solo ride, contact or basic acro flying, instrument flying and finally formation flying in the T-37 primary trainer. It was all then done again in the T-38 supersonic advanced trainer aircraft. 

Besides the designated check rides, each daily ride was graded by the instructor. No pilot was ever more than three failed rides from being booted out of the program. That tended to help student pilots keep focus. Once having graduated, check rides were given for each new certification such as air refueling, night bombing, or in the case of the Navy, carrier qualification. The military has dozens of qualifications depending on the aircraft and mission.

Back to Square One

Back in the civilian world after separating from the service, it mostly all had to be done over again. All of those military ratings count for naught in the civilian world. The FAA does throw a bone to ex-military pilots by granting them a commercial instrument rating for their military training. It's not nothing, but it's not enough to get hired by an airline. For that, a certification known as an Airline Transport Pilot, or ATP rating, is needed. This involved, you guessed it, another checkride with an FAA examiner in an airplane you had to rent.

My future employer at the time also required what is known as a "type" rating, which is a checkout to fly a particular model airplane, in this case a 737. The FAA at that time did not allow checkrides to be flown in the simulator so I had to rent an actual 737 to fly my checkride. It was only $50....a minute! To top it off, the airport we took off from, Seatac, went below minimums while we were doing touch and gos elsewhere so we had to hold for nearly an hour before getting back in. It was spendy, but I got my type rating.

Dial-a-Disaster

Most all airline training today is done in high fidelity three axis flight simulators. These machines, which cost millions of dollars, can faithfully reproduce nearly all flight regimes with very realistic computer generated visuals. The computer can generate any kind of weather that might be encountered to include thunderstorms with lightning and can even insert wayward air traffic that must be avoided.

The simulators are so good that the first time most airline pilots fly a new model plane is on a revenue flight with passengers. The FAA certifies each simulator to make sure they reproduce the airplane's characteristics accurately. The least favorite part about flying these machines though, is the emergency procedure.

In day to day flying, almost nothing ever goes wrong. In fact statistically, an airline pilot today is very unlikely to ever experience an engine failure or other major system failure. But that doesn't mean that these things don't happen, and the simulator is how pilots are kept prepared for these very unlikely events.

Engine failures, fires, hydraulic leaks, landing gear failures, loss of pressurization and flight control malfunctions are just some of the myriad emergencies which can be summoned by the simulator operator. In the military we called it "dial a disaster", and two hours of emergency procedures in "the box" with your employment on the line can really scramble your eggs. Crashing the sim, otherwise known as the red screen of death means that the ride is over figuratively and literally.

What if You Bust?

Failing or "busting" a checkride is a rare event, but it does occasionally happen. Sometimes people are just having a bad day, and other times they come to training unprepared. Checkrides always include an oral exam on policies, procedures and systems, and a knowledge bust can mean the ride is over before it starts. Crashing the sim is rarely the cause of a failure. Poor decision making such as finding yourself in bad weather with low fuel is a more likely cause of an unsatisfactory outcome. Sometimes a diversion is called for.

As airplanes do a much better job of flying themselves due to automation, the emphasis has shifted away from strictly mechanical proficiency towards decision making and teamwork. Crews are expected to work together to solve problems. A recently adopted paradigm for most airline training does not allow for individual failure, but rather the crew will either pass or fail together, just as in the airplane.

If a crew fails a ride, they will be given some remedial training and then take the ride over again. There may or may not be some loss of income during this process as they won't be allowed to fly until passing the retake. In very rare cases, a pilot ends up having more difficulty or has a weakness uncovered. This almost never happens, but the process can lead to being let go for pilots who can't pull themselves together in the sim.

Rest Assured

Airline passengers who have the misfortune of finding themselves on board an airliner with a mechanical difficulty should rest easy in the knowledge that the pilots flying their plane have most likely seen and successfully dealt with the problem many times before it actually happened.